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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal income tax laws have always included gain from
"dealings in property" as an item of gross income,' and probably only
the payment of wages rivals the sale of property in fundamental impor-
tance to taxpayers generally. Nevertheless, the courts and the Internal
Revenue Service have yet to develop a consistent and rational ap-
proach to taxing the many sales transactions in which the seller takes
some evidence of the purchaser's indebtedness in full or partial ex-
change for the underlying property. Four sections of the Internal Rev-
enue Code are potentially applicable to these transactions: section
1001, dealing with gain from the disposition of property; sections 446
and 451, specifying permissible general accounting methods; and sec-
tion 453, allowing the installment method of reporting gain from cer-
tain types of property transactions. These sections yield inconsistent
1. The first income tax statute adopted after the passage of the sixteenth amendment defined
income to include "gains, profits, and income derived from... sales, or dealings in property,
whether real or personal .... Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § IIB, 38 Stat. 114. Current law
provides that gross income includes "[glains derived from dealings in property." § 61(a)(3).
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results, and despite fifty years of dealing with the statutes, 2 administra-
tive and judicial interpretation of these interrelated provisions remains
largely ad hoc. Indeed, few courts have even perceived the tension be-
tween the conflicting but potentially applicable statutes, and certainly
no court has developed a coherent solution. The decisions instead are
arrayed in separate lines of authority, using a wide variety of reasoning
that has little or no basis in either policy or statutory language. Cases
in each line usually show no awareness that alternative approaches ex-
ist. The inevitable result can be expressed in a familiar litany-incon-
sistent tax treatment of particular taxpayers and great difficulty in tax
planning.
This Article argues that the accounting provisions under sections
446 and 451, the installment sale provisions under section 453, and the
disposition-of-property provisions under section 1001 are all amenable
to one consistent interpretation. The approach is simple, requiring only
a distinction between sales of property in the regular course of business
and isolated or casual sales. Sales in the regular course of business
should be covered by the taxpayer's method of accounting, without ref-
erence to section 1001. Section 1001 should apply to isolated sales, re-
gardless of the taxpayer's method of accounting. These rules should be
modified only when the installment sale provisions of section 453 are
both available and elected.3
This interpretation follows the apparent intent of Congress and
gives meaningful but nonoverlapping operative scope to each provi-
sion. It ends the inequity that has developed between cash-method and
accrual-method taxpayers who engage in isolated-sale transactions by
avoiding the logical inconsistency of applying their accounting meth-
ods to transactions unrelated to the regular business or employment for
which such methods were adopted. Finally, the suggested interpreta-
tion provides a unifying theory that eliminates the uncertainty now fac-
ing taxpayers about to enter into sale-of-property transactions.
Part II of the Article sets the stage by considering a brief introduc-
tory example. Part III reviews the statutory development and argues
that the suggested interpretation was probably the one Congress in-
tended when it adopted the predecessors of the current statutory provi-
2. These provisions have remained stable since the mid-1920s. Compare Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 27, §§ 202-203, 44 Stat. 10 (exchange of property), id §§ 200(d), 212(b) (methods of
accounting), id § 212(d) (installment method of reporting) with current § 1001 (determination of
gain or loss), §§ 7701(a)(25), 446, 451 (general rules for methods of accounting), § 453 (installment
method). Amendments to section 453 have been proposed, however. See text accompanying
notes 259-82 infra.
3. Admittedly this interpretation sounds almost too obvious: If it is workable, one must ask
why it was not adopted long ago. Nevertheless, no court has ever taken this approach, and the rest
of this Axticle demonstrates that it indeed works considerably better than the various judicially
approved alternatives.
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sions. Part IV points out that some of the current judicial approaches
are plainly inconsistent with congressional intent and identifies the
logic and policy problems that all of them create. Part V analyzes in
detail the way in which the suggested infierpretation will work in prac-
tice, the problems that it raises, and some possible resolutions. Part VI
then discusses the impact of this interpretation of the sale-of-property
provisions on several related matters: the classic distinction between
open and closed transactions; the treatment of amounts received by the
seller subsequent to the sale that exceed the seller's basis in the pur-
chaser obligation (the "discount" or "collection gain"); limitations on
the installment method of reporting; and tax problems upon a reacqui-
sition of the property sold.
II. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE-THREE TAXPAYERS A, B, AND C
The statutory language is surprisingly simple. On one hand, sec-
tion 1001(a) provides that gain or loss on a sale of property is measured
by the difference between the amount realized and the taxpayer's basis
in the property, and section 1001(b) defines the amount realized to in-
clude not only cash but also the fair market value of any property re-
ceived.4 On the other hand, section 446 authorizes the taxpayer to
choose generally between the cash and accrual methods of accounting
for his income,5 while section 451 requires that items be included in
4. Section 1001 reads in relevant part as follows:
(a) Computation of Gain or Loss-The gain from the sale or other disposition of
property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis
provided in section 1011 for determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the
adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the amount realized.
(b) Amount Realized-The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of
property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the prop-
erty (other than money) received....
(c) Recognition of Gain or Loss-Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the
entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on the sale or exchange
of property shall be recognized.
(d) Installment Sales-Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent (in the
case of property sold under contract providing for payment in installments) the taxation
of that portion of any installment payment representing gain or profit in the year in
which such payment is received.
5. Section 446 reads in relevant part as follows:
(a) General Rule-Taxable income shall be computed under the method of ac-
counting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his
books.
(b) Exceptions-If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the tax-
payer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable
income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly
reflect income.
(c) Permissible Methods-Subject to the provisions of subsections (a) and (b), a tax-
payer may compute taxable income under any of the following methods of accounting-
(1) the cash receipts and disbursements method-
(2) an accrual method;
(3) any other method permitted by this chapter, or
(4) any combination of the foregoing methods permitted under regulations de-
scribed by the Secretary.
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gross income in the year they are received unless properly accounted
for as of a different period under the taxpayer's method of accounting. 6
The problem is that when evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser
are received by the seller in full or partial consideration of the sale,
section 1001 yields results different from those obtained under either of
the two standard methods of accounting.
The list of possibilities is best brought into focus by an example.
Consider three taxpayers, A, B, and C, each of whom buys a 500-acre
parcel of land for $100,000 in cash in 1973. Taxpayers A and B hold
their parcels for investment. Taxpayer C subdivides his property into
1000 one-half-acre lots and begins selling the lots in 1974 to individual
purchasers for $300 per lot. The sales are made under contracts provid-
ing for a 5% downpayment, with the balance to be amortized over five
years in sixty equal monthly installments, including interest at 7% per
annum on the unpaid balance. The contracts require C to deliver a
deed covering the lots only when the balance is paid in full. By the end
of 1977, C has sold all of his lots to installment purchasers.
In 1977 taxpayers A and B also dispose of their parcels. A sells to
an individual purchaser for $300,000 under a contract identical to that
used by C-that is, 5% down ($15,000) with the balance, including 7%
interest, to be amortized over sixty months. B also sells his parcel for
$300,000, but the terms of sale are slightly more complicated. B's pur-
chaser gives B $15,000 in cash and assigns to B the contractual promise
of a third party to pay $285,000 over the next sixty months, uniformly
amortized together with interest at 7% per annum. By the end of 1977,
then, A, B, and C have each received downpayments totaling $15,000
from their respective sales plus payments of principal and interest in
total amounts that vary with the dates of the sales. C, in fact, has been
receiving these payments since his first sale in 1974. Assuming that
none of the taxpayers elects to report gain under the installment
method, the question is how each should be taxed under the Code. The
discussion below outlines the variety of judicial approaches to taxing
these transactions.7
(d) Taxpayer Engaged in More than One Business-A taxpayer engaged in more
than one trade or business may, in computing taxable income, use a different method of
accounting for each trade or business.
6. Section 451(a) reads as follows:
(a) General Rule-The amount of any item of gross income shall be included in the
gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless, under the
method of accounting used in computing taxable income, such amount is to be properly
accounted for as of a different period.
7. The cases are discussed in text accompanying notes 51-149 infra.
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A. Taxation of A (isolated-salepurchaser obligation)-Accounting
Method Governing.
Taxpayer A sold his property to a single purchaser under a con-
tract calling for deferred payment. The initial queston is whether his
method of accounting or section 1001 governs taxation of the transac-
tion. First, assume that the court holds A's accounting method, either
accrual or cash, to govern.
1. A on Accrual Method. If A is on the accrual method and for
simplicity we neglect interest payments, he must report the full
$285,000 face amount of the contract as income for 1977, even though
he only received a $15,000 cash downpayment plus whatever monthly
payments were made in that year. His gain for 1977 would be the
amount deemed received on the date of sale ($15,000 + $285,000 =
$300,000) less his basis of $100,000, or $200,000. The monthly pay-
ments actually received, whether in 1977 or later, have no tax effect
except for interest.
2. A on Cash Method. If A is on the cash method, a subquestion
arises whether the contract with the purchaser is a "cash equivalent."
(a) Contract is a cash equivalent. A's income is the amount of cash
he receives on the date of sale plus the amount of cash to which the
purchaser contract is equivalent on that date, less A's $100,000 basis.
Thus, if the contract is equivalent to $235,000 in cash, A has a 1977
gain of $15,000 plus $235,000 minus $100,000, or $150,000. Receipt of
monthly payments may or may not have a tax effect in 1977,8 but if all
payments are made, A will sooner or later have to report an additional
$50,000 gain from the sale, as well as his interest income.
(b) Contract is not a cash equivalent. A first offsets his basis before
reporting any gain. Because his basis is $100,000, A has no gain from
the sale to report in 1977, although he does have some interest income.
The theory is that in 1977 A received both cash and the contract with
the purchaser, but pursuant to the cash method of accounting, A only
counts those contract payments that he actually received in 1977. In
other words, section 451 authorizes A to treat receipt of the contract
itself as of the later tax years in which the money payments are made.
The 1977 payments, combined with the downpayment, are not suffi-
cient to offset his basis. Under this approach, once A recovers his
$100,000 basis, the principal portion of each subsequent payment con-
8. See note 10 infra.
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stitutes gain from the sale of property when received.
B. Taxation of A-Section 1001 Governing
If, on the other hand, section 1001 is deemed to apply to.A's sale, a
different series of subquestions arises. Recall that section 1001 defines
the amount realized as money plus the fair market value of property
received. A has still received cash plus a contract in 1977; the threshold
question is then whether the contract is "property" under section 1001.
1. Contract Treated as Other Than Property. (a) Amount realized
calculated independently of accounting method. If the contract is not
property, one possibility is to treat the amount realized in 1977 as only
the amount of cash A receives-the $15,000 downpayment plus the
principal portion of the monthly payments made in that year-without
distinguishing between cash-method and accrual-method taxpayers. In
this case, because the amount realized by the end of the year is lower
than A's basis, he has no gain. in 1977. On the other hand, payments
remain to be made on the contract, and therefore additional amounts
remain to be realized. Only an intrepid taxpayer would argue that A
has a loss in 1977, so the usual approach is to use the cash payments of
principal received in 1977 to offset basis. Amounts received after A's
basis has been reduced to zero will then be considered amounts real-
ized from the sale in the years they are received. At least for this trans-
action, applying section 1001 in this way yields the same result as
treating A as a cash-method taxpayer.
(b) Amount realized determined by accounting method. Again as-
suming that the purchaser obligation is not treated as property, a sec-
ond possible application of section 1001 focuses on the taxpayer's
accounting method: If A is on the accrual method, the deferred-pay-
ment contract is treated as money equal to the face amount of the obli-
gation. If A is on the cash method, however, the contract is treated as
something other than property, but not as money either. The amount
realized in 1977 is thus $300,000 if A is on the accrual method but is
only $15,000 plus the principal portion of payments made during the
year if A is on the cash method. The result for either type of taxpayer
under this approach is exactly the same as if his method of accounting
were applied to the transaction in the first instance.
2. Contract Treated as Property. If section 1001 applies and the
purchaser contract is considered property within the meaning of the
statute, the value of the contract is included in the amount realized
[Vol. 1980:417
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from the sale in 1977 because 4 received the property in that year. A
has gain or loss in 1977 to the extent of the difference between his
$100,000 basis in the property and the sum of the amount he received
on the date of sale ($15,000 plus the fair market value of the contract
on 4at date).9 The tax consequences of the sale then hinge on the as-
certainability of that fair market value.
(a) Fair market value not ascertainable. If the contract has a value
but the value is for some reason not ascertainable, the transaction must
be held open because the "amount realized" needed to calculate gain or
loss cannot be determined. Again, the result is exactly the same as if A4
is treated as a cash-method taxpayer for this transaction. Logically,
one should note that this result should obtain even if A is on the ac-
crual method, because by hypothesis section 1001, rather than the ac-
counting provisions, applies.
(b) Fair market value ascertainable. The second possibility is to
treat the contract as property under section 1001 and to find that it has
an ascertainable value on the date of receipt. If, for example, the ascer-
tained value of the contract is $250,000, the amount realized in 1977 on
the date of sale is the $15,000 cash downpayment plus the $250,000
value of the contract, a total of $265,000. Subtracting A's $100,000 ba-
sis, he has a gain of $165,000 to report as of the date of sale. Receipt of
subsequent payments of principal under the contract may or may not
have a tax effect in 1977.10 Sooner or later, however, A will have an
9. The open/closed transaction distinction under section 1001 has its roots in the require-
ment of an annual accounting for income. Theoretically it would not be necessary to decide the
issue of fair market value until the end of the taxpayer's fiscal year. Nevertheless, the contract is
usually physically received on the date of sale, and contractual rights begin on that date. As a
result, this is the most logical time for its evaluation. Moreover, this choice is more consistent with
the tradition of treating later repossessions of property as separate transactions. See text accompa-
nying note 341 infra. Finally, the limited authority that exists seems to treat the date of sale as the
relevant date. See, e.g., Estate of Wiggins v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 701, 711 (1979). Because a
different resolution of this issue would not change any of the analysis, this Article assumes that the
date of sale is the date of closure of a closed transaction under section 1001.
10. Amortizing a $285,000 principal over 60 months at 7% per annum gives equal monthly
payments of $5,643.34. The first payment consists of roughly $1,662 in interest. Thus, if payments
are made under the contract, 4 will receive approximately $5,600 per month in principal and
interest payments, assuming uniform amortization. The relative proportions of principal and in-
terest in each payment will, of course, vary over the life of the payments, so let us assume for
simplicity that, at least for 1977, the payments average $4,000 per month in principal and $1,600
per month in interest. If.4 receives six payments in 1977, he will then receive $9,600 of interest
income in that year and an additional $24,000 of principal on the contract. A's main problem in
1977, after the valuation is concluded, is how to account for this $24,000.
The issues are subsidiary to the question of what Code provisions apply to the sale itself and
may be briefly summarized. Because the $285,000 face amount contract has been valued at
$250,000 and included in gross income, the first issue is whether the taxpayer may treat all of each
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additional $35,000 gain to report from the sale, as well as his interest
income, assuming all payments under the contract are made.
C. Taxation of B (isolated-sale third-party obligation).
There is no obvious reason that the various methods courts have
used for taxing A's transaction could not also be applied to B, the tax-
payer who took assignment of a third-party contractual obligation.
Provided the quality of B's obligor is the same as that of A's, the two
taxpayers are in essentially the same financial position. Nevertheless,
no court has ever applied the taxpayer's method of accounting upon
receipt of a third-party obligation. Furthermore, no court has ever held
that such a third-party obligation is not property under section 1001.
Instead, the question has been limited to whether the contract has an
ascertainable fair market value. If it does not, the transaction remains
open, as it would for A. If the contract has an ascertainable value, that
value plus the $15,000 cash downpayment, less basis, constitutes B's
gain from the sale in 1977.
D. Taxation of C (regular-business purchaser obligation).
Each of C's sales between the years 1974 and 1977 may be treated
in the same ways as A's sale. The only difference between the two tax-
payers is that C has many purchasers over several tax years and A has
only one. No provision of the Code, however, expressly recognizes this
distinction. If C's accounting method governs, annual income for each
of the years in question is determined simply by that method. That is,
if C is on the accrual method, he must include in income the full face
amount of each contract in the year of sale, with actual receipts under
his contracts having no tax effect. If C is on the cash method, he must
report payments as received, assuming the contracts are not cash
equivalents.
On the other hand, the application of section 1001 may cause a
tremendous administrative problem. If the contracts of sale that C en-
tered into are property under section 1001, C (or the Service) must de-
termine for each of the 1,000 contracts whether a fair market value is
$4,000 principal payment as return of capital until the full $250,000 basis in the obligation has
been received and then treat the entire principal payments as income, or whether he must treat
only 250/285 (roughly 88%) of each payment as return of capital and the remainder as income for
the life of the contract. This issue arises because, if the contract is paid in full, A will receive a
total of $285,000 in principal, but he will have reported only $250,000 as of the date of sale. The
second issue is whether the payments that exceed $250,000, regardless of how the timing issue is
decided, constitute ordinary income or capital gain if the property sold was a capital asset in A's
hands. These issues are discussed in Part V of this Article. See notes 150-92 infra and accompa-
nying text.
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ascertainable. Furthermore, for each contract that has an ascertainable
value, that value must be determined as of the date of each sale. Be-
cause the value of each contract will depend in part on the identity of
the purchaser, a more onerous burden is difficult to imagine.
E. Summary.
Essentially all of the possibilities outlined above for taxing A's and
B's gains have been followed, with or without any discernible ration-
ale, by courts at one time or another. C's case has not been litigated
nearly as often, but even with so few cases the courts have failed to
develop a unifying theory. Certainly no single rationale has been ar-
ticulated that treats A, B, and C in a consistent way. Every potential
solution raises new questions. For example, with an eye on avoiding
the valuation problem presented by applying section 1001 to C, we
might opt to rely solely on the methods of accounting in all disposition-
of-property cases. It then becomes difficult to explain, however, the
presence of section 1001 in the Code. We might therefore say that sec-
tion 1001 always applies but in C's case the value of the contracts is not
ascertainable."I This approach solves that particular problem and gives
C a nice windfall, but the result is difficult to justify when the quality
and enforceability of C's contracts are the same as A's and B's. If the
value of the contracts is ascertainable, however, we face the highly un-
palatable valuation problem. Finally, if one is to distinguish between
A and B, on the one hand, and C on the other, presumably by applying
section 1001 to A and B but the accounting provisions to C, one needs
a rationale for the distinction.
Note that the analytical breakdown of the possibilities for taxing
A, B, and C in this example depends in each case on whether the ac-
counting provisions or section 1001 governs the measurement of in-
come from the transaction in question. The concurrent development of
so many different approaches is clearly the result of a judicial failure to
recognize, let alone resolve, this choice. Had an adequate answer ever
developed, many of these approaches would long since have died out as
inconsistent. The next part of this Article attempts to discern the an-
swer Congress intended in adopting these Code provisions.
III. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT
A. Development of the Statutory Scheme.
A literal reading of section 1001 requires that any property re-
11. This was the approach of the Tax Court in Estate of Wiggins v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
701 (1979). See text accompanying notes 85-95 infra.
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ceived on an exchange be included in income to the extent its fair mar-
ket value plus any cash received exceeds the basis of the property
exchanged. 12 The section makes no direct reference to the taxpayer's
method of accounting.' 3 A basic question, therefore, is whether or to
what extent the taxpayer's method of accounting impliedly modifies
section 1001. The early development of the relevant statutory provi-
sions and the accompanying congressional committee reports strongly
suggest the original congressional intent.14
1. RevenueAct of 1918. The Revenue Act of 191815 included the
12. Similarly, any loss would be measured by the difference between the basis of the property
exchanged and the fair market value of the property received. The receipt of cash in addition to
property usually has no effect on the analysis other than to change the magnitude of the numbers.
Consequently, it saves words to refer to gain or loss simply as the difference between basis and the
fair market value of the property received.
13. Section 1001(c) now reads: "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire
amount of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on the sale or exchange of property shall
be recognized." One might at first blush read the "except as otherwise provided" clause to incor-
porate the provisions covering the allowable methods of accounting. However, this subsection is
directly traceable to section 203(a) of the Revenue Act of 1924, in which the same clause read
"except as hereinafter provided in this section." Ch. 234, § 203(a), 43 Stat. 253 (emphasis added).
The next subsection of section 203 then provided for nonrecognition of gain in like-kind ex-
changes of business or investment property, reorganizations, transfers to controlled corporations,
and certain involuntary conversions. A similar structure was retained through the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939. Ch. 1, § 112, 53 Stat. 4. In 1954 the nonrecognition provisions were dispersed
through several Code sections, so that it became necessary to change the word "section" to "subti-
tle." There is no indication, however, that anything other than this technical change was intended.
See Levin & Javaras, Recept of Notes and Other Rights to Future Payments by a Cash-Basis Tax-
payer, 54 A.B.A.J. 405, 406 n.14 (1968).
14. The first income tax statute adopted after the passage of the sixteenth amendment con-
tained no antecedent to current section 1001, its drafters being content to include in income gains
from "sales, or dealings in property." Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § IIB, 38 Stat. 114. The statute
also made no direct reference to accounting methods, although it seems clear that only the cash
method was envisioned. This inference derives from the language concerning the permitted de-
ductions: expenses "actually paid," interest and taxes "paid within the year," and losses "actually
sustained." Id In fact, with respect to the deduction for taxes, the word "accrued" in the Ways
and Means Committee bill was stricken by the Senate Finance Committee and the word "paid"
was substituted. See J. SEIDMAN 994.
The Revenue Act of 1916 added provisions to insure that gain or loss would be measured
from a fixed basis on any sale or other disposition of property, thereby eliminating any doubt that
Congress intended to tax all of the appreciation in a single year. Ch. 463, §§ 2(c), 5(a), 39 Stat.
756. An amendment adopted on the Senate floor would have taxed gain on the sale of real prop-
erty only if the property were sold within two years of acquisition. The proponent of this amend-
ment intended it to imply that the only gain taxable on the sale of personal property would be that
which accrued in the year of sale. 53 CONG. REc. 13,407-08 (1916), reprinted in J. SEIDMAN 958-
59. The Conference Committee eliminated this amendment and fixed March 1, 1913, as the basis-
determining date for property acquired before that time. Id 957-58.
The 1916 Act also expressly allowed for the use of an accrual method of determining income,
although approval of the Secretary of the Treasury was required for any method other than cash
receipts and disbursements. Ch. 463, § 8(g), 39 Stat. 756.
15. Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
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first antecedent of present section 1001. Section 202(a) of that Act uti-
lized a cost basis for determining gain or loss on "sales or other disposi-
tions,"16 and section 202(b) covered exchanges: "When property is
exchanged for other property, the property received in exchange shall
for the purpose of determining gain or loss be treated as the equivalent
of cash to the amount of its fair market value, if any. . . -.7 Thus,
section 202 expressly distinguished between the "sale or other disposi-
tion" transactions covered by 202(a) and the exchange transactions in-
cluded in 202(b). In view of the contrast, a possible interpretation of
section 202 could have been that the amount of gain or loss on a sale or
other disposition, including an exchange, be determined by the basis
provisions of subsection (a). The timing of gain recognition would be
determined by the usual accounting methods, however, except in the
case of an exchange, for which section 202(b) required taxation in the
year of the exchange. 18 One might then argue that the section 202(b)
exchange provision covered a transfer of property in which the seller
took obligations of the purchaser, so that the section would have taxed
such obligations according to their market value in the year of the ex-
change.
This last step in the interpretation of section 202(b), however, is
difficult to justify. It does not appear that Congress had sales for de-
ferred-payment obligations in mind when it adopted the exchange pro-
visions of section 202(b). Rather, the section appears to have been
aimed at what might be termed "true exchanges," that is, transactions
not otherwise clearly taxable as a sale, because it also excepted from
recognition certain exchanges upon corporate reorganizations amount-
16. Id § 202(a).
17. Id § 202(b) (emphasis added). The Act also made clear that the taxpayer had an abso-
lute right to use an accrual method of tax accounting, provided only that he kept his books the
same way and that the method clearly reflected income. Id § 212(b); see Appeal of Reubel, 1
B.T.A. 676, 678 (1925).
18. The property received was statutorily deemed a cash equivalent, and the receipt of cash
was taxed in the year received under any method. The interpretation in the text below (namely,
that section 202(b) did not apply to deferred-payment sales) may receive reinforcement from the
concurrent adoption in the 1918 Revenue Act of the predecessor to current section 451, which
provides that any item of gross income should be included in the year received unless properly
accounted for as of a different period under the taxpayer's method of accounting. Ch. 18,
§ 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057. Thus, under the 1918 statute there was room to argue that section 202(b)
should cover the case of taxpayer B in the example in Part H. See text accompanying notes 4-11
supra. By taking a third-party obligation as consideration for the transfer of property, B has
made a section 202(b) exchange. On the other hand, accounting methods arguably should control
the results under the 1918 statute forA and C, whose transactions were more like sales. Neverthe-
less, in view of the later development of the predecessors of section 1001 under the Revenue Acts
of 1921 and 1924, which indicates that section 1001 governs both the amount of the gain and its
timing, see notes 21-39 & 47-48 infra and accompanying text, the argument that section 451 modi-
fies section 1001 as to timing now appears weak.
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ing to "purely paper transactions."19 Thus, a sale for deferred-payment
obligations of a purchaser might not have been an exchange within the
meaning of section 202(b). These sales would therefore have been sub-
ject to recognition in accordance with the taxpayer's method of ac-
counting.20
2. Revenue Act of1921. In any event, section 202 underwent im-
portant and illuminating changes in the next two major revisions of the
federal income tax laws. In the Revenue Act of 1921,21 section 202(b)
was totally revised to read: "For the purposes of this title, on an ex-
change of property, real, personal or mixed, for any other such prop-
erty, no gain or loss shall be recognized unless the property received in
exchange has a readily realizable market value .... *"22 The new sub-
section then went on to provide that even when the property received in
exchange had a readily realizable market value, no gain or loss would
be recognized on like-kind exchanges, certain defined corporate reorga-
nizations, and transfers to controlled corporations.
The 1921 statute maintained the distinction between "sale or other
disposition" in the basis-defining provisions and "exchange" in the rec-
ognition provisions. Indeed, the new reference to exchanges for other
"such property" might be read as an attempt to emphasize the distinc-
tion between clearly taxable sales, as to which the only question was
19. S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 5-6 (1918), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 117, 120;
cf. H.RL REP. No. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 44-45 (1919) (using similar language in connection
with a related proposal), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 130, 132. Nothing in the legislative history
indicates that sale for a deferred-payment obligation was considered in the adoption of the recog-
nition-on-exchange provisions of section 202(b). See J. SEIDMAN 789-801.
20. In the case of a transaction characterized as a sale, there is no question that a taxable
event has occurred, and the only issue is timing. On the other hand, in the case of a true exchange
not otherwise taxable as a sale, the transaction may go entirely untaxed unless tax is assessed in
the year of the exchange.
Of course, the distinction between a sale and an exchange can be pushed so far that it gives
undesirable results. For example, consider the treatment of a shareholder who exchanges his
stock for some form of debt obligation of the purchasing corporation in a reorganization. If the
reorganization fails to qualify for the nonrecognition exception of section 202(b), should he be
taxed immediately to the extent of the full fair market value of the debt obligation received on the
"exchange," when a cash-method taxpayer who simply "sells" corporate stock for the same debt
obligation would have been taxed only as payments were made? Whatever the answer, the exist-
ence of problems with the distinction does not mean that the 1918 Congress did not attempt to
make it.
21. Ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
22. Id § 202(c) (emphasis added). In addition to revising the language of subsection (b) and
changing its position to subsection (c), the 1921 Act also expanded subsection 202(a) to bring the
basis provisions regarding property acquired prior to March 1, 1913, more explicitly in line with
Supreme Court decisions. See S. RP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921), reprintedin 1939-1
C.B. (pt. 2) 181, 187-88; H.R. REp. No. 350, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1921), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B.
(pt. 2) 168, 175.
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one of timing, and exchanges, only some of which were taxable but,
when taxable, were to be taxed in full in the year of the exchange.
23
Unfortunately, nothing in the congressional history sheds any light on
the intent of this new reference. It is clear, however, that Congress in-
tended to limit drastically the taxability of exchanges. Although the
1918 Act treated anything received on an exchange as a cash equivalent
unless specifically excepted, the 1921 Act reversed direction and taxed
the transaction in the year of the exchange only when the property re-
ceived had a readily realizable market value. Indeed, both the House24
and Senate2 5 committee reports indicate that the 1921 Act was intended
to modify the existing presumption in favor of taxation.
26
3. Revenue Act of 1924. The Revenue Act of 192427 made an-
other radical change concerning the taxation of sales and exchanges of
property. For the first time the amount of the gain or loss was expressly
defined, in section 202(a), as the difference between basis and the
amount realized:
Except as hereinafter provided in this section, the gain from the sale
or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount
realized therefrom over the basis ... and the loss shall be the excess
23. There are other hints in the legislative history that section 202(c) covered only true ex-
changes. Both committee reports talked about the contemporary law's interference with "neces-
sary business readjustments." S. REP. No. 275, supra note 22, at 11-12, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) at 188-
89; H.R. REP. No. 350, supra note 22, at 10, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) at 175-76. Nothing indicates that
anything classifiable as a sale was contemplated. In fact, during the Senate floor debate concern-
ing the reorganization exception to immediate taxation of exchanges involving property with read-
ily realizable market values, Senator Reed expressed concern that some types of reorganizations
were more like sales than exchanges of property. He thought that they should perhaps be taxed as
sales. 61 CoNG. REc. 6568 (1921) (remarks of Sen. Reed), reprinted in J. SEIDMAN 796-97.
24. H.R. REP. No. 350, supra note 22, at 10, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) at 175-76.
25. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 22, at 11, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) at 188-89.
26. It is less clear precisely what was meant by the phrase, "readily realizable market value."
The House bill originally required the property received on exchange to have a "definite and
readily realizable market value" before tax would be assessed, but the Senate Finance Committee
dropped the words, "definite and." J. SEIDMAN 789. The congressional materials give no reason
for this change. It might imply that immediate recognition for tax purposes should not depend on
whether the market value was ascertainable. Nevertheless, it seems more likely that the Senate
Finance Committee's change was simply made to eliminate redundancy or, at most, to permit
taxation even when the precise amount of the property's "readily realizable" value was in ques-
tion. It is difficult to conceive of a readily realizable market value that is not ascertainable. More-
over, in the debate on the Senate floor, a suggestion was made that the word "realizable" be
replaced with the word "ascertainable." Senator McCumber responded that something more than
an abstract measurement of value was required for taxation. 61 CONG. REc. 6549 (1921) (remarks
of Sen. McCumber), reprinted in J. SEIDMAN 792-93. The drafters therefore clearly intended a
realizable value: if the exchange was to be taxable, one had to be able actually to sell the property
received. Thus, a requirement for ascertainability was inherent in the 1921 test; the value had to
be ascertained with respect to a market in which the property could readily be sold.
27. Ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
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of such basis over the amount realized.28
Section 202(c) defined the amount realized:
The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property
shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of
the property (other than money) received. 29
Finally, section 203(a) provided for recognition of both sales and ex-
changes unless specifically excepted:
Upon the sale or exchange of property the entire amount of the gain
or loss, determined under section 202, shall be recognized, except as
hereinafter provided in this section.30
Section 203(b) retained the earlier statutes' exceptions for like-kind ex-
changes, reorganizations, and transfers to controlled corporations, and
added a provision covering involuntary conversions.3 1 These three
provisions are essentially identical to current sections 1001(a)-(c).
Two points stand out in a comparison of these new provisions with
the prior law. First, Congress eliminated the provision in the 1921 stat-
ute providing that no gain would be recognized upon an exchange un-
less the property received had a readily realizable market value. The
new statutes taxed property received on an exchange to the extent of its
fair market value.32 The committee reports make it clear that the re-
version to a fair market value standard was conscious, 33 and therefore
it would be untenable that recognition of gain or loss on an exchange
should depend on the existence of some sort of formal or ready market
for the property received.34 Second, these provisions eroded whatever
justification prior law may have provided for different treatment of
sales and exchanges. Whereas the ancestors of section 203(a) of the
1924 statute had covered only exchanges, this new recognition section
28. Id § 202(a).
29. Id § 202(c).
30. Id § 203(a).
31. Id § 203(b).
32. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
33. Both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee agreed
that the requirement for a readily realizable market value was too indefinite to be applied with
either accuracy or consistency. Thus, it would be better to provide for taxability of all exchanges,
with specific and well-defined exceptions. These exceptions, of course, are covered by section
203(b). S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1924), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 266,
275-76; H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 241,
250-51.
34. Nevertheless, the courts have given little consideration to Congress's early efforts. See
Haley, The Application of Section 1001 to Deferred Payment Sales of Propery, 28 TAX LAW. 303,
305 (1975); Levin & Javaras, supra note 13, at 406. A number of courts have inquired into the
existence of a market in determining both the timing and the extent of tax on the gain upon an
exchange of property. See note 138 infra and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit, however,
recently analyzed the statutory development and concluded that ascertainability of fair market
value was the sole requirement for triggering taxation under section 1001. Warren Jones Co. v.
Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1975).
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applied to both sales and exchanges. Congress's evident intent was that
the amount of gain or loss would be determined by section 202(c) both
for sales and for exchanges of property. It no longer could matter
whether a sale for evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser was or
was not considered an exchange.
Similar analysis indicates that the sale provisions of sections 202
and 203 covered timing as well as amount of recognition. Although
section 203(a) required only recognition of the gain or loss and said
nothing expressly about its timing, the statutory development discussed
above indicates that recognition on an exchange took place in the year
of the exchange under the predecessors of section 203(a). Indeed, for
true exchanges there was no other potentially taxable event.35 Now
that both sales and exchanges were under the same umbrella, the gain
from either a sale or an exchange involving the receipt of property
would be taxed in the year of the transaction.36
This analysis receives confirmation from the legislative history of
the first provision for the installment method of reporting gain from the
sale of property, section 212(d) of the Revenue Act of 1926. 37 That
provision was aimed primarily at permitting installment reporting by
dealers in personal property. It also allowed, however, for use of the
35. See note 20 supra.
36. The House Ways and Means Committee report stated that "where income is realized in
the form of property, the measure of the income is the fair market value of the property at the date
of its receit." H.R. REP. No. 179, supra note 33, at 13, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) at 250 (emphasis
added). Almost identical language appears in the report of the Senate Finance Committee. S.
REP. No. 398, supra note 33, at 13, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) at 275. The Ninth Circuit has read this
language as implying taxation in the year of sale under section 1001. Warren Jones Co. v. Com-
missioner, 524 F.2d 788, 792 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1975).
37. Ch. 27, § 212(d), 44 Stat. 10 (1926). Prior developments that led to the adoption of this
section are also relevant to whether section 1001 and its predecessors were intended to cover tim-
ing as well as amount of gain on a sale of property. Subsection 202(f) of the Revenue Act of 1921,
ch. 136, § 202(0, 42 Stat. 227, provided that section 202 should not be construed to prevent taxa-
tion of any payment under an installment contract in the year in which such payment was re-
ceived. The legislative history under the 1921 Act gives no indication of the intent of this
provision, although it seems likely that it was meant to endorse the regulations already adopted by
the Service providing for installment reporting in certain cases. See generally 2 J. MERTENS, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 15.02 (1974).
In any event, the Board of Tax Appeals totally ignored section 202(0 a few years later when it
ruled the regulations invalid as having no statutory foundation. Appeal of B.B. Todd, Inc., 1
B.T.A. 762, 767 (1925). Section 212(d) of the Revenue Act of 1926 established a statutory basis in
direct response to this ruling. S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1926), reprinted in 1939-1
C.B. (pt. 2) 332, 346-47. Nevertheless, former section 202(0 has been preserved in precisely its
original form and is now section 1001(d) of the current Code. It has been interpreted to except
section 453 installment payments, and only these payments, from the general rule under section
1001 that gain is taxed in the year of sale. Clodfelter v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 694, 703 (1967),
aft'd, 426 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1970). This interpretation would make little sense if section 1001 did
not cover timing.
DUKE LAW JO URTAL
installment method for sales of real property and casual sales of per-
sonal property for a price exceeding $1,000, provided in either case that
the initial payments in cash or property other than evidences of indebt-
edness of the purchaser did not exceed 25% of the purchase price. The
Senate Finance Committee was clear in its interpretation of the law
applying to any sale that failed to qualify for installment treatment:
Deferred-payment contracts other than installment contracts are
not affected by the committee amendment. When the initial pay-
ment exceeds 25 per cent of the price in the case of an isolated sale of
personal property, or in the case of sales of real property, the obliga-
tions that are received in addition to the initial payment are to be
regarded as the equivalent of cash if such obligations have a fair
market value. In consequence that portion of the initial payment and
of the fair market value of such obligations which represents profit is
to be returned as income as of the taxable year of the sale.38
Finally, it should be noted that when the initial payment percentage
was raised in 1928 from 25% to 40%, committees of both houses of Con-
gress rejected an alternative proposal to provide for nonrecognition
upon the receipt of installment obligations if no fair market value could
be determined with reasonable certainty.39
4. Summary. By 1926 the current provisions for taxing the sale
or exchange of property had been adopted and seemed to require,
when read in the light of their legislative history, exactly what they
said. Gain or loss was to be recognized in the year of the sale or ex-
change, and the amount of gain or loss was the difference between the
basis in the property given up and the fair market value of the property
received. It made no difference whether the property received was
cash, tangible property, intangible obligations of third parties, or evi-
dences of indebtedness of the purchaser. At the same time, however,
other provisions required that income be measured in accordance with
either the cash or an accrual method of accounting.4° Notwithstanding
the considerable potential overlap between the sale-or-exchange provi-
sions and the accounting provisions, there is little evidence that anyone
38. S. REP. No. 52, supra note 37, at 19, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) at 347 (emphasis added).
39. S. REP. No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1928), refprintedin 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 409, 425;
H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1927), refprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 384, 394. Both
reports recommended no change in what they understood to be the existing Treasury Department
practice of finding a fair market value in all cases in which a value was ascertainable.
40. Section 212(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 212(b), 44 Stat. 10, was essentially
identical to section 212(b) of the 1918 statute, cited in note 17 supra, and the intervening statutes.
Prior to 1926 the courts had held that only the cash method or an accrual method was available.
Appeal of B.B. Todd, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 762, 767 (1925); S. REP. No. 52, supra note 37, at 19, 1939-1
C.B. (pt. 2) at 346; cf Appeal of Reubel, 1 B.T.A. 676, 677-78 (1925) (congressional intent to
provide accounting methods corresponding with taxpayers' own regular methods of accounting).
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in Congress thought about the connection between them, except per-
haps to the extent that installment reporting might be considered a
method of accounting.41
B. Interpreting the Current Statutory Framework.
At the most abstract level of statutory interpretation, the sale-or-
exchange provisions should prevail in all cases because they reached
final form later than the accounting provisions and because they are
aimed at a specific item of income-transactions in property-whereas
the accounting provisions cover all types of income. However, even if
courts had not decided otherwise by giving the accounting provisions
precedence in many cases over the past fifty years, it is clear that the
sale-or-exchange provisions could not have been intended to apply to
all dealings in property.
Retail sales by a merchant provide a straightforward example of
transactions that should not be subject to the sale-or-exchange provi-
sions. To the extent the merchant sells for cash, of course, there is no
difference in result among the cash method, the accrual method, and a
literal application of section 1001. The amount realized is the amount
of cash received, and all the gain is recognized in the year of sale. On
the other hand, suppose the merchant sells on credit and, to take the
simplest example, receives no cash in the year of sale. Under the cash
method he has no income in that year;42 under the accrual method he
has revenues measured by the full face amount of the purchaser's de-
ferred-payment obligation; and under section 1001 he has income mea-
sured by the fair market value of the deferred-payment obligation.
Even if the obligation bears interest, it is unlikely that a reasonable
assessment of its fair market value will be either zero or the exact face
amount of the obligation. Thus, section 1001 gives a result obtained by
neither of the standard accounting methods. If section 1001 were to
apply, however, a separate valuation would be required for each de-
ferred-payment obligation received. These separate valuations would
create an impossible burden for most businesses.
The short answer, of course, is that section 1001 was not intended
to apply to regular sales of property as part of an ongoing business.
Current regulations recognize this limitation on section 1001's scope:
41. See note 49 infra.
42. Under the current regulations the merchant would not be permitted to use the cash
method because he would be required to calculate the cost of goods sold pursuant to an inventory
recordkeeping system. He would therefore have to adopt an accrual method of accounting. Treas.
Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2) (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1958). Nevertheless, the example serves to il-
lustrate the relationship between the various methods of accounting and section 1001.
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"If the vendor chooses as a matter of consistent practice to return the
income from installment sales on an accrual method or on the cash
receipts and disbursements method, such a course is permissible. ' 43 It
is the reference to consistent practice that highlights the basic point.
The requirement of consistency has always been fundamental to the
accounting provisions of the Code.44 More than one transaction is re-
quired, however, even to talk about consistency, and in the context of
an accounting system, consistency makes little sense without a series of
similar transactions. In the case of an ongoing business, consistency
among the transactions insures that the primary distortion resulting
from the choice of an accounting system will occur only in the first and
last few years of operation, 45 and this minimal distortion may not be
too high a price to pay for giving the taxpayer a choice of accounting
(and therefore recordkeeping) methods. Excessive distortion usually
occurs only when transactions are not sufficiently similar or numerous
to make the application of an accounting method meaningful.
One possible approach is to interpret section 451 as the sole provi-
sion governing timing, leaving section 1001 to determine only the
amount of gain in the particular year in which section 451 requires
taxation. Under this approach, a cash-method taxpayer who sells prop-
erty in exchange for a deferred-payment obligation of the purchaser
receives, in the year of sale, property that would be included in section
1001's amount realized. Under section 451, however, his method of
accounting properly calls for taxation in a later year.46 The result of
applying this approach to a cash-method taxpayer is that even the
amount of his total gain from the sale is determined by his accounting
method. The amount realized in later years is simply the cash received
in those years. Consequently, the fair market value of the purchaser
obligation is irrelevant, and section 1001 is without meaningful appli-
cation.
The application of this approach to the accrual-method taxpayer is
even stranger. The timing of recognition under section 451 is clear: his
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(e) (1958) (emphasis added).
44. See, e.g., Connors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 913, 916 (1979); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
1(a)(2), -1(c)(1)(iv)(a), -l(c)(2)(ii), -1(d (1) (1957).
45. For example, suppose that a manufacturer has one sale a year for 10 years of an item that
he makes for $1 and sells for $2, and that he receives payment from each sale in the year following
the sale. If he is on the accrual method, he will have an evenly spaced income of $1 per year in
years 1 through 10. If he is on the cash method, he will have an operating loss of $1 in year 1, $1
of income in years 2 through 10, and $2 of income in year 11. His income in years 2 through 10 is
the same under either method.
46. Receipt of a third-party obligation on a sale is arguably not "properly" covered by a cash
accounting method, and this analysis serves to distinguish between taxpayers A and B in the
example of Part II. See text accompanying notes 4-I1 supra.
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accounting method requires taxation in the year of sale, and in any
event that is the year in which the contract is received. The amount of
gain in that year, however, is less certain. If section 1001 governs, the
fair market value and not the face value of the obligation is the meas-
ure of gain. This interpretation leads to the absurd result that accrual-
method businesses must ascertain the value of every purchaser obliga-
tion received in regular business transactions. They may not rely on
the face amount. Assuming this "absurdity" is avoided, this approach
would then leave section 1001's fair market value standard with mean-
ing, at most, only in the case of isolated sales by accrual-method tax-
payers. For them, taxation would occur in the year of sale, but the
amount of gain would be measured by the fair market value rather
than the face value of the obligation.
This approach is obviously unsatisfactory. No court has ever
adopted it, and the Service does not follow it.47 This approach pro-
vides no justification for distinguishing isolated sales by accrual-
method taxpayers from sales in the regular course of business. Nor is
there any policy basis for its distinction in result for isolated sales by
cash- and accrual-method taxpayers. Finally, the approach flies in the
face of congressional intent as evidenced by the relevant legislative his-
tory.48
The only reasonable view of the relationship between the account-
ing provisions and the sale-or-exchange provisions is that the former
apply to the timing of gain from sales or exchanges in the regular
course of business, while the latter apply without regard to the tax-
payer's method of accounting in the case of isolated or casual sales.
This interpretation would certainly not be inconsistent with the legisla-
tive history of the predecessors of the accounting provisions and section
100149 and would give both sets of provisions a meaningful role in tax-
47. See text accompanying notes 102-07 infra.
48. See notes 21-39 supra and accompanying text.
49. As discussed above, prior to 1924 the statutes defined the amount of gain from a sale or
other disposition of property (presumably including exchanges of property) but contained an ex-
press recognition, or timing, section only for exchanges. See notes 15-26 supra and accompanying
text. The exceptions to the recognition provision for exchanges, however, indicate that Congress
envisioned reorganizations and other isolated events. In 1924 the recognition section was ex-
panded to cover both sales and exchanges, but the exceptions remained similar. The inference,
therefore, is still that the drafters had in mind major, isolated events. There is nothing in the
legislative history to indicate that the recognition section covered sales in the ordinary course of
business, and any intent to intrude on the established systems of accounting for business enter-
prises would surely have been more specific.
The inclusion of the installment sale provision with the other accounting provisions in section
212 of the Revenue Act of 1926 clearly indicates that Congress envisioned the installment sale
provision as a third choice of accounting method. The legislative history accompanying the Act
supports this interpretation. S. REP. No. 52 supra note 37. Moreover, this provision was intended
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ing gain from the sale or exchange of property.50 It would also go far
toward eliminating the inconsistent and often irrational results stem-
ming from the judicial confusion that has surrounded this issue for the
past fifty years, a matter that is considered in the next Part.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
The intent of Congress, to the extent it can be determined, should
always play an important role in interpreting federal statutes. How-
ever, in the case of Code provisions as old as the ones under considera-
tion here, the relevance of even very strong evidence of congressional
intent may be significantly diminished by an alternative judicial inter-
pretation that clearly makes more sense as a matter of current tax pol-
icy. This is especially true when Congress has not acted to overturn the
judicial approach. Accordingly, judicial alternatives should be ana-
lyzed to see whether any single interpretation has sufficient foundation
in the Code and in tax policy to justify its adoption more uniformly.
It is important to remember that the primary problem under con-
sideration involves sales of property in which an obligation of the pur-
chaser is part of the consideration flowing to the seller. To be
distinguished are transactions in which an obligation is received
outside the sale-of-property context s' and sales transactions in which
an obligation of a third party is part of the consideration. A brief anal-
ysis of these transactions will aid in evaluating the principal thesis of
this Article.
to override the sale-or-exchange provisions with respect to the transactions to which it applied,
simply because it otherwise makes no sense.
The installment method, however, unlike the cash and accrual methods, is not a true account-
ing system. It is impossible, for example, for a taxpayer to be solely on the installment method
even in a single business because the method does not apply to losses or expenses. Consequently,
it is supplementary to both the accounting provisions and section 1001. It ameliorates the effect of
the basic accounting methods with respect to the regular dealings in personal property to which it
applies, and it ameliorates the effect of section 1001 with respect to the other sales to which it
applies. Therefore, the intrusion of the installment sale method into section 1001's domain of
casual or isolated sales does not provide a ground for a similar intrusion of either of the two basic
accounting methods.
50. This approach will, of course, require development of a workable definition of casual or
isolated transactions and will necessitate a case-by-case factual evaluation of the fair market value
of purchaser obligations received in these transactions. The first problem, however, appears to be
soluble, see notes 158-64 infra and accompanying text, and the second is not unique, see notes 164-
92 infra and accompanying text.
51. An example of this type of transaction would be compensation for services.
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A. Third-Party Obligations and Non-Sale-or-Exchange Cases
Distinguished
1. Third-Party Obligations. Courts have had little theoretical or
practical difficulty in handling cases in which the seller of property 52
receives an obligation of a third party from the purchaser.5 3 Few if any
courts have even considered the taxpayer's accounting system in these
cases: they have treated the third-party obligation just like a piece of
tangible property received on an exchange and have included it in the
amount realized at its fair market value.54 The theory presumably is
that, as between seller and buyer, the transaction is at an end.55 In any
52. For convenience, the term "seller" will be used to refer to the person who has given
property in exchange for something else and whose taxation is under analysis. The other party to
the transaction will be referred to as the "buyer" or "purchaser." This terminology may be used
even when the transaction involved might be characterized molre accurately as an exchange than
as a sale. A promise or obligation of the purchaser, given to the seller as consideration for the
transfer, to pay money directly to the seller in the future will be referred to as a "purchaser obliga-
tion.'
53. This is the case of taxpayer B in the introductory example. See text accompanying notes
4-Il supra.
54. Corporate liquidations and redemptions of corporate stock are the most typical situations
in which third-party obligations are received. The courts usually accept the Service's position that
property seldom lacks an ascertainable fair market value. See Slater v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d
668, 670 (10th Cir. 1966); Campagna v. United States, 290 F.2d 682, 684 (2d Cir. 1961); Estate of
Marsack v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 1961); Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 286
F.2d 850, 852-53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d
195, 198 (9th Cir. 1959); Kuehner v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 437, 441 (Ist Cir. 1954). The
Kuehner court used cash-equivalence analysis to tax a stock redemption in the year of sale when
the purchase price was placed in an unconditional escrow account with instructions that it be paid
out over a five-year period. This result is correct but somewhat shallow in its reasoning: the
unconditional escrow is no more than an obligation of the third-party escrow agent, and cash-
equivalence analysis is relevant at most only to value.
An approach that requires evaluation of third-party obligations under section 1001 receives
further statutory support from the rule that the installment method may only be used if payments
during the initial year amount to less than 30% of the total purchase price. By excluding evidences
of indebtedness of the purchaser from the 30% calculation, the Code makes it clear that an evi-
dence of indebtedness of a third party must be considered a payment. § 453(b)(2)(B); see Tombari
v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 889, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1962); Simpson v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M.
(CCH) 710, 717 (1976).
55. This theory for taxation is of considerable importance outside the area of property sales
when no express statutory provision governs the timing of income receipt. An example would be
compensation for services. Both casual and regular transactions presumably must be fit into the
taxpayer's accounting method. If the employer pays for services with tangible property-real es-
tate or a diamond ring-the employee has income to the extent of the property's fair market value.
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1957). However, because the Code has always permitted the cash
method of accounting for income, no justification exists for taxing a cash-method employee on the
receipt of an employer obligation that is not a cash equivalent. Cf. Sehlemmer v. United States,
94 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1938) (note taken in connection with performance of services is not income,
unless equivalent to cash) (alternative rationale).
The tension between these two black-letter principles is not resolved by saying that tangible
property is equivalent to cash. First, this distorts the statutory language, because one cannot
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event, the cash and accrual methods of accounting and the approach
taken by section 1001 lead to identical results in cases of this type.5 6
One problem not yet fully resolved is that raised by the famous
"spend" real estate or diamond rings for groceries. In addition, it fails to explain the immediate
taxation, to the extent of their fair market value, of non-cash-equivalent third-party obligations
received in an employment context. See, e.g., United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 865 (2d
Cir.) (third-party annuity contract purchased by employer is income to employee in year of
purchase to extent of its fair market value), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 821 (1950). A few courts have
attempted to resolve the problem by considering whether the employee has received an economic
benefit, e.g., Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810, 820-22 (Ct. Cl. 1978), but this test still
seems to miss the basic point. An unfunded deferred compensation agreement with General Mo-
tors can be characterized as cash only through a legal fiction. The agreement does, however, have
some economic value to the employee, even if the agreement is nontransferable. At the very least,
his creditworthiness improves. An obligation received from an employer is not, by virtue of its
origin, any less like cash than a comparable obligation of a third party of equal solvency. Yet
such an agreement is not taxed on receipt. See Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20, 36-37
(1965), acq. 1970-2 C.B. xxi, 1976-2 C.B. 4 n.10; Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 178.
A more appropriate reason to distinguish employer obligations from third-party obligations
may be the practical notion that when an employee agrees to accept a third-party obligation in
return for his services, his relationship with his employer, as to that item of income, is at an end.
Cf. Rev. Rul. 73-173, 1973-1 C.B. 40,41 (right to breed a stallion once a year received for services
is not immediately taxable if contingent on performance of future services, i e., if the employment
relationship has not ended). The employer gives up much if not all of his power to effect self-help
remedies, and the employee need only look to the third party, who if solvent is unlikely to have
any defenses. Like the diamond ring or other tangible property that may not be easily marketable,
the employee has accepted something of value, and the year of receipt seems the most appropriate
time to tax him on his income. The only issue is the extent of the value.
In the case of a sale or exchange of property, a rationale that looks to the termination of the
parties' transaction is unnecessary and indeed may even be inappropriate. In this case section
1001 provides an adequate statutory basis for analysis. Of course, when the taxpayer receives
tangible property in exchange, or even intangible property that represents something more than an
obligation to pay money in the future (a share of stock, for example), the property received must
be evaluated and tax assessed in the year of the exchange. Otherwise, taxation may be postponed
indefinitely--that is, until the taxpayer or his heirs or donees dispose of the property received.
However, when a third-party obligation to pay money in the future is received, it is not clear that
the operative principle resulting in immediate taxation should be the end of the transaction be-
tween buyer and seller. It might be simpler administratively to let the taxpayer rely on an analogy
to either the cash or accrual method of accounting, assuming such reliance does not distort in-
come, particularly when the taxpayer receives third-party obligations on a regular basis in his
sales business. This treatment would eliminate the need for an individual evaluation of the obli-
gations received.
Moreover, when the third-party obligation is guaranteed by the buyer, the transaction be-
tween buyer and seller is far from over, at least in principle. In this case, the seller must look first
to the third party for satisfaction of the obligation (a requirement that is eliminated by contract in
many modern guarantees), and the seller is likely to be in a stronger position in case of the buyer's
insolvency. It is not clear, however, why either of these distinctions should affect the taxation of
the seller. A much more satisfactory principle of taxation would rely on section 1001 properly
interpreted to apply only to casual or isolated transactions. Under section 1001 both third-party
obligations and purchaser obligations should be included in the amount realized from isolated
transactions to the extent of their fair market values.
56. See Denver & R.G.W.RR. v. United States, 318 F.2d 922, 924 n.l (Ct. Cl. 1963).
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case of Burnet v. Logan:5 7 what should be done when the value of the
third-party obligation is highly speculative? Most decisions seem to
recognize, at least implicitly, that essentially all obligations to pay
money in the future, however conditioned or uncertain in amount or
timing, have some ascertainable value.5 8 A few courts, however, have
found that particular third-party obligations had no ascertainable fair
market value, thereby blessing the taxpayers involved with all the well-
known benefits of an open transaction.59 Nevertheless, whether a par-
ticular obligation has an ascertainable fair market value is a question of
fact and therefore is without precedential value. For this reason, these
cases are of little assistance to other taxpayers eager for similar treat-
ment, and the theoretical error underlying them seems so evident that
few taxpayers are able to rely on them. Except for truly unusual situa-
tions,60 these cases probably only permit taxpayers to file returns re-
porting gain on the open-transaction approach without fear of being
prosecuted for fraud, the real hope always being that the particular re-
turn will not be carefully audited.61 In any event, the important point
57. 283 U.S. 404 (1931). Logan involved a direct obligation of the buyer and not of a third
party, but it is the case on which all subsequent recipients of third-party obligations have pinned
their hopes.
58. See note 54 supra and the cases cited therein. Cf Levin & Javaras, supra note 13, at 406
(courts may eventually hold nonforfeitable deferred compensation payments to be income at time
services are performed if a market develops so that cash-basis taxpayers could readily sell or
borrow against their written contracts).
59. E.., Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606, 629-30 (1968) (royalty contract owned by
corporation distributed to taxpayer on liquidation); cf. Estate of Williamson, 29 T.C. 51, 60 (1957)
(sale of stock under stipulation that proceeds of sale be loaned to corporation on open account,
with result that taxpayer received obligation of someone other than purchaser in exchange for his
stock), acq. 1958-2 C.B. 8. Both Dorsey and Williamson evoked strong dissents. In a few other
cases the Service either stipulated to or failed to argue against the proposition that the third-party
obligations received by the taxpayer had no ascertainable fair market value. Eg., Westover v.
Smith, 173 F.2d 90, 91 (9th Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911, 912 (2d Cir. 1948);
see Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15, 16.
In these cases the theory necessarily is that the property received has value but that the value
is not ascertainable. The taxpayer therefore has income only when cash receipts have exceeded
his basis in the obligation; that is, the transaction remains "open." Id, 1958-2 C.B. at 17. If,
however, the property received actually has zero value, the difference between that value and, say,
$1 or $1,000 is only one of degree. The obligation presumably should be included (at zero) as part
of the amount realized in a closed transaction in which gain or loss is completely and finally
recognized.
60. A possible example is given in M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 245-46 (2d
ed. 1979).
61. Proposals have been made to reduce incentives for the taxpayer to try this method of
reporting when he has received a direct obligation of the purchaser in a property sale. The pro-
posals would require the taxpayer to make an affirmative election to report gain under section
1001. If no election were made, the installment sale provisions would apply. If an election were
made, the Service would be on notice that an audit might be appropriate. See text accompanying
notes 278-79 infra. Even if this proposal were adopted, however, the opportunity to try for open-
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for present purposes is that because most if not all of the reported third-
party obligation cases have involved isolated transactions, their reli-
ance on section 1001 is consistent with the approach advocated in this
Article.
2. Non-Sale-or-Exchange Cases. The taxpayer's accounting
method generally governs the timing of income recognition from trans-
actions not involving the disposition of property. No specific timing
provision analogous to section 1001 normally covers these transac-
tions.62 For example, in the case of compensation for services, 63 divi-
dends,64 and rental payments under a lease of property,65 the Service
and the courts agree that an obligation from the employer or the other
party to the transaction 66 will be included in the income of a cash-
method taxpayer 67 in the year of receipt only if the right is a cash
transaction treatment for a third-party obligation would probably remain. No one is proposing
that installment reporting of gain from these sales be permitted. See note 191 infra.
62. There are, of course, special timing provisions governing certain specific non-sale-of-
property transactions. E.g., § 83 (transfer of property in connection with the performance of serv-
ices); § 421 (exercise of qualified stock options).
63. Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487, 493-94 (8th Cir. 1974); Edelman v. United States,
329 F.2d 950, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Rev. Rul. 73-173, 1973-1 C.B. 40.
64. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. United States, 318 F.2d 922, 928 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (nontransferable
car note issued as dividend giving right to take railroad sleeping cars immediately or cash in a
later year, at choice of recipient, has value in year of receipt measued only by present right to
receive sleeping cars and not by amount of cash receivable in a later year, notwithstanding sound
financial condition of issuer); Omholt v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 541, 549 (1973) (negotiable de-
mand promissory note issued to controlling shareholder held to be dividend taxable as such only
when cash payment on note was received; there was evidence that corporation was financially
unable to pay any more cash than it did), acq. 1974-2 C.B. 4; Vinnell v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.
934, 944-45 (1969) (sale of sister corporation stock to controlled corporation under long-term con-
tract held to be dividend under section 304(a)(1) only as payments were made on contract). But
cf Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir.) (affirming finding of dividend in year of
redemption on facts similar to Vinnel, but timing issue apparently not argued), ceri. denied, 377
U.S. 963 (1964).
Similarly, corporate assumption of a shareholder's liability is a dividend to the shareholder
only when he is actually relieved of liability. If the shareholder remains secondarily liable on the
debt, his liability will be relieved only when the debt is paid. Maher v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d
225, 229 (8th Cir. 1972); Kleeden v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 1122, 1125 (1944); Rev. Rul,
77-360, 1977-2 C.B. 86, 87.
65. Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961); Rev. Rul. 68-606, 1968-2 C.B.
42.
66. Of course, a third-party obligation received in any of these contexts will almost invaria-
bly be included in current income. The only issue the courts have recognized is whether the
obligation has an ascertainable fair market value. See, e.g., Coffey v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.
1410, 1419-20 (1950) (contingent right to payment issued as dividend will be taxed to extent of its
fair market value). See notes 54-61 supra and accompanying text.
67. In principle, a taxpayer using the accrual method in his primary business should be able
to use the cash method for unrelated and isolated transactions. The regulations permit the use of
different methods for different businesses. The only requirement is that once a method is chosen
for a particular business, it must be followed consistently thereafter. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(d)(1)
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equivalent. The test used to determine cash equivalence is whether the
right is both freely transferable and readily marketable. Courts that
have imported the concept into the disposition-of-property area have
used a much broader definition of cash equivalence, but the narrow test
is clearly appropriate. If the taxpayer has to go far outside his usual
commercial channels to convert the item into cash, to treat it as a cash
equivalent is really to deny the cash method as to that item. The broad
definition of cash equivalence thus runs counter to the express provi-
sions of the Code allowing the use of the cash method of accounting.68
The Service is authorized to deny the cash method when it does not
(1957). The cases and rulings usually classify the taxpayer as cash method or accrual method
without considering that he might use a combination system. Nevertheless, whether an accrual-
method taxpayer in his regular business uses a combined system should presumably depend on
how he accounts for the first item of his income unrelated to his accrual business, because from
that time forward the method must be followed consistently. The cash method generally delays
liability for taxes, so a taxpayer should probably retain the cash method for isolated and unrelated
items of income when he starts a business requiring accrual-method accounting.
68. There is, of course, a need to qualify the cash method to prevent its abuse. This is accom-
plished by the cash-equivalence rule and the related doctrine of constructive receipt. The regula-
tions provide that income is constructively received if payment is made available to the taxpayer,
that is, if he can draw upon it at any time. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1957). An item is supposedly not
constructively received if actual receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions. Id
Examples of constructive receipt and cash equivalence illustrate the theoretical difference between
the two concepts: actual receipt of a piece of paper promising to pay money in the future is
analyzed in terms of whether the paper is a cash equivalent; a letter stating that the money is ready
for the taxpayer to pick up whenever he chooses is analyzed in terms of constructive receipt. The
letter is clearly not a cash equivalent.
The problem in distinguishing between the two doctrines usually arises in contractual ar-
rangements pursuant to which the taxpayer agrees to accept payment at a time later than the time
at which he would normally be paid. For example, in the deferred-payment context, the taxpayer
may agree with his employer to forego part of his salary in return for the employer's promise to
make the payments at a future time. Arguably, if the employer does not care when payment is
made and the agreement is made solely to satisfy the personal desires of the taxpayer, the money
has actually been made available to him and the only limitations are of his own making. There-
fore, the deferred payments in this situation could be deemed constructively received in the year
they are earned. It now seems clear, however, that the taxpayer can escape the constructive receipt
doctrine by providing for later payment in an arm's-length contract. Goldsmith v. United States,
586 F.2d 810, 817 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20, 36-37 (1965), acq. 1970-2
C.B. xxi, 1976-2 C.B. 4 n.10; cf. Amend v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 178, 185 (1949) (taxpayer's
contract calling for deferred payment held to be arm's-length, so that constructive receipt doctrine
did not apply), acq. 1950-1 C.B. 1; Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 178 (additional compensation
to be received under employment contract includible in gross income only in taxable years in
which taxpayer actually receives installment payments in cash or other property previously
credited to his account).
The taxpayer in this situation has actually received something, however a promise to pay in
the future. If it is the promise of a third party, it will be taxed to the extent of its ascertainable fair
market value. See notes 54-60 supra and accompanying text. Even if the promise is from the
other party to the transaction, the question of cash equivalence, provided the taxpayer's method of
accounting governs timing, remains.
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clearly reflect income,69 and this is a more proper ground for action in
particular cases than is a general expansion of the cash-equivalence
concept.
B. Judicial Approaches in Purchaser-Obligation Cases.
The law thus seems clear that section 1001 applies to third-party
obligations received in connection with a sale of property, while the
taxpayer's method of accounting covers obligations of the other party
to the transaction in non-sale cases not specifically covered by some
other provision of the Code. The real confusion centers on the receipt
of purchaser obligations in connection with a disposition of property.
The source of the confusion is undoubtedly section 1001 itself, which
creates a tension between the general accounting provisions of the
Code and its own specific requirements in the case of a sale or ex-
change of property. The problem is to resolve this tension by a statu-
tory interpretation that gives meaningful effect to the specific sale-or-
exchange provisions under section 1001 and the accounting provisions
under sections 446 and 451.
Nevertheless, despite more than fifty years of litigation between
hundreds of taxpayers and the government, essentially no court has an-
alyzed the problem in these terms.70 The Service has added to the con-
fusion by adopting a mixture of the various judicial lines, usually
seeking to apply the taxpayer's method of accounting to accrual-
method taxpayers but section 1001 to cash-method taxpayers. The
Service has not, however, articulated a rationale for the distinction.71
69. § 446(b).
70. Judge Fay of the Tax Court, in a recent dissent, explicitly noted the potential conflict
between the accounting rules and section 1001, but he resolved the conflict by looking solely to
whether the obligation in question was a cash equivalent. 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.
788, 808 & n.9 (1978) (Fay, J., dissenting). Because cash equivalence is an accounting provision
(cash-method) concept, Judge Fay thereby implicitly assumed that the accounting rules always
govern. See text accompanying note 116 infra.
71. The Service's best and most recent effort in this regard is Rev. Rul. 79-292, 1979-39 I.R.B.
18, in which the Service held that an accrual-method corporate taxpayer in the construction busi-
ness had to include in income the full face amount of two long-term purchaser obligations re-
ceived in connection with the sale of a home (presumably one built by the taxpayer) and of
equipment used in the taxpayer's business. Because the taxpayer was in the construction business,
application of its method of accounting appears correct in terms of the approach suggested in this
Article.
The ruling, however, contains the same inconsistencies and shallow analysis that have per-
vaded this area from its inception. The Service first states, with no authority other than examples
contained in its own regulations, that section 1001 applies to both casual sales and sales in the
ordinary course of business. Id, 1979-39 I.R.B. at 19. It goes on to conclude, without citing
statutory language or legislative history, that purchaser obligations are treated as money to an
accrual-method taxpayer under section 1001(b). Id It then states that section 1001(b) is implicitly
subject to the taxpayer's method of accounting, Id, although if this were the case, there would be
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Moreover, attorneys for the Service have always felt free to deviate
from the official position of the Service in their efforts to win particular
cases.72 The result is an array of distinct lines of authority.
1. Literal Application of Section 1001. Some courts have applied
section 1001 and its predecessors literally, without regard to the tax-
payer's method of accounting. 73 The unexpressed basis of statutory in-
no need for the fictionalized treatment of the obligation as money to accrual-method taxpayers.
Moreover, the ruling then formulates the prescription for the section 1001(b) amount realized by
cash-method taxpayers-cash plus the fair market value of the obligation-without discussing
whether the obligation is a cash equivalent. Id If the obligation is not a cash equivalent, however,
the taxpayer's method of accounting would require inclusion in income only at the time cash or its
equivalent is received.
72. The Service has long taken the view that in any sale of real property by cash-method
taxpayers not eligible for installment sale treatment, obligations of the purchaser are the
equivalent of cash to the amount of their fair market value. T.D. 3921, V-2 C.B. 24, 27 (1926).
This view was extended by analogy to cover personal property as well. G.C.M. 1387, VI-1 C.B.
48, 50 (1927), declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307. These early rulings left open
the possibility that property received might well not have a fair market value, and in a number of
cases the Service so held. G.C.M. 1387, VI-1 C.B. 48 (1927) (contractual promise to pay not
evidenced by note or similar obligation is not a cash equivalent); G.C.M. 1215, VI-I C.B. 195
(1927) (second mortgage taken by vendor of real property to secure payment of purchase price
had no fair market value). However, by the 1930s the Service generally was taking the position,
with partial success, that whatever was received by the seller had a fair market value and was
therefore includable in income in the year of sale. See, e g, Whitlow v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d
569, 574 (8th Cir. 1936) (Service successful in taxing unsecured notes received upon sale of real
property at face value in year of sale, despite absence of any ready market for the notes); Kleberg
v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 277, 289 (1941) (arguing unsuccessfully that contractual promise to
pay for property transferred was includable in income of cash-method taxpayer in year of sale),
acq. withdrawn 1952-1 C.B. 5; Gillies v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 570, 572 (1930) (open account
payable of solvent vendee corporation held to have fair market value and therefore taxable to
vendor in year of sale).
The Service's official view today is similar to that developed in the 1920s and 1930s, but it
now states that property received will lack an ascertainable fair market value "only in rare and
extraordinary cases." Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(2) (1967); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1957). In
some cases, however, the Service would, and still does, reverse its own position. The Service will
argue, for example, that property received by the seller had no fair market value in the year of sale
when the statute of limitations has run with respect to that year, so payments received on the
purchaser obligation in later years are subject to taxation. E.g, Holbrook v. Commissioner, 34
T.C.M. (CCH) 1283 (1975); Eckstein v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 893 (1945). These incon-
sistent positions sometimes backfire against the Service, but that does not alleviate the confusion
they cause. See note 117 infra and accompanying text.
73. See In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1975); Dennis v. Commissioner, 473
F.2d 274, 285 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum); Clodfelter v. Commissioner, 426 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir.
1970); Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1967); Riss v. Commissioner,
368 F.2d 965, 970 (10th Cir. 1966); Doric Apartment Co. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 895, 896 (6th
Cir. 1938); Whitlow v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 569, 571-72 (8th Cir. 1936); Starker v. United
States, 432 F. Supp. 864, 869 (D. Or. 1977), modfed on other grounds, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.
1979); Caruth v. United States, 411 F. Supp. 604, 608 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 566
F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978) (dictum); McCormac v. United States, 424 F.2d 607, 618-19 (Ct. CL.
1970); Owen v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 707, 710-11 (Ct. Cl. 1934); Witte v. Commissioner, 31
T.C.M. (CCH) 1137, 1142-43 (1972), rev'don other grounds, 513 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stipu-
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terpretation is presumably that the specific and more recently adopted
provision overrides the general. None of these courts distinguishes be-
tween regular and casual sales, although the cases include examples of
both types of sales. Nor have these courts considered security for the
obligation, financial solvency of the purchaser, or degree of marketabil-
ity of the obligation as relevant to the analysis except in determining
the obligation's fair market value. The Tax Court, in fact, has taken
the literal approach to section 1001 in several cases involving unusual
fact situations, even in the face of a special Code section or revenue
ruling intended to be ameliorative.74 Once the court determined that
lation); Rubino v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 1095, 1099 (1949), qaT'd per curamn on other
grounds, 186 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1951); Robinson v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 788, 792 (1933), rey'd
on other grounds, 73 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1934); Gillies v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 570, 572 (1930).
74. One example is private annuities. In Estate of Bell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 469 (1973),
stock worth $207,000, but with a basis to the two taxpayers of only $21,000, was transferred to
relatives for an annuity-a promise to pay $1,000 per month for as long as either taxpayer re-
mained alive. The court valued this annuity at $126,000 and therefore concluded that the taxpay-
ers had made a gift of $81,000 ($207,000-$126,000) to the relatives and had a gain of $105,000 on
the exchange. The taxpayers' "investment in the contract," for the purpose of applying the exclu-
sion ratio to the annuity provisions under section 72, was found to be $126,000. Thus the taxpay-
ers essentially obtained the treatment they had sought on this issue. The finding of a high
investment in the contract meant that a high percentage of each payment would be excluded from
income. However, taxpayers also sought to report their gain on the cost-recovery approach, and
the court denied them this treatment. Id at 473-75. The taxpayers were therefore subjected to a
very heavy tax burden in the year of the transfer and certainly received insufficient cash from the
transaction itself to cover the assessment.
The Service in Bell had sought to apply Revenue Ruling 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43, which would
fix the taxpayers' investment in the contract at the lower value of the taxpayers' basis in the stock
transferred, thereby decreasing the exclusion ratio. At the same time, however, the ruling would
permit the taxpayers to report the $105,000 gain ratably over their combined life expectancy.
Consequently, a higher percentage of each annuity payment would represent gain, but a ratable
portion of the gain would be capital gain for the period of the taxpayers' life expectancy, and the
taxpayers would have no immediate recognition of gain from the exchange. In this sense, the
revenue ruling would have ameliorated the harsh effect of section 1001, although it would also
have retained the exclusion ratio previously calculated even with respect to payments made after
the taxpayers outlived their original life expectancy. Id, 1969-1 C.B. 44. Because the taxpayers
really didpay $126,000 for their annuity, the sizable increase in ordinary income that would result
from the ruling might be considered an unfairly high price for the benefit of ratably reporting the
gain. The dissent in Bell would have given the taxpayers the benefits of ratable reporting coupled
with the value of the higher investment in the contract, essentially by judicial flat. 60 T.C. at 478-
79 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
The Bellholding was reaffirmed in 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788 (1978). A dissent
in 212 Corfporation would also have adopted an installment method of reporting the gain, by
analogy to other regulations outside the sale-of-property area. Id at 813-14 (Simpson, J., dissent-
ing). In neither Bell nor 212 Corporalon did the majority opinion even refer to, let alone distin-
guish, the long line of cases cited in the dissents holding that a cash-method taxpayer need not
report income from an exchange unless the purchaser obligation received is a cash equivalent.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine a contractual obligation to pay money in the future that is
less like cash than is a nontransferable private agreement to pay a fixed monthly sum for the
lifetime of a particular individual.
Other unusual situations can occur when one of the statutory exceptions to recognition of
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the ameliorative provision was inappropriate, it applied section 1001
harshly, giving no consideration to the other lines of authority under
section 1001 that could have softened the blow.75
2. No-Ascertainable-Fair-Market- Value Approach. Another
group of decisions rests on a similar theory in purporting to apply sec-
tion 1001 or its predecessors, but these courts arrive at a different result
by finding that the purchaser obligation has no fair market value. This
approach is known as keeping the transaction open, and the effect is
identical to applying the cash method of accounting to the transaction.
Whoever has the burden of proving either absence or existence of a fair
market value usually loses, as the Service discovered when the Tax
Court held that its proof of a minimum value was insufficient to show
fair market value.76 However, courts have found no ascertainable fair
market value when the taxpayer introduced uncontradicted evidence of
an unsuccessful attempt to market the obligations, together with expert
testimony that the obligations were without fair market value.77 Still
other cases have required ready marketability before finding a fair
market value,78 although this requirement is without support in the leg-
islative history.79 Moreover, at least one case found that a contract had
no ascertainable fair market value notwithstanding that it was a type
passed from hand to hand in commerce.80
Two recent cases in the Tax Court may indicate that the open-
gain from a sale or exchange applies. Turner v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 468 (1961), rev'd
inpart on other grounds, 303 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 922 (1962), involved transfer
of a sole proprietorship to a controlled corporation in a transaction qualifying for nonrecognition
of gain under section 351. The taxpayer had valued his proprietorship with an exorbitant amount
of goodwill, thereby unnecessarily increasing the amount of gain realized from the transfer. Of
course, under section 351 the gain would not have been recognized and no harm would have been
done had the taxpayer not also taken a $49,000, unsecured, non-interest-bearing, short-term "No-
tice of Indebtedness" from the corporation in addition to his stock. The court held that this note
was boot under section 351 and therefore taxable in the year of the exchange. 20 T.C.M. at 746.
No consideration whatsoever was given to the possibility that, assuming the taxpayer was on the
cash method, the obligation of the corporation might not have been a cash equivalent.
75. See note 74 supra. These lines of authority are cited and discussed in notes 76-95 & Ill-
35 infra and accompanying text.
76. MacDonald v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 840, 860-61 (1971), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 2. The Serv-
ice had the burden of proof in MacDonald because it was seeking an increased deficiency. Nor-
mally the taxpayer carries the burden of proof. See note 189 infra.
77. Miller v. United States, 235 F.2d 553, 555-56 (6th Cir. 1956); Cambria Dev. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 34 B.T.A. 1155, 1158 (1936), acq. on this issue 1937-1 C.B. 4. The courts in Miller and
Cambria Development held that substantial collections in later years were insufficient to show
ascertainable fair market value in the year of sale. 235 F.2d at 556; 34 B.T.A. at 1158.
78. Sterling v. Ham, 3 F. Supp. 386, 388 (S.D. Me. 1933); cf. McIntosh v. Commissioner, 26
T.C.M. (CCH) 1164, 1179-80 (1967) (alternative rationale).
79. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
80. Estate of Ennis v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 799, 802 (1955), nonacq. 1956-1 C.B. 6.
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transaction approach based on nonascertainability is about to enter a
period of increased respectability. In McShain v. Commissioner,8t the
court held that a $3,000,000 nonrecourse note secured by a second
mortgage on a leasehold interest in a hotel lacked an ascertainable
value. The court recognized that expert testimony that the note actu-
ally had zero value, based on such factors as the degree of occupancy of
the hotel, cash flow from the property, and absence of personal liabil-
ity-was more relevant to the level of value than to its ascertainability.
Nevertheless, the court strained to point out that the testimony was
consistent with the latter issue as well.82
The MeShain court apparently took this approach because the
Ninth Circuit had rejected the Tax Court's cash-equivalence analysis in
Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner.8 3 Although cash equivalence is an
accounting-method concept and is therefore logically relevant only if
the taxpayer's method of accounting governs taxation of the transac-
tion, the result under that approach for cash-method taxpayers like Mc-
Shain is the same as the result under the no-ascertainable-value
approach under section 1001.84 The McShain holding may therefore
indicate that the Tax Court, at least, is determined to achieve that result
by one means or another. Although cash-equivalence analysis is fore-
closed, at least in the Ninth Circuit, the no-ascertainable-value ap-
proach may still be available.
An even more interesting case is Estate of Wiggins v. Commis-
sioner,85 in which the taxpayer had acquired and subdivided a parcel
of real property into 1,200 lots. He began selling by contract to individ-
ual purchasers.86 The contracts were admittedly of dubious value.
They required only 5% down and permitted the seller to retain all sums
paid as liquidated damages in the event of default. They gave the pur-
chasers the right to trade the lot purchased for any other unsold lot in
the tract of equal or higher value, and they promised a 5% credit for
any new customers that the purchaser referred to the seller. The tax-
payer made no credit checks of his purchasers, nor did he seek to deter-
mine whether they had correctly identified themselves. Finally, the
seller made no effort to enforce the contracts upon default other than to
81. 71 T.C. 998, 1009 (1979).
82. Id at 1005 & n.2.
83. 60 T.C. 663 (1973), rev'd, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975). In McShain the Tax Court ex-
pressly noted that it was adopting a new rationale. 71 T.C. at 1005.
84. The cash-equivalence approach is discussed in text accompanying notes 108-32 infra.
85. 72 T.C. 701 (1979).
86. The facts of this case form the basis for the hypothetical situation of taxpayer C in the
introductory example. See text accompanying notes 4-11 supra.
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repossess the property and try to sell it to someone else. 87
The Tax Court, relying in part on McShain, again concluded that
the contracts each had some value, but that none was ascertainable.88
The exact basis for the decision is unclear, although the opinion implies
that the taxpayer's unwillingness to sell the contracts in blocks at a sub-
stantial discount from face-apparently the only way they could be
marketed-negated the existence of a willing seller and buyer funda-
mental to the concept of fair market value. This rationale, however,
cannot withstand analysis, because it implies that even an exchange-
traded corporate bond may lack ascertainable value if the recipient is
unwilling to sell at the market price and instead holds it until maturity
or at least until prices rise. In any event, without citing any authority,
the court simply stated that determination of market value with "fair
certainty" was not possible and therefore held for the taxpayer.8 9
The interesting aspect of Wiggins is not its holding on as-
certainability; it is only a single case in one of the many differing lines
of judicial authority. It will take more than a few Tax Court decisions
to establish uniformity among these lines.90 The interesting point is
that neither the parties nor the court in Wiggins even considered the
possibility that anything other than section 1001 governed taxation of
this particular taxpayer's transactions. A hint of the court's real prob-
lem, however, may lie in a footnote to its "fair certainty" standard on
ascertainability, in which the court indicated that its conclusion was
bolstered by the "accounting morass" that would have resulted had it
found an ascertainable value for the contracts.91 As indicated in the
discussion of taxpayer C's position in the introductory example, 92 one
might understandably seek to avoid the individual valuation of 1,200
contracts of this type. Because this taxpayer had established himself in
87. 72 T.C. at 705-06.
88. As in McShain, the Wiggins court did not clarify how the factors it considered were
relevant to the ascertainability issue rather than simply to level of value.
89. 72 T.C. at 713-14.
90. In Diab v. Commissioner, [1979] TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 79,475, at 1860, for exam-
ple, the Tax Court declined to follow Miggins. In Diab a taxpayer in the business of buying and
selling real estate under contracts not obviously more substantial than those in Wiggins failed to
carry his burden of proving that the contracts were without ascertainable value. Id at 1865. The
"accounting morass" feared by the Jiggins panel was avoided because the taxpayer also failed to
present any evidence that the fair market value of the contracts was less than face. As a result, the
Diab court simply accepted the Service's decision to deny any discount. Id at 1867. In effect, the
ruling placed the taxpayer on the accrual method, which of course may well be the appropriate
method of accounting if other methods do not clearly reflect income. Because the rationale of the
decision is based on section 1001, however, rather than on the adequacy of the taxpayer's account-
ing method, it adds to the confusion surrounding the nonascertainability-of-value approach.
91. 72 T.C. at 714 n.ll.
92. See text accompanying notes 4-11 supra.
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the business of selling lots, however, the same result would have been
achieved by starting with the assumption that his method of account-
ing, rather than section 1001, would determine the amount of income
from these transactions. At least in this case, such an approach would
have avoided entirely the difficult ascertainability issue.
Thus, the real problem in Wiggins may not have been as-
certainability, because the accounting morass would have been present
even if each purchaser had given a secured negotiable promissory note.
The value of such notes might often be substantially less than face, but
it seems that the court could make a reasonable estimate of the value of
at least some of them. The real problem is that the value will vary with
the financial circumstances and reputation of the purchaser, so that the
accounting will be intricate notwithstanding the ascertainability of the
notes' value.
The confusion surrounding ascertainability is entirely unsatisfac-
tory. First, the absence of standards for determining ascertainability
can leave two similarly situated taxpayers in dramatically different tax
positions. If a court concludes that the obligation received does not
have an ascertainable value, the taxpayer reaps a bonanza: no immedi-
ate taxation and capital gain treatment for payments as they are made.
If the court, however, happens to find that the value is ascertainable,
the taxpayer is faced with a dilemma: if the ascertained value is low,
the immediate tax impact is minimized but later payments will often be
treated as ordinary income when received; if the ascertained value is
high, on the other hand, the immediate tax impact is drastic and later
payments may still be treated as ordinary income when received. 93 In
addition, the very circumstances that might call for special treatment
because the obligation received has no ascertainable value usually
render the transaction ineligible for the tax relief of the installment sale
provisions.94 This enhances the possibility of unequal treatment by
making everything turn on the ascertainability issue.
Finally, there are other circumstances, usually involving contin-
gent-price contracts, in which the courts might legitimately seek to
93. See, e.g., M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 60, at 302-03. This problem is discussed in detail
in Part V of this Article. See notes 150-92 infra and accompanying text.
94. Under current law, a contingency in the purchase price will render the installment sale
provisions unavailable because the percentage of gain on each payment cannot be calculated in
accordance with the statutory formula. In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398, 1402 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975) (quot-
ing Gralapp v. United States, 458 F.2d 1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 1972)). See text accompanying note
249 infra. Uncertainty in amount, however, has been central to the taxpayer's argument in a
number of cases that have found a contract to have no ascertainable fair market value. E.g.,
Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); MacDonald v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 840, 860-62 (1971),
acq. 1973-2 C.B. 2; Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606, 629-30 (1968).
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avoid the direct application of section 100 I's fair market value standard
even to isolated transactions and even when a fair market value is in
fact ascertainable. In these cases as well, ascertainability is simply not
a standard that achieves uniform and equitable results.95 Therefore,
although there may be cases of true nonascertainability in which open-
transaction treatment is appropriate, different rationales are needed in
these other circumstances. The basic rationale suggested in this Article,
distinguishing between isolated sales and sales in the regular course of
business, solves the W'iggins problem. The problem of contingent-price
contracts is considered in Part VI below.96
It is worth noting that Burnet v. Logan97 does not logically provide
a rationale for keeping the transaction open when the fair market value
of a purchaser obligation is not ascertainable. The sale in Logan took
place in March 1916, when the 1913 statute98 was in effect. That statute
envisioned only the cash method of accounting and contained no spe-
cial recognition provision covering sales or exchanges. 99 Consequently,
the Court was free to fashion its own measure of gain. Moreover, the
accounting method should have governed the timing issue because
there was no equivalent of section 1001 to override the accounting pro-
visions of the Act. The substantial legislative revisions and additions
that took place from 1916 to 1926,100 including the special provision for
taxing capital gains,101 should have induced a complete reevaluation of
the Logan approach. The failure of any court to do so, notwithstand-
ing the existence of ample statutory grounds, is undoubtedly a major
source of the current confusion.
3. Accounting-Provision Approach. A third group of cases relies
on the taxpayer's method of accounting to tax gain from the sale of
property. Although these cases do not expressly deny the potential ap-
plicability of section 1001, few indicate their bases for ignoring it.
Those that make an attempt to explain their approach, moreover, usu-
ally adopt a line of reasoning that, followed to its logical conclusion,
would read section 1001 out of the Code, at least when purchaser obli-
gations are received upon the sale of property. Because separate lines
95. See text accompanying notes 224-58 infra.
96. See notes 224-58 infra and accompanying text.
97. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
98. Ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 166 (1913).
99. See note 14 supra.
100. See notes 15-39 supra and accompanying text.
101. Cf. Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606, 635 (1968) (Simpson, J., dissenting) (Logan not
applicable; value should be ascertained). The first capital gains tax was adopted as part of the
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206, 42 Stat. 232.
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of authority have developed for accrual-method and cash-method tax-
payers, it is perhaps easiest to consider the two types of accounting sys-
tems separately.
(a) Accrual-method taxpayers. Accrual-method taxpayers in a reg-
ular business of building and selling real property have generally been
required to include in income the full face amount of the purchaser's
obligations. The courts reach this result even when the security for the
obligations is plainly insufficient' 0 2 or when the seller is required to
deposit funds with the third-party financer as additional security. 10 3 If
section 1001 is discussed at all, it is held inapplicable on the fictional
ground that the purchaser obligation is money rather than property't 4
for accrual-method taxpayers. The results of these cases are consistent
with the approach suggested in this Article, but the courts have failed
to recognize the most obvious justification for section 100 I's inapplica-
bility: the taxpayer's method of accounting governs sales in the regular
course of business.
Cases involving isolated transactions, on the other hand, take a
slightly different tack, passing over section 1001 as applicable only to
cash-method taxpayers.'05 Nearly every case involving an isolated sale
102. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 474, 487 (1963). The value of the
purchaser obligation plus the downpayment in this case was less than the seller's basis, so the
seller sought to be taxed under section 1001.
103. Western Oaks Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 365, 370-74 (1968), nonacq. 1968-2
C.B. 3; Key Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 109, 111-12 (1958), a 'dper curam, 271 F.2d
280 (6th Cir. 1959). The Western Oaks case is interesting because it also involved several sellers
who were on the cash method. Although the court acknowledged section 1001, it concluded that a
cash-method taxpayer did not have to include a purchaser obligation in income unless it was a
cash equivalent, even when for other purposes it might be considered to have a fair market value.
49 T.C. at 376. Consequently, the court actually followed the accounting methods of both types of
taxpayers. In terms of the interpretation of section 1001 suggested by this Article, both results in
Western Oaks are correct-a rather extraordinary case, since so few others have managed to reach
even one correct result. The rationale under the suggested approach would, of course, be different
from the court's in Western Oaks; the analysis in this Article would emphasize that the taxpayers
involved were all in the business of selling the property on a regular basis. Id at 367.
104. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 474, 487 (1963).
105. Freitas v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 545, 555 (1966) (sale of stock); George L.
Castner Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1061, 1067-68 (1958) (sale by an accrual-method business of
all of its assets); Brown v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 1054, 1060 (1950) (sale of partnership
interest). The taxpayer in Brown apparently was engaged in a number of businesses involving
vending machines and similar food distribution operations, but the opinion is not clear whether
the taxpayer was in the business of selling these business interests. In any event, that certainly was
not the ground for the decision.
Another confusing twist in this area centers around Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6 (1958) and its pred-
ecessors, which provide that in sales of real property not eligible for the installment method of
reporting, gain or loss is to be measured by the fair market value of the purchaser obligation
received. Both Freitas and Castner held that this regulation does not apply to casual sales of
personal property by accrual-method taxpayers. Neither court, however, seemed to notice that the
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by an accrual-method taxpayer follows this rationale. The Service has
also consistently taken the view that the taxpayer's method of account-
ing governs taxation of sales by accrual-method taxpayers, whether the
sales are isolated or in the course of a business. 0 6 Thus, section 1001
has essentially been read out of the Code for accrual-method taxpay-
ers. 10 7 Unfortunately, it is not clear why section 1001 should apply to
cash-method taxpayers but not to accrual-method taxpayers.
(b) Cash-method taxpayers. The preponderance of reported sale-
of-property cases have involved cash-method taxpayers, and these
cases are far less uniform in rationale and result. As already noted, 08
some courts apply a literal reading of section 1001 to cash-method tax-
payers, and others have taken a doctrinally related open-transaction
approach based on nonascertainability of value.1°9 Still others apply
what might be termed a "mixed" approach (mixing section 1001 and
the accounting provisions).10 Another line of cases, however, has re-
lied solely on the taxpayer's method of accounting, essentially exclud-
ing analysis under section 1001.
The statement of the rule most often quoted in these cases comes
from Johnston v. Commissioner,"' which involved a sale of stock in
1942 under a contractual arrangement requiring that a downpayment
be paid into escrow in that year and that a contingent balance be paid
in 1943 when the exact price could be determined. In a reversal of the
usual roles, the taxpayer sought to recognize his gain in 1942 but the
Service determined that the gain was taxable in 1943. Although the
regulation is indistinguishable from section 1001. Moreover, the Western Oaks court, 49 T.C. 365,
372 n.4 (1968), nonacq. 1968-2 C.B. 3, concluded that this regulation did not apply even to sales of
real property by accrual-method taxpayers. For a discussion of the history of this regulation, see
Haley, supra note 34, at 319-21.
106. Rev. Rul. 79-292, 1979-39 I.R.B. 18. See note 71 supra. In another recent ruling the
Service held that a 1977 securities litigation settlement in which the defendant promised to pay the
accrual-method taxpayer a fixed sum was taxable in 1977 in the full face amount promised. Rev.
Rul. 79-278, 1979-37 I.R.B. 18. This amount was actually paid in 1978. Because it appears that an
isolated transaction was involved, the approach suggested in this Article would find gain only to
the extent of the fair market value of the promise received in 1977.
107. In Rubino v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 1095 (1949), a fdper curiam on another
issue, 186 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1951), an accrual-method taxpayer was apparently taxed under the
literal section 1001 approach. The opinion contains essentially no discussion of the relevance of
the taxpayer's method of accounting. However, the obligations in question were valued by the
Service at face value, and the taxpayer failed to meet his burden of proving this determination
wrong. Therefore, the result is the same as obtained by ignoring section 1001 and relying on the
taxpayer's accrual method. See note 90 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
109. See text accompanying notes 76-101 supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 133-44 infra.
111. 14T.C. 560 (1950).
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court recognized the possibility of applying Burnet v. Logan 112 to these
facts, 113 it did not decide the case on this basis. Rather, the court fo-
cused on the distinction between cash- and accrual-method taxpayers:
for a taxpayer on the cash method, the issue is whether the obligation
received on a sale of property is a cash equivalent. Moreover, a con-
tractual obligation is not a cash equivalent if it "merely require[s] fu-
ture payments and no notes, mortgages, or other evidence of
indebtedness such as commonly change hands in commerce. . .[are]
given or accepted .... u14 This, of course, is a valid statement of cash
equivalence in cases not involving the disposition of property, in which
no special timing provisions apply. 115 Applied to property sales, how-
ever, this definition has the effect of reading section 1001 out of the
Code." 6 Section 1001 says nothing about cash equivalence, a concept
designed to prevent abuses by cash-method taxpayers through manipu-
lation of their accounting method. To apply the cash-equivalence test
to sales transactions is to say that the taxpayer's method of accounting
always prevails. Nevertheless, a large number of cases have relied on
this statement from Johnston to apply cash-equivalence concepts to the
taxation of the sale or exchange of property. 117
Because the Johnston opinion is so often cited, it is worth examin-
ing its erroneous foundation in some detail. The Johnston court not
only failed to consider the statutory provisions governing the transac-
tion with which it was dealing; it also relied on several prior decisions
that either were inapplicable because of changes in the relevant statutes
112. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
113. 14 T.C. at 565, 566. Covering all bases, the court also noted that the record failed to
establish a fair market value for the contract in 1942. Id at 566. Nevertheless, most of the opin-
ion centers on the cash-equivalence analysis.
114. Id at 565.
115. E.g., Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961) (involving notes received
as partial payments on a lease). See notes 62-69 supra and accompanying text.
116. The Johnston court expressly rejected, as contrary to his cash accounting method, the
taxpayer's attempt to apply the predecessor of section 1001 to the contract. 14 T.C. at 565.
117. Silverton v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 817, 833 (1977); Lowe v. Commissioner, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) 652, 653 (1974); Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 663, 669 (1973), rev'd,
524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975); Western Oaks Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 365, 376-77
(1968), nonacq. 1968-2 C.B. 3; Estate of Hurlburt v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1286, 1288 (1956),
nonacq. 1956-2 C.B. 10; Ennis v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 465, 470 (1951); Vf. McIntosh v. Commis-
sioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1164, 1179 (1967) (while negotiable promissory notes given in exchange
for property are property within meaning of term in section 1001(b), nonnegotiable, non-interest-
bearing notes are not); Andrews v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 1026, 1035 (1955) (mere promise of
future payments in contract of sale is not "property" as intended in predecessor of section 1001).
Many of these cases achieved results favorable to the taxpayer, and there is perhaps a degree of
frontier justice in hanging the Service with the rope it helped fashion in Johnston. However, the
inconsistency and confusion the case has caused is a heavy price.
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or were wrongly decided. One example is Bedell v. Commissioner,118 in
which Judge Learned Hand delivered his familiar admonition that "it
is absurd to speak of a promise to pay a sum in the future as having a
'market value,' fair or unfair."1 19 The transaction in Bedell, however,
was governed by the Revenue Act of 1918.120 Thus, the Bedell court
had no need to analyze the implications of the legislative developments
in 1921, 1924, and 1926, all of which suggest that a promise of future
payment should, under the current statutory scheme, be included in the
measure of income at its fair market value.121 Accordingly, even those
who agree with Hand's conclusion that it is absurd to attribute a mar-
ket value to promises of future payment must come to grips with the
opposite conclusion subsequently drawn by Congress. Moreover, al-
though it was not part of the Bedell analysis, there is a respectable ar-
gument that because the specific statutory recognition provision
covered only exchanges, the accounting provisions governed the timing
of taxation of all sales transactions under the 1918 statute. 122 If this
argument is valid, cash-equivalence analysis correctly achieves Hand's
result.
The Johnston court also relied on Ruprecht v. Commissioner,123 in
which a cash-method taxpayer received in exchange for real property
the purchaser's promise to pay $10,000 per year for five years. The
Ruprecht court held that the taxpayer did not have to include the value
of this promise in his income for the year of sale,124 emphasizing that
the only written evidence of the purchaser's promise was contained in
the deed to the property and that the seller received no other written
contract or note.125 The court126 made no reference to the applicable
118. 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929) (alternative holding).
119. Id at 624. The Bedell case is another in which the normal roles of the taxpayer and the
Service were reversed. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra. The taxpayer contracted to sell
real property in 1919 and argued that the sale took place in that year rather than in 1920 when the
closing occurred and title passed. The court concluded that the taxpayer realized gain only when
the sale was completed in 1920, 30 F.2d at 624, and therefore the discussion of cash equivalence in
the opinion may properly be regarded'as dictum. Nevertheless, the quoted langauge has been
very influential.
120. Ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
121. See text accompanying notes 21-39 supra. The Bedell court did note that the statutory
provisions had been liberalized in 1921 in favor of the taxpayer, but it concluded that this did not
imply a stricter approach under the 1918 statute that governed the case. 30 F.2d at 624. The court
made no attempt to interpret the retrenchment in 1924 or the adoption of the installment sale
provisions in 1926.
122. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
123. 16 B.T.A. 919, 921-22, acq. VIII-2 C.B. 46 (1929), a 'don another issue, 39 F.2d 458 (5th
Cir. 1930).
124. 16 B.T.A. at 922.
125. That the purchaser involved happened to be the Standard Oil Company apparently did
not move the Ruprecht panel.
126. For simplicity, this Article refers to the Board of Tax Appeals, the forerunner of today's
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statute, 127 and its reliance entirely on cash-equivalence analysis indi-
cates that the court considered only the accounting provisions relevant.
Nonetheless, the sale in Ruprecht took place in 1921 and was subject to
the liberal provisions of the Revenue Act of 1921.128 Consequently, the
result in Ruprecht can easily be justified under the then-applicable stat-
utory law. In addition, regardless of how one interprets the exchange
provisions under the 1918 and 1921 Acts, neither Ruprecht nor Bedell
can logically serve as authority for transactions occurring after 1926;
between 1918 and 1926 Congress had addressed the problem of taxing
dispositions of property no fewer than three times.' 29
The major error in the development of judicial authority in this
area occurred in Humphrey v. Commissioner, 30 in which a cash-
method taxpayer successfully argued that nonnegotiable notes he re-
ceived upon the sale of his interest in a partnership were not cash
equivalents and therefore not taxable until actually paid. The Board of
Tax Appeals relied heavily on Bedell, particularly on the language
quoted above, 31 without recognizing that intervening legislative devel-
opments required a new look at the Bedell analysis. The Johnston case
not only followed Humphrey and Bedell, but it compounded those er-
rors with similarly mistaken reliance on Ruprecht.132 Consequently,
the cases following Johnston and Humphrey, relying solely on cash-
equivalence analysis to resolve the timing question for dispositions of
property, are based on a major, but apparently unintentional, oversight
by the Tax Court.
4. Mixed Approaches. (a) No "oroper y" received. Other cases
have acknowledged the potential applicability of section 1001 or its
predecessors to dispositions of property. In dealing with section 1001,
however, these courts have reasoned that a contractual obligation of
the purchaser not evidenced by a negotiable and freely transferable
note or other evidence of indebtedness is not property to a cash-method
Tax Court, as a "court," although until recently it may more properly have been regarded as an
independent agency of the executive branch. See, e.g., B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME
ESTATE & GiFr TAXATION 941 (1972).
127. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
128. The sale in Ruprecht took place in June 1921 and the Revenue Act of 1921 was not
adopted until November of that same year. Ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227. However, the 1921 statute
covered fiscal years ending during calendar year 1921 as well as fiscal years ending December 31,
1921. Id § 200(1).
129. See notes 21-39 supra and accompanying text.
130. 32 B.T.A. 280, 282, nonacq. XIV-2 C.B. 34 (1935).
131. 32 B.T.A. at 282.
132. 14 T.C. at 566.
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taxpayer and therefore is not includable in the amount realized under
section 1001.133 Thus, the outcome is the same as in Johnston and
Humphrey: no immediate taxation to a cash-method taxpayer unless
he receives a true cash equivalent.134 The result under this approach is
exactly the same as looking solely to the accounting provisions and al-
together ignoring section 1001, the provision specifically designed to
cover the question. 135
(b) Expanded cash-equivalence approach. A second group of cases
has been less willing to read section 1001 out of the Code in principle
or in practice, but these courts are also unable to ignore the accounting
provisions. They begin by finding, through one method or another,
that the purchaser obligation in question has a fair market value and
that taxation under section 1001 is appropriate. They then resolve the
apparent conflict between section 1001 and the accounting provisions
by expanding the concept of cash equivalence in connection with the
sale of property, so that the purchaser obligation received by the seller
is defined, often implicitly, to be a cash equivalent to the extent of its
fair market value. As a cash equivalent, the obligation is treated identi-
cally under section 1001 and the cash method of accounting.
One decision, for example, found that the obligations involved had
a fair market value and then concluded that they were cash
equivalents. The court based this conclusion solely on the notes' nego-
tiability, even though the obligor was a thinly capitalized corporation
and the notes had a value much less than face. 136 Admittedly, the pres-
133. McIntosh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1164, 1179-80 (1967); Andrews v. Com-
missioner, 23 T.C. 1026, 1035 (1955); Kleberg v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 277, 289 (1941), acq.
withdrawn 1952-1 C.B. 5; cf. Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 663, 670 (1973) (Scott,
J., concurring) (question in case was factual one of whether contract was "property received" such
that the fair market value of the property was part of the amount realized by the petitioner from
the sale of the apartment building under section 1001(b)), rev'd, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975).
134. The phrase "true cash equivalent" is used here to mean an item that would be considered
income to a cash-method taxpayer even if it were received independent of a disposition of prop-
erty-for example, as compensation for services or as a dividend. Thus, the term "true cash
equivalent" refers to the narrow test of cash equivalence, as opposed to the somewhat broader test
that has been developed by a few courts in the sale-and-exchange area. See notes 62-69 supra and
136-44 infra and accompanying text.
135. This approach is similar to treating a purchaser obligation as money to an accrual-
method taxpayer. See notes 104-05 supra and accompanying text. In both situations an intangible
that has value to the taxpayer and can be freely encumbered is treated as something other than
property in calculating the amount realized under section 1001.
136. Marcello v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 168, 180-81 (1964), remanded on other grounds, 380
F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S 1044 (1968). A recent Tax Court decision also read
the Johnston rule literally and held that a $25,000 note received in connection with the sale of a
law practice was a cash equivalent. Silverton v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 817, 823 (1977).
The court did not discuss whether the note was negotiable in form. The court also found that a
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ence of a negotiable promissory note does distinguish the result here
from the cases that have relied solely on cash-equivalence analysis.
The latter have involved purely contractual obligations, as in Johnston,
or at most a nonnegotiable instrument, as in Humphrey. This distinc-
tion, however, lacks economic substance because it looks solely to the
form of the obligation and ignores factors that may affect its acceptance
in the marketplace. Courts considering cash-equivalence concepts
outside the disposition-of-property area have long realized that to de-
fine all promissory notes as the equivalent of cash is nothing more than
a legal fiction.137 In fact, several courts contributing to this line of cases
have concluded that even a purely contractual obligation taken in con-
nection with the sale of property can be a cash equivalent if there is a
market for the particular type of contract.138
The cases in this line, because they rely essentially on section 1001,
come to the same result as the approach advocated in this Article, at
least to the extent they have involved only isolated transactions. In
failing to recognize, however, that the accounting provisions should not
apply to isolated sales, these courts have unnecessarily felt compelled to
deal with the concept of cash equivalence. If that concept were rele-
vant, a test requiring marketability and the actual existence of a market
would have considerable appeal. Formal distinctions such as negotia-
bility, which as a practical matter may be irrelevant to whether any
cash can actually be realized, would enter the analysis, if at all, only as
factors affecting value. The valuation problem itself is also more easily
and more accurately resolved when there is a ready market for obliga-
tions of the particular type. 139 Nevertheless, before embarking on a
cash-equivalence analysis, one should ask the reason for considering
the concept at all. Cash equivalence is an accounting-provision con-
cept designed to prevent evasive delaying tactics by cash-method tax-
payers when timing is properly governed by the taxpayer's method of
accounting. 140 The definition of any analytical term should, at least
contractual obligation not evidenced by a note but received in the same transaction was not a cash
equivalent. The note, but not the contractual obligation, was therefore includable as an amount
realized in the income of the cash-method taxpayer. Id at 833.
137. E.g., Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961). See notes 62-69 supra
and accompanying text.
138. Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 790 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1975); Heller Trust
v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 675, 681 (9th Cir. 1967); Kaufman v. Commissioner, 372 F.2d 789,
793-94 (4th Cir. 1966); Perelman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 234, 242 (1963), acq. 1965-2 C.B. 6.
All these cases involved real estate sales contracts on a standard form for which there was at least
a local market.
139. See Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. United States, 318 F.2d 922, 928 (Ct. Cl. 1963). See also
text accompanying notes 167-74 infra.
140. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
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ideally, be the same for all matters to which it properly applies, and to
broaden the concept of cash equivalence in the special case of property
dispositions can only add confusion in areas in which the concept is
more appropriately narrow, such as compensation for services. 141 Such
broadening under this line of cases is totally unnecessary, because the
cases assume that the express timing statute, section 1001, applies. If
these courts only realized that this assumption logically precludes ap-
plication of the accounting provisions, the apparent conflict would dis-
appear and no distortion of language would be necessary to resolve it.
Because section 1001 does not refer to cash equivalence, there is no
reason to consider the concept at all.
Moreover, to broaden the concept of cash equivalence for cash-
method taxpayers leaves open the correct treatment of accrual-method
taxpayers. Either of the two possible approaches has its problems. On
the one hand, it is possible to treat purchaser obligations as money to
accrual-method taxpayers, but to treat identical obligations as property
to cash-method taxpayers only to the extent that the obligations are
cash equivalents under the broad definition of that term. The problem
with this approach has already been discussed above:142 it ignores the
timing implications of section 1001 in favor of the taxpayer's method of
accounting. On the other hand, to treat the obligations similarly for
both types of taxpayers implies that section 1001 is the governing provi-
sion, but that section literally speaks about fair market value and not
about cash equivalence. Consequently, the relevant inquiry is to the
factors that properly go into the determination of fair market value.
Although the existence of a market and a high degree of marketability
may be crucial to a rational definition of cash equivalence, neither of
these factors is determinative of the existence (as opposed to the de-
141. See text accompanying notes 62-69 supra. The confusion also runs in the reverse direc-
tion. For example, a frequently cited cash-equivalence case is Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d
20 (5th Cir. 1961), which involved bonus payments in connection with an oil lease. The bonus
took the form of a contractual obligation to pay money in the future. After rejecting formalistic
tests like negotiability, the court defined a cash equivalent to be "a promise to pay of a solvent
obigor [that] is unconditional and assignable, not subject to set-offs, and is of a kind that is fre-
quently transferred to lenders or investors at a discount not substantially greater than the gener-
ally prevailing premium for the use of money." Id at 24.
The limitation on the degree of discount is an important restriction in the Cowden definition
and is probably appropriate outside the property disposition area. See notes 62-69 supra and
accompanying text. However, the Ninth Circuit in Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d
788 (9th Cir. 1975), felt compelled to distinguish Cowden in a sale-of-property setting by saying
that the discount language in Cowden was only descriptive of the obligation involved in that case
and not a general requirement for cash equivalence. Id at 794 n.9. The court in Warren Jones
would not have had so much trouble if it had recognized that cash equivalence is irrelevant to
transactions governed by section 1001.
142. See text accompanying notes 102-07 & 133-35 supra.
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gree) of fair market value.1 43 In addition, to import a cash-equivalence
standard into section 1001 contradicts the evident intent of Congress
when it eliminated the requirement in the Revenue Act of 1921 of a
readily realizable market value as a condition to immediate taxation. t44
Consequently, before discussing the concept of cash equivalence, one
should first decide whether the taxpayer's accounting method or section
1001 governs taxation of the transaction. If section 1001 governs, the
search for cash equivalence should be abandoned and attention fo-
cused on the factors that determine the fair market value of the prop-
erty received.
C. Summary.
In considering whether the taxpayer's accounting method or sec-
tion 1001 should govern the timing issue, it is helpful to summarize the
various judicial approaches and their deficiencies.
Cases that resort to section 1001 without considering the taxpayer's
accounting method ignore the usefulness of reliance on the taxpayer's
method of accounting when property sales are part of a regular ongoing
business. This approach unnecessarily requires a cumbersome and in-
accurate valuation mechanism, because by hypothesis the taxpayer's
method of accounting does not distort his income.145
The cases finding that a particular obligation had no ascertainable
fair market value are not clearly objectionable in the abstract, but one
must question whether there are many obligations whose value is in
fact nonascertainable. Moreover, so many methods of valuation have
been developed t46 that it is impossible to identify clear standards to
determine whether a fair market value is or is not ascertainable. Con-
sequently, most cases are result-oriented and without predictive value.
This approach can leave two similarly situated taxpayers in very differ-
ent tax positions. Especially when installment reporting is unavailable,
similarly situated taxpayers may find themselves facing diametrically
opposite tax results, because all tax consequences will turn on the as-
certainability issue. Finally, and possibly most important, as-
143. It will not do to object that a fair market value test implies a requirement that a market
exist, because a market is rarely even considered as a condition of immediate taxation when the
seller receives third-party obligations or tangible property in the transaction. See note 54 supra
and accompanying text.
144. See notes 21-39 supra and accompanying text.
145. Otherwise, the Service is authorized to recompute income by a method that does accu-
rately reflect income. § 446(b).
146. In Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), the Court noted that the very contract whose
value could not be ascertained had been valued for estate tax purposes. Id at 413. See also
McShain v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 998, 1009 n.4 (1979).
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certainability is often not the real problem, and only confusion can
arise when this standard is warped to achieve results demanding a dif-
ferent rationale.
The cases that rely solely on the taxpayer's accounting method ig-
nore both the language of section 1001 and the evident intent of Con-
gress that taxation of gain from property dispositions be governed by
that section unless the transaction qualifies for the ameliorative install-
ment sale provisions. The rationale of these cases would also unjustly
distinguish between cash- and accrual-method taxpayers who make
isolated sales of similar property on similar terms outside their regular
businesses.
The cases that treat a purchaser obligation as money in the hands
of an accrual-method taxpayer and as something other than property in
the hands of a cash-method taxpayer purport to rely on section 1001.
In fact, these cases deny its application, because the result in each case
is determined solely by the taxpayer's method of accounting. More-
over, this approach either explicitly or implicitly assumes the applica-
bility of section 1001, but that section provides no express basis for
distinguishing between the two types of taxpayers. Finally, this inter-
pretation of section 1001 gives the same word in the same section of the
Code different meanings, and the only justification for the variable def-
inition is the result achieved. The best that can be said in favor of this
approach is that it does rationalize some of the cases that have distin-
guished between cash- and accrual-method taxpayers under section
1001.147
The cases that use an expanded definition of the accounting-
method concept of cash equivalence in property-disposition transac-
tions do so for reasons that have nothing to do with accounting. The
courts use this analysis in an attempt to accommodate the apparent
command of section 1001. As a result, the concept of cash equivalence
is likely to become clouded in matters that are not governed by any
special timing provision and that require a narrow definition of the
concept. 148 Moreover, these cases do not achieve a rational accommo-
dation of section 1001 to the accounting provisions. To the extent that
courts adopting this rationale continue to distinguish between accrual-
and cash-method taxpayers, they still rely solely on accounting meth-
147. Haley, supra note 34, at 321.
148. If the concept of cash equivalence is to be expanded, the expansion should be related to
the goals that cash equivalence and the related doctrine of constructive receipt are intended to
serve: the prevention of income distortion through evasive delaying tactics by cash-method tax-
payers.
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ods rather than on section 1001 to determine the timing of taxation. 149
On the other hand, to the extent that the cases treat both types of tax-
payers similarly, they do no more than import an accounting-method
concept into section 1001 without any apparent reason for doing so.
V. OPERATION OF THE SUGGESTED APPROACH
A. General Operation.
Because no single approach has become well enough established
that only congressional reform is possible, it is not too late to offer an
interpretation of the current statutes that provides a more coherent ra-
tionale and more predictable results.150 Under the approach suggested
by the statutory development, the key distinction would be whether a
sale or other disposition takes place in a regular course of a business or
is instead a casual or isolated transaction.1 51 Property dispositions in
the ordinary course of business would be governed by the taxpayer's
method of accounting for income from that particular business, while
transactions outside the ordinary course of business would be subject to
section 1001. The timing of taxation in either case would, of course, be
overridden by the installment sale provision15 2 whenever the taxpayer
is eligible for and elects to report gain under section 453.153
One obvious advantage of this approach is its consistency with the
evident intent of Congress in originally adopting the predecessors of
section 1001. At the same time, this interpretation would give both the
accounting provisions and section 1001 substantial nonoverlapping op-
erative scope. It would eliminate the need for complex and necessarily
inaccurate valuations of obligations received as part of a regular busi-
ness,' 54 and, probably even more important, it would go far toward
eliminating litigation over valuations in those cases.' 55 It would end
149. These courts use section 1001, however, to modify the cash method in the special case of
property dispositions by making it a basis for expanding the cash-equivalence concept.
150. Legislative proposals have been made that, if enacted, would greatly affect many prop-
erty sales. All these proposals, however, suffer from the basic problem that has infected judicial
analysis: the failure to distinguish between regular and isolated sales. The proposals are discussed
in text accompanying notes 259-282 infra.
151. See text accompanying notes 42-50 supra.
152. § 453.
153. There is, of course, a further exception for any transaction governed by a specific timing
or nonrecognition provision, such as a tax-free reorganization or an exchange of like-kind prop-
erty. The analysis in the text applies when the transaction does not fit within one of these special
categories.
154. The same approach could also be used in connection with third-party obligations re-
ceived in the regular course of business, with the same advantage of eliminating the need for
valuations. See note 55 supra.
155. Of course, in the majority of cases, the sales-business taxpayer's method of accounting
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discrimination between otherwise similarly situated cash- and accrual-
method taxpayers who sell property unrelated to the businesses for
which their accounting systems were adopted.1 56 Further, because the
approach gives coherent scope to potentially applicable but apparently
contradictory statutory provisions, it provides a theoretical framework
that should eliminate the confusion resulting from judicial attempts to
apply more than one provision to the same problem. Finally, the sug-
gested approach would provide predictability for taxpayers contem-
plating sale-of-property transactions. 157
The suggested resolution focuses on a number of questions. The
evidently is accepted by the Service without any attempt by either side to apply section 1001.
Otherwise, the entire tax bureaucracy would be swamped with valuation proceedings. Neverthe-
less, in a significant number of cases, all involving taxpayers in the business of improving or
otherwise dealing in real estate, either the Service or the taxpayer has sought to apply section 1001.
Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967); Kaufman v. Commissioner, 372 F.2d
789 (4th Cir. 1966); Miller v. United States, 235 F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1956) (sole transferee of all
assets of corporation in real estate business); Owen v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 707 (Ct. Cl. 1934);
Diab v. Commissioner, [1979] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 79,475, at 1860; Estate of Wiggins v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 61 (1979); Witte v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1137 (1972) (stipula-
tion), rep'don other grounds, 513 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Perelman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.
234 (1963), acq. 1965-2 C.B. 6; Rubino v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 1095 (1949) (applying
predecessor of section 1001 to accrual-method taxpayer in regular real estate business but con-
cluding that fair market value of obligation was equal to its face value, thereby reaching same
result that taxpayer's accounting method would have provided), ajf'dper cur/am on other grounds,
186 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1951); Cambria Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1155 (1936) (applying
section 1001 to taxpayer in regular business but concluding that obligations received had no ascer-
tainable fair market value), acq. andnonacq. 1937-1 C.B. 4. Other courts have impliedly or ex-
pressly rejected a proposed application of section 1001 to accrual-method taxpayers in a regular
real estate business, but none have made the regular business a ground for the decision. Western
Oaks Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 365 (1968), nonacq. 1968-2 C.B. 3; First Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 474 (1963); Key Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 109 (1958),
aj7'dper cur/am, 271 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1959).
156. The distinction cuts in two directions. The more frequent situation involves an accrual-
method taxpayer who is taxed on the full face amount of the obligation he receives in an isolated
transaction. See notes 102-03 supra and accompanying text. The other possibility involves a pur-
chaser obligation in which the total amount payable is contingent on future events. Because not
all the events necessary to fix the amount of the obligation with reasonable accuracy have oc-
curred, this amount should not be immediately taxable to an accrual-method taxpayer if his ac-
counting method governs timing. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(ii) (1957). Nevertheless, the
contingency may not be so strong that the obligation cannot be valued, and under an expanded
interpretation of cash equivalence a cash-method taxpayer may face immediate taxation in ac-
cordance with the fair market value of the obligation. Under the proposed approach, the only
question in the case of an isolated transaction is whether the obligation has a fair market value. If
it does, the tax result is the same for both taxpayers.
157. Of course, for isolated transactions, there is considerable uncertainty in the determination
of fair market value. Nevertheless, this uncertainty is a much narrower issue. Moreover, the
taxpayer knows the relevant factors in the analysis, such as solvency of the obligor, amount and
type of security, degree of discount, and ease of marketability. He can therefore build a record
substantiating his position. In the vast majority of cases, there is likely to be a fair market value
above whatever minimum the taxpayer would like not to exceed. In this case the taxpayer knows
that he must structure the transaction to make himself eligible for installment reporting.
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most obvious issue concerns the standards for determining whether a
sale is isolated or in the regular course of a business. Second, if the sale
is isolated, it is necessary to determine the section 1001 fair market
value of the purchaser obligation received. The rest of Part V analyzes
these two issues.
B. Degfnition of Isolated Transactions.
Under the suggested approach, any sales transaction must be char-
acterized either as isolated or as in the regular course of a business.
Although there are no judicial definitions of an isolated transaction in
the specific context of section 1001, the distinction should not be too
difficult in practice. The issue may accurately be rephrased in terms of
whether the accounting method used in the taxpayer's regular business
or employment could sensibly be applied to the transaction. For exam-
ple, if the taxpayer maintains an inventory of the item sold, if he has
previously reported similar sales using the accounting method of his
business or employment, or if he sells a new or unusual item through
an established sales operation, the transaction should probably be con-
sidered a regular sale. The very purpose of his accounting method is to
give uniform and consistent treatment to these transactions. On the
other hand, suppose the taxpayer sells his personal residence or all the
stock or assets of a wholly owned business. There will normally be no
reason to apply to these sales the accounting system he uses in report-
ing income from ordinary individual transactions in his business or em-
ployment. With respect to the isolated sales, the consistency necessary
to make sense of an accounting system is lacking.158
Further guidance is available from section 453. The installment
sale provisions expressly distinguish between regular sales of personal
property on the installment plan and casual sales of personal property
158. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra. The distinction between regular and isolated
transactions could perhaps be made even more predictable with a strict numerical test. For exam-
ple, the California sales tax applies to retail sales of personal property, but there is an exemption
for occasional sales. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 6006.5(a) (West 1970); id §§ 6051, 6367 (West
Supp. 1979). The state's Board of Equalization regulations hold that, in general, three sales of
similar character render the occasional-sale exemption unavailable. Cal. Bd. of Eq. Regs.
§ 1595(a) (1972). A strict numerical test, however, may have its own problems. For example, if
the taxpayer were free to choose a method of accounting for his "business" whenever the specified
number of sales transactions was exceeded, many taxpayers might abuse the system by artificially
increasing their number of sales in order to escape section 1001 treatment. On the other hand, if
the method of accounting otherwise used by the taxpayer in his unrelated business or employment
were to apply automatically whenever the number was exceeded, hardship could result-for ex-
ample, when an accrual-method taxpayer in his usual business sells stock held as a side investment
in several close corporations. Therefore, a strict numerical test is probably inadvisable absent
evidence that individualized attention is unmanageable.
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for a price exceeding $1,000.159 Litigation over this fifty-year-old dis-
tinction has been infrequent, so that the distinction does not appear to
be a difficult one to make in practice. The authority that does exist
supports the examples given in the previous paragraph. Thus, an early
general counsel memorandum concluded that the sale of a pearl on
unusual terms by a person in, the jewelry business is not casual within
the meaning of the predecessor of section 453,160 while courts have held
that the sale by a corporation of all of its assets 161 and a series of sales
of corporate stock holdings by a business executive' 62 are casual. This
authority under section 453 is directly relevant to the regular/isolated
distinction suggested for determining the application of section 1001.
Indeed, the proposed approach requires that sections 1001 and 453 be
read together, leaving only section 453 to relieve the rigors of section
1001. If a transaction is sufficiently irregular to be covered by section
1001 rather than the taxpayer's method of accounting, it should also
qualify as a casual sale under section 453.163 The distinction between
isolated transactions and regular transactions in the course of business
should be handled identically for both section 453 and section 1001
purposes.164
C. Valuation of Purchaser Obligations.
If a transaction is isolated and section 1001 applies, the taxpayer
still must determine the fair market value of the purchaser obliga-
159. Section 453 makes this distinction for the purpose of determining when the installment
method is available. § 453(a)-(b).
160. G.C.M. 1162, VI-1 C.B. 22, 24 (1927).
161. McDonald v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d 920, 922 (4th Cir. 1931).
162. Greenwood v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1209, 1211-12 (1936), acq. 1937- C.B. 11. The
taxpayer in Greenwood owned about 200,000 of the outstanding 300,000 shares of an insurance
company and hired a broker to sell up to 20,000 of his shares. The broker in turn used as many as
14 salesmen at one time to sell the shares either for cash or for a specified percentage down with
the balance to be paid in installments. The sales were nevertheless held to be casual because the
taxpayer was not regularly engaged in buying and selling stock and the sales were not connected
with his business as an executive. 34 B.T.A. at 1210-12.
Greenwood pushes the definition of "casual" close to the borderline. For a large number of
similar sales, especially over several annual accounting periods, the valuation requirement of sec-
tion 1001 is both cumbersome and unnecessary. A separate accounting method could be adopted
for the "business" of selling the stockholdings serially. Nevertheless, the case is still good author-
ity for the proposition that sales of stock unrelated to one's regular employment should not be
governed by the method of accounting for income from such employment. The sales either are
isolated or constitute a separate business.
163. Ifa personal property transaction does not qualify as a casual sale under section 453, the
installment method of reporting is available only when the taxpayer regularly engages in the sales
on the installment plan.
164. Similarly, if a transaction is in the regular course of the taxpayer's business and therefore
covered by his accounting method rather than section 1001, the sale should not be casual under
section 453. Because the sale is not casual, the only issue with respect to section 453 eligibility
should be whether the taxpayer regularly sells on the installment plan. § 453(a)(1).
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tion.165 The courts and commentators have adequately addressed the
general problem of valuation in tax and other areas, 66 and we need
only outline the overall framework of the issue in order to determine
the appropriate interpretation of section 1001.
The fundamental question is whether section 1001's valuation re-
quirement is workable. The failure of the courts to adopt the suggested
interpretation of section 1001 may reflect its unmanageability, and even
the current confusion in the law would presumably be preferable to an
internally consistent but impractical theory of taxation. The suggested
approach, however, has an obvious practical benefit: it actually elimi-
nates the need for valuations in any regular business transaction. In
addition, the difficulties with determining fair market value in isolated
transactions are not unique to this area of tax law, and other possible
interpretations of the Code offer no easier solutions. In order to ana-
lyze the valuation problem, it is helpful to distinguish those situations
in which a market for the obligation actually exists from those in which
fair market value must be determined in another manner.
1. Existence of a Market. (a) Formal markets. The existence of a
formal market for a specific purchaser obligation undoubtedly eases
the valuation problem. In the extreme case of securities traded on a
national securities exchange, 167 one can usually find within a few per-
centage points the amount the seller could have received for the obliga-
tion on any given day. Because section 1001 is designed to measure
pecuniary gain, there is no reason to go beyond this market price in
determining the fair market value of what the seller has received.1 68 If
the seller of the property decides to hold the obligation rather than sell
it, the tax law might appropriately consider this a separate investment
decision 169 and not embroil itself in the taxpayer's reasons for doing
SO. 170
165. This analysis assumes that the taxpayer does not elect the installment method.
166. For example, the Mertens tax service contains a separate 167-page chapter on valuation
problems. 10 J. MERTENS, supra note 37, §§ 59.01-.91 (1976) (chapter 59).
167. A formal market also exists when prices are widely quoted in an over-the-counter market.
168. As in all areas of the law, of course, one should not follow general principles blindly. The
existence of market quotations, for example, does not necessarily mean that the holder of a large
block either could have obtained, or would have been restricted to, the quoted price. Cf. Bolles v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 342, 351-55 (1977) (market quotation discounted because stock subject to
restrictions on transferability pursuant to Securities Act of 1933).
169. An actual sale would, of course, involve brokerage fees and other transaction costs, and
these fees might constitute a major reason for the seller's decision to hold. In the established
securities markets, however, these costs can probably be estimated with considerable accuracy and
deducted from the fair market value determined from the daily transactions or quotations. The
rationale for this method is that if the seller had actually sold, he would have received only the fair
market value less the transaction costs involved in the sale.
170. Presumably, the main reason for holding a debt obligation that has a market price less
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(b) Quasimarkets. Unfortunately, most individual sale-of-prop-
erty transactions do not involve purchaser obligations traded in an es-
tablished securities market, and a question then arises about the precise
meaning of the term "market." Presumably, the value to be attributed
to a purchaser obligation depends on the particular characteristics of
the transaction 7 and on the obligor's financial circumstances. 172 Be-
cause financial circumstances vary from purchaser to purchaser and be-
cause most purchaser-obligors have only a small number of obligations
outstanding at any given time, price quotations based on actual sales or
bids of the type available in the national securities markets will be un-
available. Nevertheless, when the characteristics of the transaction, in-
cluding the legal rights and obligations of the parties, are set forth in a
standard form contract of a type bought and sold by a reasonable
number of persons or firms in the community, it may be possible to
define a "quasimarket" through arm's-length bids on a particular pur-
chaser's obligation, even though no similar obligations of the same pur-
chaser are outstanding or actively traded. If these bids are available,
they should be used to determine fair market value under section
1001.1 They establish what the seller could have obtained for the ob-
ligation had he chosen to dispose of it rather than to hold it, and the
existence of this quasimarket greatly simplifies the otherwise thorny
valuation determination.1 74
than its face value is that the holder either believes that lower interest rates in the future will raise
the price of the obligation or has more faith in the solvency of the obligor than does the market in
general. In this case, the government might argue that the obligation was actually worth more to
the holder than the market price, and this argument might leave the taxpayer with little incentive
to raise considerations other than market price. It ' should be noted that current law goes even
further than the discussion in the text indicates, in that it prohibits the use of the installment
method of reporting when the obligation received by the seller is traded in an established securi-
ties market. See § 453(b)(3). Thus, the seller is not even permitted the investment choice of hold-
ing the purchaser obligation unless he independently has sufficient funds to pay the tax
determined under section 1001.
171. Relevant characteristics of the transaction include the amount and type of security, the
size of downpayment, the interest rate, and the term of the security.
172. Relevant financial circumstances include the obligor's balance sheet, income, and reputa-
tion for making payments when due.
173. This quasimarket exists primarily for certain types of real estate contracts. See, eg.,
Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 789 (9th Cir. 1975); Kaufman v. Commissioner,
372 F.2d 789, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1966); Witte v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCI-I) 1137, 1140 (1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 513 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Perelman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 234,
237-38 (1963), acq. 1965-2 C.B. 6; Estate of Ennis v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 799, 802 (1955) (find-
ing no ascertainable fair market value notwithstanding the existence of a market), nonacq. 1956-2
C.B. 10. Presumably the value of these contracts inheres primarily in the quality of the underlying
security rather than in the individual circumstances of the obligor.
174. Of course, in an established securities market, one need usually only refer to the Wall
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2. Absence of a Market. Some courts have been reluctant to find
cash equivalence in the absence of a formal market or a quasimarket
because finding cash equivalence requires a complicated valuation
without significantly serving the purposes of the cash-equivalence con-
cept.1 75 These considerations, however, do not apply to determinations
of fair market value under section 1001. Cash equivalence is an ac-
counting-provision concept designed to prevent distortion of income by
taxpayers reporting on the cash method. As discussed above, 176 cash
equivalence has no place in cases to which section 1001 applies; the
standard set by that section is fair market value. While it may seem
paradoxical to require a market for cash equivalence but not to require
even a quasimarket in the determination of fair market value, the
courts have never required the existence of a market to determine the
fair market value of third-party obligations received in a sale-of-prop-
erty transaction.177 Consequently, there is no basis for such a require-
ment in the case of purchaser obligations.
In the absence of a market or quasimarket, however, fair market
value must be determined by balancing the various characteristics of
the transaction and the purchaser's financial circumstances. All of the
factors might be brought under one verbal umbrella-the "speculative
character" of the obligation or the "degree of risk" involved-but that
hardly furthers the analysis, nor does it alter the fact that no one has
developed an objective formula for weighing all of the relevant factors
Street Journal for the trading day in question. Obtaining bids in the type of quasimarket envi-
sioned here may involve considerably greater effort. In fact, when bids have not been obtained at
the time of the transaction, the arm's-length assumption totally breaks down, and one can at best
seek an honest assessment, from people making a market in these obligations, of what they would
have bid had they been asked. Nevertheless, the range of their estimates will be circumscribed by
evidence of the types of transactions they did enter into around the date in question.
175. See text accompanying notes 139-40 supra. Consider, for example, the following lan-
guage from Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. United States, 318 F.2d 922 (Ct. Cl. 1963), concerning a
rather special railroad "car note" issued to the taxpayer as a dividend:
The advantage of that general rule [requiring a market] is the relative ease and
accuracy of determining when (and by how much) receipt of an obligation constitutes
income. The test is the practical one of the market, in its broadest sense. To go further
and require the current assessment of the worth of non-realizable or non-marketable
obligations-instead of awaiting the actual receipt of money under those obligations-
would thrust both taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service into the briar-patch of
valuation sans market.
Id at 928. See a/so Mcntosh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1164, 1179 (1967) (succumbing
to the temptation to avoid valuation absent a market even in a sale-of-property context).
176. See text accompanying notes 140-44 supra.
177. See note 54 u.pra and the cases cited therein; see also text accompanying notes 143-44
supra.
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together. In simple terms, valuation of purchaser obligations is a very
difficult problem.
One is tempted to suggest the repeal of section 1001, leaving the
determination of income upon the sale of property to the taxpayer's
method of accounting. However, assuming that Congress would con-
sider eliminating this longstanding provision, this approach would not
be entirely free from objection. In transactions outside the regular
course of the taxpayer's business, this approach would leave two other-
wise similarly situated taxpayers in radically different tax positions
simply because they chose different accounting systems. Their tax con-
sequences would differ even though the transaction in question is to-
tally unrelated to the business or employment for which the accounting
method was chosen. If these similarly situated taxpayers are to be
treated equally, further steps are necessary.
(a) Cash-method approach. These taxpayers would be treated the
same if all casual or isolated transactions were governed by the cash
method, regardless of the accounting system used in the taxpayer's reg-
ular business. This equalizing rule, however, might result in a signifi-
cant loss of revenue.1 78 This approach would also put heavy pressure
on the definition of a casual transaction, since the possibility of deferral
would sorely tempt accrual-method taxpayers to arrange large sales
with unusual features in an effort to qualify them as transactions
outside the ordinary course of business. The litigation on this issue
could rival that under section 1001 by cash-method taxpayers. Finally,
as a practical matter, this approach is unrealistic because it would
surely receive the strongest possible opposition from the Treasury De-
partment 179 and is therefore highly unlikely ever to get through Con-
gress.
(b) Accrual-method approach. A second approach would be to ap-
ply a pure accrual system to all sales transactions--that is, to require all
taxpayers to include the full face amount of the purchaser obligation in
income in the year of sale. This rule, however, would often be econom-
178. The loss of revenue in any year would be the difference between the tax based on the
current fair market value of the purchaser obligation and the present value of the tax to be as-
sessed against future payments representing the taxpayer's gain from the transaction. Because the
cash method is always better for the taxpayer in that he recovers his basis before recognizing any
gain, this approach would also completely obviate the need for an installment method election in
the case of casual sales. Eg., Johnston v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 560, 564 (1950).
179. The Treasury Department has, in fact, proposed the exact opposite, that the cost-recovery
method of reporting gain, which produces the same results as the cash method, be statutorily
barred in the case of property sales. See text accompanying notes 263-65 inf!ra.
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ically unrealistic and might actually be unconstitutional. 80 For exam-
ple, when the purchaser obligation has a fair market value considerably
less than the face amount,181 the taxpayer would be taxed on a gain
that is in no way related to an actual increase in his present wealth.
Moreover, this approach would be as one-sidedly favorable to the gov-
ernment as the cash-method approach would be to the taxpayer, and a
large number of transactions would require a recognition of loss in sub-
sequent years when the obligation is ultimately disposed of or the
transaction is finally closed. 182 Thus, although the valuation problem
could be eliminated by going to a pure cash or to a pure accrual ap-
180. Assuming that the realization requirement of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920),
still has meaning, it is difficult to see how the taxpayer can be said to have realized any amount
above the value of the obligation received. He can get no more for the obligation than its value,
even assuming that he is actually able to sell it for the ascertained value. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has included in the term "income" under section 61(a) items that constitute "undeniable
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). Amounts exceeding the value of
the obligation received do not satisfy this sufficiency standard in either of its first two elements.
There is no accession to wealth beyond the value of the purchaser obligation, at least if wealth is
measured in a pecuniary sense for tax purposes; and there is no realization, as discussed above.
Moreover, because there is no accession to wealth and no realization, the only thing above the
value over which the taxpayer could have dominion, complete or otherwise, is a valueless right to
payment in the future.
Logically, it might appear that these arguments apply equally to the accrual method itself,
and that this method is therefore also of questionable constitutionality. However, the analogy
holds only insofar as the sixteenth amendment requires income to be measured on a transaction-
by-transaction basis. In fact, however, the sixteenth amendment empowers Congress "to lay and
collect taxes on income," and this clause has long been interpreted to refer to income ascertained
on the basis of fixed accounting periods rather than from particular transactions. Burnet v. San-
ford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1931). As applied to a series of related transactions over
a given period, the accrual method, consistently applied, is not an unreasonable measure of the
income actually received during the period. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text. Ac-
counts receivable in a given year are taken into income at face value, less an allowance for doubt-
ful accounts, This is more or less balanced by money actually received from prior period sales that
is not included in income. No claim can be made that the accrual method gives a reasonable
measure of income from isolated transactions. By definition, the consistency necessary to make
sense of an accounting system is lacking. Consequently, income from isolated transactions is dis-
torted by automatic valuation at face, not only when measured on a transaction-by-transaction
basis but also when measured over the annual accounting period. The same is not true for sales in
the regular course of business.
181. This low fair market value might even be determined in a formal market.
182. The word "closure" is used loosely in this context to refer to any set of conditions in
which it is clear that the seller will receive no further amounts of money or property from the
purchaser out of the transaction. Thus, the transaction might become closed by the bankruptcy of
the purchaser.
The noncorporate taxpayer would be at a further disadvantage under this system because
current law does not permit noncorporate taxpayers a capital loss carryback. A taxpayer might
have a large capital gain in the year of sale (face value less basis) and a large capital loss in a later
year when part of the obligation goes unsatisfied. Because we are dealing with isolated transac-
tions, the particular taxpayer may never have another capital gain large enough to permit him to
enjoy a tax benefit to the full extent of this loss. He could, of course, use part of his loss to offset
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proach for all casual sales of property, there would necessarily be sig-
nificant undesirable effects in related areas.
(c) Installment-method approach. A final method of eliminating
the need for a section 1001 valuation would be a compulsory form of
the installment sale method. 183 Under this approach, every money pay-
ment by the purchaser 184 would be divided into return of capital and
income in the same proportion that the seller's basis in the property
sold bears to the total contract price. This analysis would change the
current law in three ways. First, it would apply the installment sale
method to losses as well as gains.185 Second, it would eliminate the
current restrictions on the use of the installment sale method--the 30%
downpayment limitation, the two-payment rule, and the fixed-total-
price requirement-because by hypothesis the installment approach
would be the sole method of reporting income from the sale of prop-
erty. Finally, it would remove the option taxpayers now have either to
structure the transaction to qualify for the installment method or to
report gain immediately, as measured by the fair market value of the
purchaser obligation.
It is difficult to find intrinsic theoretical objection to either of the
first two changes. Permitting installment reporting of losses might ben-
efit taxpayers who anticipate future gains, but the circumstances in
which this benefit would accrue are rare.186 In addition, it may be ap-
ordinary income in each future year, but this use is limited and of little value to taxpayers with
very large recognized losses or short life expectancies. §§ 1211, 1212.
183. One of the purposes of the installment provisions was to eliminate the need for appraisals
of the purchaser obligations received. S. REP. No. 52, supra note 37, at 19, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) at
347; see Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 503 (1948).
184. Actual or imputed interest would of course first be excluded.
185. Section 453 refers only to the return of income and not to losses; for this reason it appears
to have been settled fairly early that losses could not be spread through the installment approach.
Sacks v. Burnet, 66 F.2d 223, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Martin v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 942, 944 (2d
Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 737 (1933). The Service has ruled similarly, although without
giving any reason. Rev. Rul. 79-92, 1979-1 C.B. 180; Rev. Rul. 70-430, 1970-2 C.B. 51.
186. Current law restricts corporate capital loss carryforwards to five years, although individ-
ual carryforwards continue indefinitely. § 1212. Consequently, a corporation that could foresee a
capital gain more than five years in the future but not before (including the/past three years, for
which there is a carryback), could benefit by reporting a realized capital loss on an installment
basis.
The potential advantages to an individual are even more limited. An advantage could ac-
crue, however, to an individual who has a capital loss and a capital gain in the same year. Assume
that the taxpayer also has low ordinary income in that year and is in a relatively low tax bracket.
If he can foresee a future increase in his ordinary income and capital gain in the same years, he
might be better off postponing recognition of the loss. Because he will be in a higher tax bracket
in later years, offsetting his loss at that time will effect a greater reduction in his tax liability. Even
in this case, of course, the potential gain from the difference in tax brackets is partially offset by his
delay in utilizing the tax loss. In any event, there are probably few of these cases.
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propriate to relax or eliminate many of the restrictions on the availabil-
ity of the installment-method alternative even if section 1001 is
retained.1 87 Thus, the primary cost of excising section 1001 from the
Code is the elimination of the taxpayer's option to report gain immedi-
ately.188
The elimination of this option, however, would be a serious impo-
sition on the taxpayer, and on balance, retention of section 1001 would
be a better course. The valuation problems under section 1001 are not
so difficult as to justify its repeal, primarily because the burden is on
the taxpayer to prove that the Service's assessment of tax liability is
incorrect. 89 This rule significantly eases the court's valuation problem:
if either or both parties introduce hard evidence of value, the court has
a solid basis for its decision. If neither side introduces such evidence,
the court simply holds for the Service. Because the taxpayer is in the
best position to build the kind of record necessary to establish value,
this rule makes particularly good sense.190 By hypothesis, the taxpayer
wishes to report under section 1001 and to risk having to pay a defi-
ciency or having to litigate under a heavy burden of proof should the
Service infer a different fair market value from the evidentiary record.
Because this option has been available for over fifty years, only a strong
policy reason should deny the taxpayer this choice.
If all valuations could be eliminated, or at least those valuations
associated with the sale of property, the policy choice might change to
favor the mandatory approach, but this is plainly not the case. There
would still be a need to evaluate third-party obligations received upon
a sale of property. Even if an installment method could be devised for
them too, 191 the problem of valuing property other than an obligation
187. See notes 247-54, 296-97 & 302-08 infra and accompanying text.
188. The Treasury Department has proposed amendments to section 453 that would to a large
extent make the installment method mandatory for gains, at least from real property sales; only a
form of the accrual method would be available as an alternative. See text accompanying notes
270-76 infra.
189. In general, the taxpayer may litigate a deficiency asserted by the Service in the Tax Court
without paying it beforehand, or he may pay it and sue for a refund in a federal district court.
Eg., A. KRAGEN & J. MCNULTY, FaDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1264 (3d ed. 1979). Under the
Tax Court's rules of practice, the taxpayer generally carries the burden of proof. T.C. RUL. PRAC.
& PRoc. 142. See also Niederkrome v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 238, 241 (9th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 945 (1959). In a suit in the district court for a refund, not only must the taxpayer
prove that the Service's determination was erroneous, he also must establish facts upon which the
correct determination can be made. E.g., Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1935); e. Bar
L. Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1970) (double-pronged burden of proof on
taxpayer too stringent when taxpayer challenges correctness of tax as defense in collection suit).
See generally 10 J. MERTENs, supra note 37, § 58A.35 (1976).
190. See United States v. Lease, 346 F.2d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 1965).
191. In principle, it should be possible to treat a third-party obligation in the same way as a
[Vol. 1980:417
Vol. 1980:417] TAXING THE SALE OF PROPERTY
to pay money, such as stock of a close corporation, would remain. Val-
uation is a difficult but inevitable part of our tax law. 192 It is not worth-
while to make a fundamental policy change to eliminate only some of
the transactions calling for valuation of property.
VI. IMPLICATIONS IN RELATED AREAS
A. Open/Closed Transaction Distinction.
Under section 1001 a sales transaction is usually considered open
if the third-party or purchaser obligation does not have an ascertain-
able fair market value when the seller receives it; otherwise it is closed.
The benefits of the open characterization are well known. First, the
taxpayer recognizes no gain until he receives his basis, and thereafter
only as he receives payments on the obligation. Second, payments on
the obligation remain part of the original sale or exchange, so the seller
retains capital gain treatment for all payments if the property sold was
a capital asset.193
In principle, at least, acceptance of the suggested interpretation of
section 1001 would not affect the open/closed transaction distinction.
First, consider sales in the regular course of business. Under the sug-
gested approach, section 1001 would never apply to regular sales, and
therefore open-transaction analysis under section 1001 would never be
necessary. However, when the purchaser obligations are such that the
open-transaction doctrine would otherwise be appropriate, the account-
ing provisions lead to the same results as section 1001 analysis. Cur-
rently, a transaction is likely to be held open under section 1001 only if
the total amount to be paid on the obligation is indefinite. 194 Pursuant
purchaser obligation under section 453, with each payment split into return of capital and income
in accordance with the seller's basis in the property sold and the total contract price. Under this
analysis, the contract price would include the face amount of the third-party obligation. The
courts, however, have never taken this approach. The installment sale provisions have always
been limited to purchaser obligations, and the fair market value of a third-party obligation must
be included as part of the payment in the year of sale. Eg., Tombari v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d
889, 891 (9th Cir. 1962); Simpson v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 710, 717 (1976).
192. Even the Supreme Court in Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), the most venerable
authority for avoiding valuation problems when possible, recognized the need to value purchaser
obligations for the purpose of calculating the estate tax. Id at 413. Other common situations
requiring valuation include the allocation of basis among various securities received on a tax-free
reorganization or transfer to a controlled corporation, e.g., Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507
(1935), and the separate valuation for depreciation purposes of land and improvements or of all
the assets of a business purchased as a unit, e.g., Walsh v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 728
(1974).
193. E.g., M. CmRELsTEmN, supra note 60, at 301-03.
194. E.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413 (1931) (open-ended mineral royalty); Westover
v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90, 91 (9th Cir. 1949) (lower court's finding of no ascertainable fair market
value in percentage-royalty contract not challenged by Service); Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d
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to the accounting provisions, an accrual-method taxpayer includes an
item in income only when the amount can be determined with reason-
able accuracy,195 and a cash-method taxpayer includes payments only
as received. Therefore, for transactions in the regular course of busi-
ness, the accounting methods and the current open-transaction ap-
proach give identical results. 196 Consequently, for regular sales the
suggested approach will change only the doctrinal analysis, not the re-
suit.
Consider next the case of isolated sales. Here the suggested ap-
proach dictates that section 1001 govern, but nothing in the approach
poses a logical bar to application of the open-transaction doctrine. Sec-
tion 1001 requires that gain or loss be measured by the fair market
value of the purchaser obligation, but it says nothing about what to do
when such value is not ascertainable. If there is a case of true nonas-
certainability, there is no choice under the current statutory scheme
other than to leave the transaction open.197
One must be careful, however, not to blur the analysis. First, to
say that the fair market value of an obligation is not ascertainable is
fundamentally different from saying that the value is zero. If the obli-
gation in fact has zero value, the transaction should still be closed and
gain or loss measured in precisely the same way as for any other fixed
911, 911 (2d Cir. 1948) (parties stipulated to absence of ascertainable fair market value in oil
brokerage contracts); MacDonald v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 840, 860-61 (1971) (sale price of pat-
ent rights dependent on amount manufactured under the patent), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 2; Dorsey v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606, 629 (1968) (sale of equipment for a percentage of future receipts).
The same result obtains if the uncertainty is in the taxpayer's right to receive the payment. Eg., In
re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1975); Bolles v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 342, 356 (1977).
195. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(ii) (1957).
196. A case involving fixed-price contracts, like Estate of Wiggins v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
701 (1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 85-95 supra, would in fact arrive at different
results for an accrual-method taxpayer depending on whether (1) the accounting method applies
or (2) section 1001 applies and taxation thereunder is delayed because the transactions are consid-
ered open. No court, however, has ever applied section 1001 to an accrual-method taxpayer. See
text accompanying notes 102-07 supra. Moreover, notwithstanding cases that have found fixed-
price contracts to have no ascertainable value, e.g., MeShain v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 998 (1979),
discussed in text accompanying notes 81-84 supra, the discussion in the text infra indicates that a
finding of nonascertainability of value is often difficult to justify even for contingent-price con-
tracts. See text accompanying notes 224-28 infra. Honest analysis and the always available option
of reporting under section 453 make such a finding almost totally unjustified in the case of a fixed-
price contract.
197. The uniform litany is that whether a particular contract or obligation has an ascertain-
able fair market value is a question of fact rather than law. See, e.g., Riss v. Commissioner, 368
F.2d 965, 970-71 (10th Cir. 1966); Estate of Marsack v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 533, 535 (7th Cir.
1961). See also text accompanying note 60 supra. Therefore, it is always theoretically possible to
receive open-transaction treatment, especially now that the Tax Court appears to be more recep-
tive to the argument. See notes 81-95 upra and accompanying text.
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dollar value. 198 Second, as pointed out above,199 the traditional reli-
ance on Burnet v. Logan200 as a basis for the open-transaction doctrine
is without foundation in the current statutory scheme.20 1 Third, it
would be incorrect to conclude that an obligation does not have an
ascertainable value at a given time simply because it is possible that the
assessment of value might change with future developments. The mar-
ket value of even a publicly traded security will vary with new informa-
tion about the company. 20 2 The issue in every sales transaction is
whether, at the time of the transaction, a reasonable assessment of
value can be made based on the information then available. In fact,
given the wide variety of valuation techniques, there are probably few
cases in which a reasonable assessment cannot be made. The real prob-
lem frequently is that penalties will attach to an assessment that later
turns out to have been greatly in error. This may explain why courts
are sometimes inclined to find that the value is not ascertainable. How-
ever, the existence of an ascertainable value is not rationally related to
the problem of unfair penalties. Rather, it is the fairness and not the
existence of an ascertainable value under section 1001 that must serve
as the focus for analysis and as the basis for maintaining all or part of
the open-transaction doctrine. The next section carries out this analysis
198. See note 59 supra.
199. See text accompanying notes 97-101 supra.
200. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
201. There are undoubtedly many cases in which both the taxpayer and the Service will agree
that a purchaser obligation has no ascertainable fair market value, perhaps because neither side
wishes to address the difficult valuation question. Eg., Gralapp v. United States, 458 F.2d 1158,
1159-60 (10th Cir. 1972) (value of contingent additional payment on sale of oil lease stipulated to
have no ascertainable fair market value at time of sale); Frost v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 190, 191
(1938) (Service did not question claim of nonascertainability of fair market value even in the case
of fixed-price contracts), acq. 1938-2 C.B. 12. In these circumstances, there seems to be no reason
for a court unilaterally to refuse to allow the traditional open-transaction approach apparently
acceptable to both sides. The suggested approach to the interpretation of section 1001 certainly
does not bar the open-transaction method in this form. However, there is no way to know in
advance just when the Service will adopt this friendly position. Therefore, to rely solely on a test
of nonascertainability of fair market value invites different results for similarly situated taxpayers
in a manner that is inconsistent with any rational theory of taxation.
202. For example, in the famous case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968), the public market price for the company's common stock
went through a rapid rise over the few months during which knowledge of insider trading activity
and the scope of the actual mineral finds became public. Nevertheless, anyone who exchanged
property for Texas Gulf Sulphur stock in the middle of the price rise should have had gain mea-
sured by the market price on the day of exchange. Such a taxpayer might argue that the "true
value" was speculative or changing, but the parties presumably would have negotiated their trans-
action on the basis of the then-available information, including the then-current public market
price. Because the seller could have realized that price in cash on the date of the transaction, the
same amount should be the fair market value for section 1001 purposes, notwithstanding that fast-
flying rumors made the value speculative.
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in detail.203 It suffices to state here that reliance on avoidance of unfair
penalties as a basis for the open-transaction doctrine permits a more
rational analysis of the doctrine's benefits, the limits that might appro-
priately be placed on it, and possible alternatives.
B. Character and Timing of the Discount Payments.
Under the suggested interpretation, section 1001, unadulterated by
accounting-method concepts, would govern in all isolated sales transac-
tions, with statutory relief coming solely from the installment sale pro-
visions of section 453. In addition, because most if not all purchaser
obligations have a value that can be assessed reasonably on the basis of
the information available at the time of the transaction, the traditional
basis for applying the open-transaction doctrine would be undercut.
Therefore, the model for taxing isolated transactions not subject to sec-
tion 453 would be the same as the method currently applied to closed
transactions: the seller would recognize gain or loss in the year of sale,
and the amount would be measured by the difference between the as-
certained fair market value of the purchaser obligation and the seller's
basis in the property sold.2°4 The seller would then acquire a basis in
the purchaser obligation equal to the ascertained fair market value and
would recognize additional gain or loss in subsequent years to the ex-
tent that the total payments made by the purchaser 2o5 differed from the
basis acquired in the purchaser obligation. The crucial question here is
whether such treatment under section 1001 of all non-installment-
method isolated sales constitutes a sound tax policy. In other words,
are there undesirable implications of the suggested approach that out-
weigh the arguments in its favor?2°6
In attempting to answer this question, two judicial doctrines that
embellish the method of taxing closed transactions must be reviewed.
The first is the doctrine that any amount that the seller receives subse-
quent to the sale above his basis in the purchaser obligation20 7 is ordi-
nary income. For convenience, we will refer to any such amount as a
203. See text accompanying notes 241-58 infra.
204. For simplicity, assume that the purchaser obligation is the only item received by the seller
at the time of the sale. Then gain or loss equals the difference between basis and fair market
value. See note 12 supra.
205. In calculating gain or loss, actual or imputed interest would be subtracted from the total
of the payments made by the purchaser.
206. The arguments in favor of the suggested approach are summarized in the text accompa-
nying notes 154-157 supra.
207. This amount will be equal to the ascertained fair market value of the purchaser obliga-
tion on the date of the sale.
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"discount payment." 208 The second is the doctrine that the total gain
represented by the difference between the face amount of the purchaser
obligation and the ascertained fair market value on the date of sale
must be amortized over the period of payment unless the purchaser
obligation is speculative. We will refer to the difference between the
face amount of the purchaser obligation and the ascertained fair mar-
ket value on the date of sale as the "discount."
The analysis that follows leads to two principal conclusions. First,
it is useful in characterizing the discount to divide the types of pur-
chaser obligations into fixed-price contracts, in which the only contin-
gency is whether the purchaser will fulfill his legal obligations, and
contingent-price contracts, in which there is a risk of nonpayment even
though the purchaser fulfills his legal obligations. For fixed-price con-
tracts, the discount bears a strong analogy to interest. Moreover, for
these types of purchaser obligations, the seller is almost invariably in a
position to maintain capital gain treatment for all discount payments
by electing to report under the installment method of section 453. It is
therefore not unreasonable to treat the discount payment as ordinary
income when gain is reported under section 1001. For contingent-price
contracts, on the other hand, the analogy to interest is much weaker,
and the installment method of reporting is often unavailable. There is
a strong case, therefore, for treating discount payments on contingent-
price contracts as capital gain if the seller would otherwise be entitled
to capital-gain treatment. The suggested rationale is a modified form
of the open-transaction doctrine: a contingent-price contract should be
treated as open if and to the extent the Service deems it ineligible for
the installment method of reporting.2°9 The second principal conclu-
sion is that speculativeness is an inadequate test to determine whether
the discount should be amortized over the term of the obligation.
Rather, a coherent reading of section 1001 and 453 suggests that prorat-
ing should not be required for purchaser obligations but probably
should be required for third-party obligations. The much more diffi-
cult discount-characterization question is taken up first.
208. Others use the term "collection gain." See notes 264 & 280 infra.
209. Existing legislative proposals to amend section 453 of the Code, if enacted, would in
essence lead to the same results as the analysis suggested by this Article. The analysis concerning
the character of the discount payments proceeds on the assumption that the Code will retain the
form it had in January 1980, that is, that Congress will not pass the legislation. Footnotes are
included, however, to indicate points at which a proposed, legislative change would affect the
analysis, and a more coherent discussion of the proposed amendments and their effect on the
thesis presented in this Article is included as a separate subsection. See text accompanying notes
259-82 infra.
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1. Character of the Discount-Discount Payments as Ordinary In-
come. Once a purchaser obligation has been valued in a closed transac-
tion and included in the measure of gain for the year of sale, the
theoretical basis for taxing the discount payments210 as ordinary in-
come is that there is no sale or exchange, a necessary element in the
capital gain preference. 211 Professor Rabinovitz has cogently pointed
out21 2 the inconsistency between this doctrine and the rationale under-
lying the famous Supreme Court case of Arrowsmith v. Commis-
sioner,213 in which the Court held that the character (ordinary or
capital) of a deductible loss in a current tax year can be determined by
reference to a transaction in a prior year to which the current loss is
integrally connected. The Arrowsmith rationale applies with equal
force to subsequent gains, and receipts on a purchaser obligation fol-
lowing a closed transaction seem to be even more strongly related to
the original underlying sale than the transactions in Arrowsmith were to
each other.214 Therefore, if the original sale involves a capital asset, the
Arrowsmith rationale strongly suggests that all discount payments
should receive capital gain treatment.
Nevertheless, as Professor Rabinovitz points out,215 the tradition
of treating these excess payments as ordinary income appears firmly
established, and reconciliation of the conflicting doctrines may require
210. The term "discount payments" is defined in the text accompanying note 208 supra.
Stated in slightly different words, discount payments are amounts received by the seller on a
purchaser obligation subsequent to a closed transaction that are not treated as a return of seller's
basis in the purchaser obligation. The seller's basis in the purchaser obligation is the ascertained
fair market value of the purchaser obligation included in the amount realized for purposes of
reporting gain or loss under section 1001 in the original closed transaction. The term "purchaser
obligation" refers throughout this Article to a debt instrument received directly from the pur-
chaser in a sale-of-property transaction in full or partial exchange for the property transferred and
on which the purchaser is the obligor.
211. E.g., Osenbach v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1952) (third-party claims
distributed on corporate liquidation). See also Hudson v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 734, 736 (1953)
(payment received on settlement ofajudgment debt acquired by purchase), aj'dsub nom. Ogilvie
v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1954).
212. Rabinovitz, Effect ofPrior Year's Transactions on Federal Income Tax Consequence of
Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX. L. REV. 85 (1972).
213. 344 U.S. 6 (1952). The original transaction in Arrowsmith was a corporate liquidation;
the shareholder-taxpayers recognized long-term capital gain upon their acquisition of the corpo-
rate assets. The related transaction in the subsequent year was the payment by the taxpayers, as
transferees of the corporate assets, of a judgment rendered against the corporation after the liqui-
dation. Taxpayers sought an ordinary business deduction for the later payment of the judgment,
but the Supreme Court held that because it arose out of the liquidation proceedings, the payment
was deductible only as long-term capital loss. Thus, Arrowsmith deals with neither the amount
nor the timing of an income or deduction item; the case says simply that the character of the item
may be determined by its relation to a prior transaction.
214. Rabinovitz, supra note 212, at 97-101.
215. Id
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additional guidance from Congress.216 The result is to put the taxpayer
216. Significant statutory assistance already exists. Section 1232(a) treats amounts received by
the holder of corporate evidences of indebtedness when the debt is retired as amounts received in
exchange for the debt. Therefore, if the debt instrument is a capital asset in the hands of the
holder, amounts received in payment on retirement (excluding any original issue discount) will be
capital gain to the extent that they exceed the holder's basis. Even a series of payments on a
corporate obligation may each be treated as for the purpose of retiring the obligation. Cf. Riss v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1020, 1020 (1965) (stipulation that each monthly payment on an
11-year installment note issued on redemption of corporate stock was for the purpose of retiring
the note within the meaning of section 1232(a)), aj'd, 368 F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1966). Proposals
have been made to extend the benefits of section 1232(a) to recipients of notes of individual as well
as corporate obligors. See note 280 and text accompanying notes 264 & 266 infra.
The preponderance of authority supports the general proposition that payments on a note are
ineligible for the capital gain preference because they do not involve a sale or exchange in the year
of payment. Most of this authority, however, does not deal with situations involving payments on
purchaser obligations-obligations given by a purchaser directly to a seller in full or partial pay-
ment for property sold. Moreover, disallowing the capital gain preference for payments on pur-
chaser obligations is the only situation that directly conflicts with the Arrowsmith rationale. Thus,
there is yet room to argue that the Arrowsmith rule supplies the necessary sale-or-exchange ele-
ment to purchaser obligation payments.
It is important to distinguish the rulings in cases like Fairbanks v. United States, 366 U,S.
436, 437 (1939), in which the courts have held (prior to the adoption of section 1232(a)), that
redemption of a corporate bond purchased for money does not involve a sale or exchange. In
these cases the bondholder made no underlying sale of property to which the redemption payment
could relate. Similarly, payments on third-party notes purchased for cash do not relate to an
underlying sale-of-property transaction by the recipient of the payments. A large number of cases
can be distinguished from those involving purchaser obligations on this ground. Eg., Darby Inv.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1963); Willhoit v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 259 (9th
Cir. 1962); Phillips v. Frank, 295 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1961); Underhill v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 489
(1966). As Professor Herwitz has pointed out, D. HERwrrz, BUSINESS PLANNING 503 (1966), for
purposes of requiring amortized recognition of the discount, there may be no distinction between
the cases involving third-party notes purchased for cash and those involving purchaser obligations
received in exchange for property; the obligation is essentially purchased either for cash or for
property in any event. For purposes of determining the character of the discount, however, the
distinction may be crucial. The Arrowsmith rationale arguably supplies the necessary sale or ex-
change in the case in which property has been exchanged for a note, but not in cases in which a
note has been purchased for cash.
The Arrowsmih rationale also does not necessarily apply to those cases in which a third-party
obligation is received in exchange for property. The most common example of this situation is the
receipt of a royalty or similar contract upon the liquidation of a corporation. E.g., Waring v.
Commissioner, 412 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1969); Slater v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1966);
Tombari v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1961); Campagna v. United States, 290 F.2d 682
(2d Cir. 1961); Estate of Marsack v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1961); Chamberlin v.
Commissioner, 286 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); Gersten v. Commis-
sioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959); Osenbach v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1952);
McCormac v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 955 (1977); Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15. In these cases
the taxpayer has indeed exchanged property: he has exchanged his stock for the contractual obli-
gation of a third party. The payment made by the third-party obligor on the contract, however, is
not in any way incident to the exchange between this taxpayer and the corporation. For example,
in the corporate liquidation setting, the obligor would have been bound to make his contractual
payment to the holder of the contract whether or not there had been an exchange in a liquidation
transaction. See Campagna v. United States, 290 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1961) (refusing to apply
Arrowsmith to payments made on a mortgage received in a corporate liquidation on the ground
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in a well-known dilemma: either he reports a high value for the pur-
that the payments did not involve any modification or adjustment of the underlying mortgage
obligation). See also Lowe v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 363, 374 n.6 (1965), acq. in result 1966-1
C.B. 2. In addition, when the taxpayer exchanges his stock in liquidation and reports the fair
market value of the contract as part of his amount realized under section 1001, his relationship
with the other party to the exchange (the corporation) is over, in other words, the sale is arguably
completed. Therefore, subsequent payments on the contract are not so integrally related to the
exchange of stock that Arrowsmith compels capital gain treatment.
Admittedly, this distinction between third-party obligations and purchaser obligations is not
so strong that it could not be overcome if there were strong policy reasons for applying the Arrow-
smith rationale to these cases. It does no great offense to either logic or language to conclude that
the payments on third-party obligations "arise out of' or are "integrally connected with" the un-
derlying exchange transaction. The discussion in the text infra, however, suggests that policy
should be looking in the other direction-that is, to restricting the scope of judicial gloss in sales
transactions and extending the availability of the installment method as the primary means of
relieving the harsh effects of section 1001. See text accompanying notes 244-58 infra. If we con-
tinue to permit use of the installment method-in which the gain recognized on each payment
retains the character of the underlying sale--only for purchaser and not for third-party obliga-
tions, that policy choice would also seem to militate against applying the Arrowsmith rationale to
subsequent payments received on third-party obligations obtained in a closed transaction under
section 1001. Moreover, to give capital gain treatment to the discount payments received on third-
party obligations obtained upon corporate liquidation would compound a defect already present
in the corporate liquidation rule, which permits the corporation in some circumstances to escape
tax on what is ordinary corporate business income. See M. CHIRELSTIN, supra note 60, at 303-
04.
This analysis leaves, then, only a small number of cases in which discount payments on pur-
chaser obligations have been held to constitute ordinary income on the ground that the payments
did not involve a sale or exchange. There are, in fact, surprisingly few post-Arrowsmith cases in
which the underlying transaction involved a sale of property in a closed transaction and in which
the character of subsequent payments on the purchaser obligation was an issue. Two Tax Court
cases have involved stipulations by the parties that the discount constituted ordinary income, so
that the only issue the court decided was whether the discount had to be recognized pro rata from
each payment or whether taxpayer's basis could be recovered first. Witte v. Commissioner, 31
T.C.M. (CCH) 1137, 1142-43 (1972), rev'don othergrounds, 513 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Potter
v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 159, 174 (1965), acq. 1966-1 C.B. 3. Only one case known to this author
appears factually on point, and any rejection of Arrowsmith it may contain is only implicit, as the
argument was not directly raised. The Fifth Circuit held that subsequent payments on a note that
qualified as a security for purposes of nonrecognition under section 351 (transfer of property to a
controlled corporation) were ordinary income. Dennis v. Commissioner, 473 F.2d 274, 287 (5th
Cir. 1973). The Dennis case is arguably distinguishable from the transactions analyzed in this
Article: a section 351 transfer is not, strictly speaking, a section 1001 closed transaction, because
section 351 is an exemption from the recognition requirement of section 1001. Nevertheless, this
distinction lacks force. The gain ultimately arises out of the corporation's acquisition of the un-
derlying assets for stock plus the note, and thus out of a sale or exchange of those assets. More-
over, payment comes directly from the purchaser corporation and is therefore integrally related to
the underlying exchange transaction. On the facts of the case, therefore, the court in Dennis held
the Arrowsmith rationale inapplicable to discount payments arising out of a property exchange
transaction. However, although the taxpayer in Dennis made several highly sophisticated argu-
ments, none were based on Arrowsmith, and one might therefore argue that the court did not have
a fair opportunity to consider its potential application.
At least two pre-Arrowsmih cases held that a subsequent loss on notes previously included in
income of the seller in the year of property sale was not a capital loss because extinguishing the
notes for a payment less than face did not involve a sale or exchange. Bingham v. Commissioner,
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chaser obligation in the year of sale-perhaps without having received
105 F.2d 971, 972 (2d Cir. 1939); Hale v. Helvering, 85 F.2d 819, 821-22 (D.C. Cir. 1936). The
Service apparently continues to follow this view, at least officially. See Rev. Rul. 56-531, 1956-2
C.B. 983; Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 7745009, 1977 Fed. Taxes: Private Letter Rulings 256(77); I.T. 4018,
1950-2 C.B. 20, declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 69-43, 1969-1 C.B. 310. These cases are of questiona-
ble authority, however, in light of later decisions reaching the opposite result on the basis of the
Arrowsmith rule. See Wener v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 938, 945-46 (9th Cir. 1957) (negotiated
reduction, in return for immediate payment, of amount due on purchaser obligation previously
taken into income at a loss held to be a capital loss as part of the original sales transaction); Smith
v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 872, 880 (1967) (purchaser obligation taken into income in year of sale
but prepaid in a later year at a discount in accordance with the original contract terms results in
capital loss, by reference to the original sales transaction), rev'd on other grounds, 424 F.2d 219
(9th Cir. 1970). Admittedly, these later cases involved renegotiated discount or discount in ac-
cordance with the original contractual terms, while the pre-4rrowsmith cases involved com-
promises of disputed claims or actual default by the purchaser. Nevertheless, there is nothing in
the Arrowsmith rationale that would justify distinguishing the character of the subsequent losses
on this basis, notwithstanding the Wener court's attempt to make such a distinction with respect to
Hale, 242 F.2d at 943, 946. Even the Service, in a case that may come back to haunt it, has
recently argued that a default subsequent to a closed sales transaction should be treated as a
capital loss because of its capital transaction origins. Grudberg v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) 669, 673 (1975). Moreover, Arrowsmith has been relied on in other contexts to treat de-
ductible expenses incurred in relation to an underlying sales transaction as capital loss. E.g., Bird
v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 65, 68-69 (1963) (payment of corporate expenses to facilitate
sale of corporate stock is in effect a reduction of the sale price and a capital loss because related to
the sale of a capital asset); Estate of Shannonhouse v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 422, 424 (1953)
(payments made in year subsequent to sale of real property pursuant to warranty deed are an
outgrowth of the sale of the underlying property and therefore capital loss). Consequently, there
is abundant authority for the proposition that, under the Arrowsmith rationale, subsequent losses
related to payment or satisfaction of a purchaser obligation previously taken into income in con-
nection with a sale of property are capital in nature.
Finally, at least one Tax Court decision, although involving somewhat bizarre facts and stip-
ulations, has concluded on the basis of Arrowsmith that a subsequent-year gain arising from pay-
ment of a purchaser obligation (in the form of cash plus a return of the property originally sold)
was capital because the payment effected an adjustment or renegotiation of the earlier underlying
sales transaction. Lowe v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 363, 374 (1965), acq. in result 1966-1 C.B. 2; see
Rabinovitz, supra note 212, at 95-101. See generally Abbott, The Reversed Transaction, 46 B.U.L.
Rnv. 493 (1966); Murphy, Reacquisitions ofroperty, 20 U.S. CAL. L. CENTER TAX INST. 805, 826-
30 (1968). The idea that Arrowsmith applies to subsequent-year gains as well as losses was later
reaffirmed by the Tax Court. Bresler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 182, 186 (1975) (involving section
1231 transactions), acq. in decision 1976-2 C.B. 1. In addition, one Tax Court judge has recently
questioned, in light of the Arrowsmith rationale, the supposed general rule that payments subse-
quent to a closed sales transaction exceeding the obligation's fair market value on the date of sale
constitute ordinary income. 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788, 809 n.l1 (1978) (Fay, J.,
dissenting). The Service itself may recently have hammered another nail into the coffin when it
ruled that a 1977 settlement of securities fraud litigation was short-term capital gain to the tax-
payer because it grew out of his purchase and sale of stock in 1974. The 1974 sale resulted in
short-term capital loss because the stock had been held for only four months. Under the Arrow-
smith rule, the character of the 1974 loss determined the character of the 1977 gain, even though
the corporate defendant in the securities litigation was not the purchaser of the stock sold by the
taxpayer in 1974 and payment was thus less integrally connected to the underlying transaction
than is the usual purchaser obligation. Rev. Rul. 79-278, 1979-37 I.R.B. 18.
In summary, there is no logical reason for distinguishing subsequent gains from subsequent
losses in applying the Arrowsmith rationale. In addition, the area of conflict between the Arrow-
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enough cash in the deal to pay his taxes-or he reports a lower valua-
tion, only to find himself taxed later at ordinary income rates on a sig-
nificant portion of his gain. One effect of applying section 1001
universally to isolated sale transactions-absent an installment-method
election-would then be to remove one potential escape route for a
cash-method taxpayer: the possibility of convincing a court that his
method of accounting governs and that the purchaser obligation is not
a cash equivalent. One should therefore consider whether closing this
potential escape route is a serious problem and, if so, what should be
done about it.
(a) Fixed-price contracts. At first blush, the question appears al-
most to answer itself. By hypothesis, we are considering an isolated
transaction-that is, one not made in the regular course of a business.
Because application of an accounting method makes no sense in these
transactions, 217 there is certainly no basis for distinguishing cash-
method taxpayers from accrual-method taxpayers. The more basic
question, however, of whether either type of taxpayer should treat dis-
count payments as ordinary income, requires deeper analysis.
At least for purchaser obligations involving a fixed face amount,
the discount (the difference between face and fair market value) may be
thought of as a measure of the assessed risk of nonpayment. Likewise,
perceived higher risk is usually taken into account by charging a higher
interest rate.218 For example, if the interest rate on readily available
and essentially riskless investments is 10%, a lender who decides, based
on past experience, that there is only a fifty-fifty chance a particular
class of loans will be repaid will have to charge each borrower in the
class 120% interest just to match what he could make on the riskless
investment.219 If he makes a large number of loans to this class of bor-
rowers at 120% interest and if the repayment rate follows past experi-
smith doctrine and the rule that payments on a note are ordinary income is in fact much narrower
than first appears. Finally, there is only limited authority on either side of the issue in the specific
fact situation giving rise to a conflict---the characterization of payments on a purchaser obligation
made to the seller of property subsequent to a closed transaction under section 1001. Therefore, a
judicial resolution without congressional intervention is still possible. If judicial resolution is ef-
fected, the taxpayer's dilemma discussed in the text would be eliminated, along with a strong
impetus to import accounting concepts into the sale-of-property area.
217. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
218. Professor Herwitz has made this point. D. HanwrTz, supra note 216, at 498.
219. Consider the simple example of a lender who has $200. If he makes a one-year, $100
loan to each of two borrowers at 120% interest and one of the borrowers defaults, the lender will
receive one year later the $100 principal plus $120 in interest from the nondefaulting borrower, for
a total of $220. This total is precisely what he could have earned on his $200 through a riskless
investment at 10%.
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ence, he will have a net return of 10% on the money invested in the
loans. Although the lender charges a high interest rate to compensate
for nonpayment of principal by others, the 120% is still an interest pay-
ment to the repaying borrower. He has in fact paid $120 for the use of
$100 for one year. Symmetry, at least, would dictate that it also be
considered interest to the lender.
In a sense, however, the argument that equates speculative risk
and interest is unsatisfying. For one thing, when the lender makes a
large number of loans, there is a strong argument that a large percent-
age of his repayment receipts truly does represent return of capital.
Despite the 120% "interest" payments, he ends up with only 10% more
than he started with.22o Moreover, for the taxpayer who makes an iso-
lated speculative $100 purchase of a debt instrument promising to pay
$220 one year later, the problem is even more complex. First, because
such a taxpayer's loss on default is likely to be treated as a capital
loss, 221 there would be some justification for permitting him a capital
gain when he wins his bet and the purchaser pays. Moreover, the value
of the instrument does generally vary with time in a manner that is
inconsistent with the concept of a uniform interest rate. For example, it
rises as the debtor maintains his job and pays his other obligations but
falls with his sudden disappearance. Whether the taxpayer sells the
instrument prior to maturity at a gain22 2 or holds it for collection, much
of his gain will be attributable to changes in circumstances prior to the
sale or collection transaction in question. At high enough levels of ab-
straction, these changes are quite similar to the changes in circum-
stances that affect the values of capital assets generally. In essence,
there is speculative risk in many transactions in which ultimate gain is
characterized as capital.
Nevertheless, one important distinction remains. When the con-
220. Interestingly, precisely this type of lender-one in the business of regularly lending
money-is usually indifferent to the characterization of the repayments. Any defaulted loans will
constitute business bad debt deductions from his ordinary interest income. § 166(a).
221. The nonbusiness bad debt deduction is limited to short-term capital loss treatment.
§ 166(d). Moreover, in the case of default on a purchaser obligation received in an isolated sale-
of-property transaction, the .4rrowsmith rationale will usually serve independently to limit any
deduction to capital loss. See note 216 smpra.
222. A sale prior to maturity will apparently be treated as a sale or exchange for capital gain
purposes unless it is considered a sham. The sale will be good if there is a bona fide passage of
title and risk but not if the purchaser acts simply as a conduit for redemption or repayment.
Compare Everett v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 454, 455 (1945), and Hobby v. Commis-
sioner, 2 T.C. 980, 985 (1943), acq. 1944-I C.B. 13 (both finding bona fide sales, for long-term
capital gain purposes, of stock a few days prior to redemption), with Weiner v. Commissioner, 316
F.2d 473, 473 (3d Cir. 1963), and Hilton v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 623, 630-31 (1949), acq. 1950-1
C.B. 3 (both finding that the purchaser acted as a conduit).
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tingency creating the discount relates only to whether the purchaser
will fulfill his legal obligation, as is usually the case in a fixed-price
contract, the discount payments might be more appropriately consid-
ered interest, because this risk is traditionally associated with a higher
interest rate. Banks, for example, do not lend to everyone at the prime
rate. On the other hand, if the amount the seller will receive may vary
even when the purchaser satisfies his obligations in full, the change in
value is similar to what is traditionally characterized as a capital gain.
Resolution of this characterization problem would require analysis
of the sale-or-exchange requirement for the capital gain preference;
such an analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. Never-
theless, given that the sale-or-exchange requirement is a correct inter-
pretation of the statute and that repayment of an obligation does not
generally satisfy it, there is yet another example that makes treatment
of the discount payment as ordinary income more palatable. If a tax-
payer acquires a third-party debt instrument due in one year in the face
amount of $100 plus 120% stated interest, there is little if any authority
that does not hold him to the form of the instrument he chose to deal
in. He has ordinary interest income on payment. If instead the same
taxpayer acquires a one-year obligation with a $200 face amount and
stated interest of 10%, but he pays the same $100 for it because of the
risk he perceives, there is little justification for a different treatment of
the discount payment. Accordingly, it is hard to see why a discount in
the assessed value of a purchaser obligation received in an isolated
property sale transaction based on such factors as probability of repay-
ment, amount of collateral, and degree of stated interest should be
treated any differently than a third-party obligation.223
In summary, we can say that giving cash-method taxpayers the
equivalent of open-transaction treatment by applying their accounting
method to isolated sales of property is at best haphazard. There is sim-
ply too much variation in the judicial approaches to accommodating
the accounting provisions with section 1001. In addition, there is no
basis for singling out cash-method taxpayers for favored treatment in
the case of isolated sales. Finally, for either type of taxpayer, treating
discount payments after a closed sale-of-property transaction as ordi-
nary income is consistent with the notion that risk of default is a meas-
ure of interest income.
223. In either case, the taxpayer has purchased the obligation in question, in one case for cash
and in the other for property. See D. HERwrrz, supra note 216, at 503. Of course, this entire
discussion assumes that the Arrowsmih rationale will not be applied to payments on purchaser
obligations in years subsequent to a closed transaction. Arrowsmith arguably could supply the
necessary sale or exchange for discount payments on a purchaser obligation. See note 216 supra.
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An additional observation is probably even more important: when
the purchaser obligation involves a fixed face amount, the transaction
can usually be structured to permit reporting of gain under the install-
ment method of section 453. Proper structuring of the sale thus permits
the seller to claim any capital gain preference otherwise available for
the full amount of the discount. For fixed-price purchaser obligations,
then, treatment of the discount payments as ordinary income following
a closed transaction does not raise a fundamental problem with the
suggested interpretation of the statute.
(b) Contingent-price contracts. Obligations for contingent amounts
present problems that are not so easily resolved. These obligations
often arise, for example, when mineral rights are sold to a developer for
a percentage of ultimate revenues derived from the property or when a
nonpatentable invention or secret process is sold for a percentage of
ultimate sales to a firm better equipped than the inventor to develop
and market it.224 In many, if not all, of these cases, the obligations can
be reasonably valued as of the date of sale.2 2 5 In some cases, such as
the sale of mineral rights, there may even be an actual market in the
sense that arm's-length bids are available. Nevertheless, one or both of
the parties may be unwilling to assume the risk of being wrong in the
assessment of value, and such unwillingness is often expressed in a per-
centage-of-sales or similar contingent-price contract. Assuming these
transactions are treated as closed under section 1001 because the pur-
chaser obligation has an ascertainable fair market value, two questions
arise. First, should amounts received on the obligation beyond such
fair market value be treated as ordinary income? Second, can such
treatment be justified or are there more attractive alternatives?-
Again, an example makes the issues more concrete. Suppose a
taxpayer owns the mineral rights to property on which there is one
chance in ten of finding oil. For simplicity, assume he has a zero basis
in these rights. Drilling costs, including a normal return, are $25,000
regardless of whether oil is discovered. If oil is discovered, the mineral
rights are expected to produce a stream of revenue having a present
value of $500,000. If no oil is found, the rights will be valueless. In
these circumstances a rational oil driller in a competitive market will
bid up to $25,000 for the rights. Thus, the fair market value of the
rights may be set at $25,000. If the taxpayer sells for this price, he has a
straightforward gain of $25,000, and the driller risks losing a full
224. Inventors holding patents can usually arrange their transfers in such a way that the sale
or exchange necessary for capital gain treatment is supplied by statute. § 1235.
225. See text accompanying note 203 supra.
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$50,000 in order to have the opportunity for a possible bonanza profit
of $450,000.
The taxpayer may, however, prefer to gamble that oil will be dis-
covered and participate in the bonanza, or the driller may prefer to risk
only the drilling costs. Taxpayer and driller might then agree that the
rights will be conveyed for a straight fifty-fifty split of revenue from
any oil discovered. How much the taxpayer will ever receive on this
contract is highly uncertain: he may eventually get $250,000 in present
value, or he may get nothing. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the
value of this purchaser obligation is neither zero nor unascertainable;
in fact, it is $25,000.226 Therefore, assuming the mineral rights are a
capital asset in taxpayer's hands, if the transaction is treated as closed
under section 1001, taxpayer has a capital gain of $25,000 in the year of
sale.227 In subsequent years, he will have either an additional $225,000
of ordinary income or, if the driller finds nothing, a $25,000 capital
loss. 2 28
The question is whether a closed-transaction approach to section
226. In an arm's-length transaction, it is usually held that the value of property received, when
that value is difficult to measure intrinsically, can be equated to the value of the property given in
exchange. Eg., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962); Philadelphia Park Amusement Co.
v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct. Cl. 1934). In the hypothetical, the mineral rights are
clearly worth $25,000 in a competitive market. Therefore, the value of the contract taken in ex-
change for rights in an arm's-length transaction can be assumed to be $25,000 as well. Moreover,
one need not, under the assumed facts, adopt this valuation by association approach. Under his
percentage contract, our taxpayer has one chance in 10 of receiving $250,000 (in present value)
and nine chances in 10 of receiving nothing. Anyone in the business of buying up these contracts
would lose money in the long run if he paid more than $25,000 for any single one. In a competi-
tive market, however, he could not get away with paying less. Therefore, the contract has a value
of $25,000.
227. Depending on how the transaction is structured, income to the extent of half of the drill-
ing costs may be imputed to the taxpayer, he clearly receives half the benefit from these costs. The
example attempts, however, to focus on certain concepts; it does not purport to portray anything
realistic and certainly nothing in any way tied to oil discovery. Therefore, to keep things simple
and as independent as possible from the arcane world of real life oil and mineral exploration, we
ignore the possiblity of drilling-cost income to the seller. Presumably, if he has this income he will
also have a deduction sooner or later in the same amount.
228. One can obtain a slightly more realistic version of the problem, without changing the
result of the analysis, by relaxing the assumption of a precisely known probability of discovery
and a known present value of future income flow in the event of discovery. In this case, both
parties will have to make estimates of these quantities, and their conclusions will affect both the
cash sale price of the mineral rights and the respective percentage interests in any contingent-price
contract. The amount that the taxpayer will eventually receive under a percentage contract will
not be determined on an all-or-nothing basis, but will vary from zero to a somewhat nebulous
upper limit. The precise value of both the mineral rights and taxpayer's contingent-price contract
will be much less clear, but a rational estimate of that value can often still be made. In fact,
mineral rights are bought and sold every day, and certainly those in the business of oil exploration
put a great deal of effort into assessing the chances of actually making a discovery and the value of
the oil if discovered.
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1001 that makes no reference to the taxpayer's method of accounting is
a rational and equitable approach to taxation of contingent-price sales
contracts that can be reasonably valued.229 It might be observed that
the discrimination between accrual-method and cash-method taxpayers
that results from applying the accounting provisions in lieu of section
1001 to fixed-price contracts does not exist in the case of most contin-
gent-price contracts. If accounting methods governed, a cash-method
taxpayer would simply report the receipts as they came in, but because
the total amount of the contract cannot be determined with reasonable
accuracy, an accrual-method taxpayer would presumably do the same
thing.230
Moreover, the argument equating the discount to risk of default,231
whatever its merits with respect to fixed-price contracts, 23 2 is much
weaker here. This weakness does not arise out of formal problems in
defining the amount of the discount. Admittedly, there is no fixed face
amount of the contract from which the total discount can be calculated,
but any amount eventually received above the previously reported fair
market value-which is the taxpayer's basis in the contract-must be
included in income. The issue is only the character of this income.
Nor does the weakness come from certainty of payment. In fact, the
discount exists precisely because, on our assumed facts, nine times out
of ten the seller will receive nothing on the contract. Rather, the weak-
ness seems to inhere primarily in the feeling that, under the contingent-
price contract, the taxpayer has maintained a fundamental equity inter-
est in the property. That is, the risk is not whether the purchaser will
perform his obligations but instead arises from the seller's lack of
knowledge as to the existence of oil. If he invested the $25,000 drilling
costs himself, he would then know whether his mineral rights were
worthless or worth $500,000. If the latter, no one doubts that he could
then sell the rights on a high, fixed-priced contract and treat the gain as
capital. When he sells the rights on a contingent-price contract, he
splits the risk, but in an economic sense he nevertheless pays $25,000 to
229. Nothing in the suggested approach to section 1001 prohibits open-transaction treatment if
one concludes that the contract cannot reasonably be valued. However, if ascertainability of value
and not the mere fact of contingency is really the test, there may not be many contingent-price
contracts that qualify. See notes 198-203 supra and accompanying text.
230. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1979). When a particular receipt actually comes in, the
right to receive it is already fixed and its particular amount is fully determined. Therefore, the
receipt is includable in income of an accrual-method taxpayer at that time. Conceivably, at some
point near the end of the productive life of the well, the remaining amount to be received by an
accrual-method taxpayer may become determinable with reasonable accuracy. To this extent, his
reporting of income could differ from that of a cash-method taxpayer.
231. The discount might be treated as interest income if it is equated with risk of default.
232. See text accompanying notes 218-23 supra.
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participate in the half interest that he retains. 233 Thus, the ultimate
payoff in the happy event of oil discovery is more like a redemption of
an equity participation than a loan repayment, and it is difficult to treat
the discount as ordinary income on the ground that it is equivalent to
interest on a debt.
Nevertheless, terms like "equity interest" are of little value for de-
termining whether the discount payments should receive capital gain
treatment. We are again forced back to the fundamental recognition
that current law requires a sale-or-exchange element for the capital
gain preference.23 4 If one accepts that requirement and the proposition
that payment of an obligation does not generally satisfy it, a third party
who acquires a contingent-price contract by cash purchase will neces-
sarily have ordinary income from payments on the contract that exceed
his basis. The question is whether it makes sense to try to distinguish
this third party's tax situation from that of a taxpayer who sells his own
property for a contingent-price contract. Moreover, if the distinction
makes sense, we must find a doctrinal basis for it.
At the root of the matter we find a taxpayer owning a capital asset,
the mineral rights, that he wishes to sell. Unfortunately, however, he
does not know their true value, as opposed to their fair market value
for purposes of section 1001, and section 1001 makes him pay a heavy
tax penalty for this lack of knowledge regardless of the drilling results.
If the drilling is unsuccessful, he has paid tax on a $25,000 long-term
capital gain without ever receiving anything from the sale, either at the
time of the transaction or later. The only relief is in the form of a
future capital loss, which he cannot even carry back to offset his earlier
gain3.2 5 If the drilling is successful, it means the rights were actually
worth much more than he reported earlier, but his capital gain is lim-
ited to the earlier-reported figure. On the other hand, the third-party
233. Ignoring taxes that the seller would pay if he sold the rights for cash, he could receive
$25,000 for them. He foregoes this receipt in order to participate in the venture, and he will never
recover it should the mineral rights prove worthless. Similarly, if he chooses to handle the drilling
himself, he pays $50,000 for the privilege of maintaining a 100% participation in the venture.
234. If this taxpayer, for example, sold an undivided one-half interest in the mineral rights for
the purchaser's promise to carry out the drilling, he should report income in the amount of
$12,500-the value of the promise. He may also have a later deduction in this amount. A11 in-
come from his share in the proceeds from oil sales would be ordinary gain, because notwithstand-
ing his equity interest, he is now in the business of producing and selling oil. In order to get
capital gain treatment, he must effect a second sale of his remaining one-half interest in the rights
after oil is discovered. Nevertheless, either of these taxpayers, seller or purchaser, can get the
same result by selling his one-half interest after discovery. Therefore, the issue of how the seller's
gain in our original hypothetical should be characterized when he does not resell his contract
cannot be resolved by looking to such factors as equity interests.
235. See the second paragraph of note 182 supra.
[V'ol. 1980:417
Vol. 1980:417] TAXING THE SALE OF PROPERTY
taxpayer who purchases the contingent-price contract consciously
chooses to place himself in a situation in which his fortunes will vary
dramatically with developments in future knowledge. The tax conse-
quences, whatever they are, are matters that he can take into account in
deciding whether to make the investment. If the two taxpayers are to
be distinguished, therefore, it must be on the basis that one has sold an
underlying capital asset of highly uncertain true value, whereas the
other has not.236 The next question is how the necessary sale-or-ex-
change element is to be supplied.
(c) Possible doctrinal bases for capital gain treatment of discount
payments under contingent-price contracts. If the seller of capital-asset
property under a contingent-price contract is to have capital gain on
payments received subsequent to his including the contract's fair mar-
ket value in the amount realized under section 1001, it will be necessary
to reconsider firmly established judicial doctrine. Perhaps with the
help of the Arrowsmith rule we could modify the doctrine that pay-
ments on an obligation following a closed transaction do not involve a
sale or exchange. An alternative approach is to continue using some
form of the open-transaction doctrine, preferably with a more rational
and predictable basis. In any case, because a decision in favor of capi-
tal gain treatment would presumably be designed to ameliorate the
quandary in which current law places the seller of capital-asset prop-
erty whose true value is highly uncertain, neither approach should be
adopted without considering its interrelationship with the installment
sale provisions.
(i) Application of the Arrowsmith rule. The application of the Ar-
rowsmith holding to relate the earlier sale to discount payments and
thereby make them eligible for capital gain treatment, if adopted, must
logically be extended to fixed-price as well as to contingent-price con-
tracts. In Arrowsmith the Court held that notwithstanding the absence
of a sale or exchange in a subsequent year, a subsequent-year payment
(or, arguably, receipt) by a taxpayer will be treated as capital if it is
integrally related to a capital transaction in a prior year.237 In the cases
236. It is immediately evident that this distinction will often exalt form over substance. For
example, our second taxpayer might just as consciously enter this speculative investment by
purchasing the actual mineral rights for a flat $25,000, assuming they or their equivalent are avail-
able. He is then indistinguishable from the first taxpayer, but his claim to special tax treatment
seems no greater than it was before. Again, any attempt at fundamental resolution of this problem
must get into the sale-or-exchange requirement itself, but that analysis is beyond the scope of this
Article.
237. See notes 213-16 supra and accompanying text.
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we are considering, the prior-year transaction is the original sale of a
capital asset. In the usual contingent-price contract, however, the seller
parts with considerably less than he does in a fixed-price contract; the
amount the seller will receive usually depends on the future success of
the venture in which the property is used, and in a very real sense the
seller maintains an equity interest in the property sold. Therefore, the
underlying transaction in the contingent-price case is less like a sale
than in the fixed-price case,238 and in this sense the discount payments
look a bit like payments from a partnership engaged in the develop-
ment of the property.239 Thus, if the Arrowsmith rule applies to pay-
ments on contingent-price contracts, the rule should also apply to fixed-
price contracts, in which the transaction is more clearly an outright
sale.
Admittedly, once it is granted that a sale has taken place,240 the
contingent-price discount payments are arguably more like a true pay-
ment of the purchase price than are fixed-price discount payments.
Nevertheless, this is a weak ground for distinction. In fixed-price con-
tracts the entire discount is closely associated with factors usually
treated as interest. In contingent-price contracts, however, the discount
depends on two types of risk: first, risk of nonpayment dependent on
the characteristics of the purchaser and the transaction; second, risk of
nonpayment dependent on other future developments. Only the sec-
ond type of risk, typical of capital gain assets, makes subsequent pay-
ments on the contract seem similar to payments of the purchase price.
To distinguish, in the application of Arrowsmith, fixed-price from con-
tingent-price contracts on this ground would logically require a quanti-
tative assessment of each of the two types of risk in contingent-price
contracts. This may be an even more difficult task than the original
valuation process.
In conclusion, it is difficult to see how the fact of price contingency
238. Courts typically look to such factors as the degree of risk retained by the seller and the
existence of a fixed sale price to determine both the timing of a sale and whether a sale has in fact
occurred. E.g., Bradford v. United States, 444 F.2d 1133, 1144 (Ct. CI. 1971); Maher v. Commis-
sioner, 55 T.C. 441, 451-52 (1970), a'd, 56 T.C. 763 (1971), nonacq. 1977-2 C.B. 2, a f'd inpart and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 469 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972); Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. of
America v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 675, 682 (1961).
239. See notes 233-34 supra and accompanying text.
240. It may be observed that the application of section 1001 to the underlying transaction, as is
assumed here, does not require that a sale or exchange for capital gain purposes has taken place.
Section 1001 applies to all "sale[s] or other disposition[s]," and a transfer of property in exchange
for a contingent-price contract conceivably is a rearrangement of interests sufficient to constitute a
disposition under section 1001. This transaction, however, might not qualify as a sale or exchange
for capital gain purposes. In that case, the entire underlying transaction, not just the discount,
should involve ordinary gain or loss.
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makes the actual payment any more integrally related to the underlying
sales transaction than a fixed payment would be. Consequently, if the
Arrowsmith rationale is to be used to characterize the discount pay-
ments, it should be applied to fixed- as well as contingent-price con-
tracts. If nothing else, adopting this approach would simplify
enormously the problems associated with taxing the sale of property.
(ii) Distinguishing fixed- from contingent-price contracts through a
modfed open-transaction approach. If capital gain treatment must be
limited to discount payments made on contingent-price contracts, one
way to achieve doctrinal coherence would be to modify the open-trans-
action approach. The modified approach would be based on the fact of
contingency rather than on the absence of an ascertainable market
value: Any sale-of-property transaction involving a purchaser obliga-
tion that the Service holds ineligible for installment reporting under
section 453 on the ground of a contingency in price or obligation to pay
should be regarded as open for the purposes of applying section 1001.
Thus, when the installment method is unavailable because of contin-
gencies, the transaction would be entitled to open-transaction treat-
ment.
This modification of the open-transaction doctrine would be a def-
inite improvement on the current approach. The open-transaction doc-
trine based on ascertainability of fair market value of a purchaser
obligation, with its emphasis on the value of the obligation, operates
haphazardly at best. Especially with the burden of proof on the tax-
payer, one can never be certain he has met the requirements, and this
makes careful tax planning extremely difficult.241 In addition, the mod-
ified approach would not require any radical change of doctrine. It
simply would involve recognizing that the economic rationale for ap-
proving open-transaction treatment has been a contingency, other than
the purchaser's failure to fulfill his legal obligations, that might cause a
significant future change in the value of the obligation.242
Even more important, however, is that ascertainability of value for
the purchaser obligation bears no rational relationship to the principal
241. See notes 60 & 146 supra and accompanying text.
242. Price contingency of the classic Burnet v. Logan type need not be the sole ground for
open-transaction treatment, although that type has inspired the use of the term "contingent-price
contract" and serves as a model for the discussion in the text. The right to a specific amount may
be sufficiently contingent to justify open-transaction treatment. Cf. In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398,
1403 (9th Cir. 1975) (right to payment dependent on favorable judicial decision on a novel ques-
tion of state law); Bolles v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 342,355-56 (1977) (right to additional consider-
ation on sale of stock dependent on purchaser's success in acquiring at least 50% of the
outstanding shares through a tender offer).
DUKE LAW JOUNAL
problem in characterizing discount payments on contingent-price con-
tracts.243 The real problem with contingent-price contracts is that their
value on the date of the sale, even when that value can quite rationally
and definitively be ascertained, will often be very different from what
later turns out to be their true value. Severe tax penalties may attach to
any error in valuation made as of the date of sale. In a sense, then, the
real problem is not whether the value is ascertainable but whether the
ascertained value is fair. Thus, if the Service denies installment treat-
ment because of a price contingency, the courts should allow open-
transaction treatment on the ground that no fair market value is ascer-
tainable.
(iii) Interrelationsho with the installment method of reporting. Be-
cause of the close relationship between the suggested modification of
the open-transaction doctrine and the installment method of reporting,
a brief review of the current treatment of contingent-price contracts
under section 453 is helpful in assessing this modified approach to open
transactions. Under current law, there is no clearly available install-
ment method of reporting gain in cases involving a contingent-price
purchaser obligation. The basic purpose of section 453, however, is to
reduce the hardship of taxing the full section 1001 profit from a sale
when the taxpayer may have received little or nothing in the year of
sale with which to pay his tax.244 If no installment election were avail-
able to delay recognition of gain and to preserve the character of the
underlying sale, much could undoubtedly be said for a judicial ap-
243. A good example of the reasons why ascertainability of value should not be the test of
openness for the purpose of treating the discount payments as capital gain is the confusion that
test caused recently in McCormac v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 955 (1977). In McCormac taxpayers
received on a section 333 liquidation a right to payments from a trust fund consisting of prepaid
funeral expenses. The Service treated the payments as ordinary income because of the absence of
a sale or exchange-that is, on the ground that the section 333 liquidation was a closed transac-
tion. Taxpayers argued that the transaction should remain open because the right had no ascer-
tainable fair market value, even though fair market value is irrelevant to taxation of the section
333 liquidation transaction. The Tax Court rejected the argument but only on the ground that
taxpayers failed to prove the absence of ascertainability. Id at 964. Surely the important distinc-
tion between ordinary income and capital gain should stand on something less ephemeral than
whether a right to payment had an ascertainable fair market value in a prior proceeding in which
the fair market value was neither ascertained nor required to be ascertained.
244. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 503 (1948); Dennis v. Commis-
sioner, 473 F.2d 274, 284 (5th Cir. 1973); Tombari v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir.
1962); Horneff v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 63, 75 (1968) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting), vacated and
remanded, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9727 (3d Cir. 1969); Irwin v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 544, 550
(1966), rev'don other grounds, 390 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1968); Vf. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 24 (1934) (Congress finds it unreasonable to use installment method of reporting income to
postpone paying taxes "in cases where such tax can well be paid in the year of the sale"), reprinted
in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 554, 572.
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proach that tempered the rigors of section 1001, notwithstanding con-
fficts with statutory language or apparent legislative intent. In the case
of fixed-price contracts, however, section 453 usually stands ready to
ease the burden on any taxpayer who is careful enough to bring himself
within its requirements.245 Because the statutory scheme contains a
safety valve to relieve the pressure, there is less justification for judicial
tampering.246
Contingent-price purchaser obligations, in which the underlying
sale involves a capital asset, present a stronger case for treating at least
a part of the discount payments as capital gain, 247 but current law dis-
qualifies these contracts from installment sale treatment. The disquali-
fication stems from a somewhat formal reading of section 453, which
treats as income that portion of any payment received on the contract,
including the downpayment, that equals the ratio of the gross profit to
the total contract price.248 In a contingent-price contract, neither the
gross profit nor the total contract price is known in the year of the sale.
Thus, the percentage of each payment that must be included in income
cannot be precisely determined, and courts ruling on the issue have
upheld the Service in holding that section 453 is unavailable in these
cases.249 Coherent interpretation of section 1001 and section 453, how-
ever, suggests that these decisions are wrong.
A general principle of tax law is that privileges and exemptive pro-
visions should be strictly construed.250 Although section 453 is a relief
245. Section 453 is no model of perfection even in the case of fixed-price contracts. In fact, the
statute and its interpretation have been subject to severe and cogent criticism. E.g., Ginsburg. See
also text accompanying notes 295-307 infra. However, because most fixed-price transactions can
be structured to qualify for the section 453 election, the harshness otherwise resulting from section
1001 can be avoided, and any remaining problems are more appropriately addressed directly
rather than through a distorted interpretation of section 1001.
246. The Ninth Circuit has also concluded, although without distinguishing between regular
and isolated sales, that when section 1001 would otherwise apply, the installment sale provisions
of section 453 stand as the sole basis for relief. Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788,
792 (9th Cir. 1975). See also In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1975).
247. See notes 229-36 supra and accompanying text.
248. Basically, the gross profit is the selling price, including assumed mortgages, minus the
seller's basis. The total contract price is the selling price minus assumed mortgages. See Treas.
Reg. § IA53-4(c) (1958); Miller, Installment Sales of Mortgaged Realty-Another View, 6 J. REAL
EST. TAX. 5, 11-12 (1978). If the amount of the mortgage exceeds the seller's basis, the excess is
included in the total contract price. This insures that the ratio of gross profit to total contract price
will not be greater than one.
249. Gralapp v. United States, 458 F.2d 1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 1972). See also Emory, The
Installment Method of Reporting Income, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 181, 195-96 (1968).
250. Eg., Cappel House Furnishing Co. v. United States, 244 F.2d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1957).
See also Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1283, 1285 (Ct. CL 1973) (apply-
ing the principle of strict interpretation to uphold the Services two-payment rule under section
453).
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provision, however, there is good reason not to apply this principle to it
blindly. If the seller has clearly received less than 30% of the selling
price in the year of the sale, as is often the case when there is a fixed
minimum price plus a contingency, he fits within the class of taxpayers
whom the statute was designed to relieve: those who have not received
sufficient cash with which to pay their taxes. 25 Moreover, section 453
gives the Service broad authority to write regulations providing for the
return of income pursuant to its installment method. 252 Professor Gins-
burg has suggested a number of possibilities, 25 3 all of which are consis-
tent with the statute,254 for handling contingent-price contracts under
251. See note 244 supra and accompanying text.
252. § 453(a)(1), (b)(1).
253. Ginsburg 493-97. For example, if there is a maximum price, the government does not
lose if that maximum is taken as the total contract price for the purpose of calculating the percent-
ages; if the maximum is not reached, the taxpayer will later have a capital loss. If there is a fixed
time period for payments, basis can be apportioned ratably over the period, with any excess in a
particular period treated as gain. Even if there is neither a maximum price nor a fixed period of
payment, the regulations could simply fix a reasonable period for recovery of basis-perhaps the
seller's life expectancy or, in a particular case, an expected period of production of the asset sold.
In fact, at the 1979 hearings on legislation proposed to simplify installment reporting, the Treasury
Department appeared to approve this approach, at least in principle. Treas. Release No. B-1758,
at 9-14.
Moreover, in many cases the seller's basis may be so low compared to expected receipts on
the contract that nearly all of each payment will represent gain no matter how the percentage is
calculated. This situation arose in both In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1975), and Gralapp v.
United States, 458 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1972). In such cases the government can hardly complain
about administrative difficulties or delayed payment of taxes if the taxpayer offers to report all of
each payment as gain under section 453, recovering his basis in the year that the final payment is
made, or taking a loss when it becomes clear that no more payments will be forthcoming. When
there is a sizable fixed minimum payment, as there was in both Steen and Grala p, this approach
might not constitute too high a price for avoiding immediate taxation to the extent of fair market
value of the fixed obligation, obtaining capital gain treatment for the discount payments on the
fixed obligation, and obviating the need to argue about whether the contingent portion could be
valued. Although apparently neither taxpayer in these cases offered to report in this manner, one
or the other may well have done so if the procedure had been authorized by regulation.
To the Service's credit, it has tried to provide for a ratable reporting of gain in the very
limited area of private annuities received in exchange for appreciated property. The Service, how-
ever, has been rebuffed in this attempt by the Tax Court. See note 74 supra.
A more difficult problem in the case of contingent-price contracts may be defining the statu-
tory 30% requirement. That problem, however, also appears solvable by regulation. See notes
300-01 inf a and accompanying text.
254. Section 453(b) states that income from sales of real property and casual sales of personal
property "may (under regulations prescribed by the Secretary) be returned on the basis and in the
manner prescribed in subsection (a)." Section 453(a) expressly sets forth the installment method
with respect to dealings in personal property and requires that each payment received on the
contract be included in income in the ratio of the gross profit to the total contract price. See note
248 supra. Neither gross profit nor total contract price is defined by the statute, at least for the
purpose of section 453(b) sales. A very narrow reading of the section would be that the Service is
unauthorized to extend its benefits to contingent-price contracts on the ground that the term "total
contract price" implies a fixed number. Consequently, an amendment of section 453(b) expressly
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an installment approach. The Service could adopt these procedures by
regulation, and no additional input from Congress would be required.
There is no need for highly technical construction when the underlying
policies are clear and a rational method of resolving individual cases is
available.
In summary, then, a test relying on the ascertainability of the mar-
ket value of contingent-price purchaser obligations does not rationally
distinguish between sellers of property who are and those who are not
equitably entitled to capital transaction characterization for their dis-
count payments. Moreover, while an argument can be made that the
discount payments should represent ordinary income on all purchaser
obligations, the fact is that we permit capital gain treatment of the dis-
count on fixed-price purchaser obligations through the availability of
the installment sale provisions, even though as between fixed- and con-
tingent-price contracts, the latter have the greater equitable claim to
this benefit. In many cases involving taxation, the best one can do is
point out the anomaly and call for statutory reform, but that is not the
case here. Any court that sees the issue in its correct perspective can
fashion a satisfactory solution within the current statutory framework.
The court would reason that when section 1001 would otherwise apply,
the purpose of section 453 is to give some tax relief to sellers of prop-
erty in isolated transactions who do not receive enough cash in the year
of sale to cover their tax. Accordingly, these sellers should be able to
pay their tax pro rata out of each payment received. The Service is
broadly authorized to write regulations specifying the method of in-
stallment reporting and is capable of writing reasonable regulations
covering contingent-price purchaser obligations. Therefore, if the
Service holds that a particular transaction involves a contingency ren-
dering section 453 unavailable, it is appropriate for the court to take the
view that no fair market value can be ascertained. The reason for the
absence of a fair market value, however, is not that the obligation has
no value, but that the future value is likely to be very different from the
current value even when the purchaser fulfills all of his obligations
under the contract. Doctrinally, this would simply be a continuation of
the time-honored open-transaction approach. The test, however,
would bear a more rational relation to equitable taxation and statutory
permitting installment reporting on contingent obligations might be useful. This proposal is cur-
rently under consideration. See notes 277-82 infra and accompanying text.
Such a narrow reading of the Service's authority, however, is hardly necessary. Because the
statute does not define the relevant terms, the broad authority to adopt regulations should cer-
tainly include authority to make rational definitions of gross profit and total contract price when
contingencies are present. Moreover, because section 453 is ameliorative and optional, it might be
difficult to find a person with standing to complain about the regulations.
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interpretation.
Judicial application of the suggested test would be very simple.
The only inquiry would be whether, under current regulations, install-
ment-method reporting under section 453 was unavailable on the
ground of contingencies in the purchaser obligation. It will usually be
quite clear whether this test is satisfied, since litigation will not nor-
mally arise unless the taxpayer has attempted to make a section 453
election and has been denied by the Service.2 55 The test would cer-
tainly be more predictable in result than the almost metaphysical cur-
rent test of whether the purchaser obligation has an ascertainable
value. It would reserve open-transaction treatment, for which there is
little statutory authority,2 56 for those who are denied the benefits of
section 453 for reasons that have no relationship to the taxpayers' abil-
ity to pay the tax from the transaction.2 57 On the other hand, those
ineligible for open-transaction reporting would, by hypothesis, either
255. The regulations require that the elections be made in the return covering the tax year of
the sale. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8(b)(1) (1958). Therefore, failure to make the election would be a
ground for denying open-transaction treatment under the test suggested, as ineligibility for section
453 reporting would rest not on the contingency but on the failure to make a timely election. At
the least, the taxpayer who believes he does not qualify should claim open-transaction treatment
on the ground of the contingency but elect the installment method in the alternative. This ap-
proach appears to be acceptable to the courts. See Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d
788, 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1975). If the Service denied both, the issue would be clear in subsequent
litigation.
256. See text accompanying notes 97-101 supra.
257. The facts in In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1975), and Gralapp v. United States, 458
F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1972), are instructive. Both cases involved the sale of mineral rights by
extremely low-basis sellers for a significant fixed minimum price, to be paid in installments, plus a
contingency. In both cases the courts concluded that the contingent portion of the purchaser obli-
gation was to be held open on the ground that it was not capable of valuation. Consequently, the
government would not collect tax on that portion of the gain until and unless it was paid. How-
ever, the existence of the contingency was enough to make the total contract price unascertainable,
and both courts thought that section 453 should therefore be unavailable even for the fixed-price
portion. In other words, the result in both cases was to adopt a wait and see approach with respect
to the contingency, so that the only issue remaining for decision was whether basis could be recov-
ered and profit reported ratably out of actual payments on the fixed portion, or whether section
1001 alone would apply.
Once the courts took the contingency out of the picture, there could be no justification for its
serving as the reason to deny an installment election otherwise available. Section 453 gives every
fixed-price property seller the right to elect, and the possibility that these particular taxpayers
might receive some additional payments at the end of the contract period should not make any
difference as to section 453 eligibility. Basis would have been recovered by that time in either
event, and additional payments would represent income in their entirety. Taxation of the contin-
gency payments is exactly the same whether or not section 453 treatment is allowed.
A much more sensible approach in both cases would have been to permit the adoption of
section 453 with respect to the fixed-price portion and to follow the open-transaction approach
with respect to the contingency. This approach will serve well enough until the Service promul-
gates regulations permitting installment reporting of contingent-price contracts. The same ap-
proach should be taken even if the contingent-price portion of the contract has an ascertainable
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have section 453 to relieve the harshness of section 1001 or would in
any event be ineligible for reasons that Congress has expressly decided
are sufficient to require the application of section 1001. Finally, in the
long run, the modified test would probably spell the end of the open-
transaction approach, as the Service would have a strong incentive to
devise regulations expanding the coverage of section 453 to contingent-
price contracts.2 58 Section 1001 and section 453 would then be the sole
either/or choice available to taxpayers who make isolated sales of
property, and nearly all of the judicial verbiage that has developed
around these statutes over the past fifty years could be forgotten.
(iv) Currently proposed legislative changes. In 1979, legislation
designed to simplify reporting income pursuant to the section 453 in-
stallment method was introduced jointly in the House2 59 and Senate.260
The bills as introduced would eliminate two eligibility rules under sec-
tion 453: the requirement that no more than 30% of the selling price be
received in the year of sale, and the administratively adopted rule that
two or more payments in two or more tax years are necessary for the
election of installment reporting. Both of these changes would be wel-
come.261 However, in its descriptions of the bills, the Joint Committee
on Taxation brought up additional issues for consideration, including
sales subject to a contingency and the open-transaction problem.262 In
the hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee, the Treas-
ury Department indicated that it would support the proposed eligibility
changes provided that the sponsors include additional amendments to
section 453 that, in practical effect, would require all casual sales of
value in the year of sale. That portion, but not the fixed-price portion, should be treated as open
unless and until the Service agrees to its eligibility for the installment method of reporting.
258. It would certainly remove the basis for open-transaction treatment of most, if not all,
third-party obligations received upon a sale or exchange. Because section 453 is not available for
these obligations, the open-transaction approach should not be available either. The only excep-
tion would be the rare case in which the third-party obligation has a value but that value is for
some reason truly not ascertainable. Nothing suggested in this Article would prohibit an open-
transaction approach in cases of true nonascertainability; there is, however, a question as to how
many of these cases actually exist. See text accompanying notes 197-203 supra.
259. H.R. 3899, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
260. S. 1063, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
261. See text accompanying notes 295-307 infra.
262. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., lsT SEss., DESCRIPTION OF S. 1062
AND S. 1063 RELATING TO SIMPLIFICATION OF CERTAIN PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION PRO-
VISIONS AND INSTALLMENT SALE REPORTING RULES UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 29-
31 (Joint Comm. Print 1979); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., lST SESs.,
DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3899 AND H.R. 3900 RELATING TO SIMPLIFICATION OF INSTALLMENT SALE
REPORTING RULES AND CERTAIN PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION PROVISIONS UNDER THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 16-18 (Joint Comm. Print 1979).
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property to be reported on the installment method.263
The key to the Treasury proposal is the allocation of basis over the
period in which payments are to be made. The proposal, applying to
all sales of real property and casual sales of personal property, would
permit the taxpayer to elect to include the fair market value of the pur-
chaser obligation in income for the year of sale. Unless the fair market
value of the purchaser obligation were equal to its face value and there
were no contingent payments, however, part of the taxpayer's original
basis in the property he sold would be attributable to payments re-
ceived in later years. Thus, the taxpayer would not be able to deduct
his full basis from the fair market value of the obligation in determin-
ing his gain, and the total income reported in the year of sale would be
even greater under the election than under current section 1001. There
is, therefore, a strong disincentive to making the election. Moreover, if
the purchaser obligation has no ascertainble fair market value, the re-
sults under the election would be identical to those from the new in-
stallment method. The character of the gain in either case (including
the discount payments) would be the same for all payments.264 Be-
cause all sales would automatically be under the new installment
method unless election were made to include the fair market value of
the purchaser obligation in the first year, the cost-recovery, or open-
transaction, method would be denied.265
Making all purchaser obligations, whether contingent or not, eligi-
ble for installment reporting would certainly be a welcome change, al-
though it is doubtful that rewriting the statute is necessary to do it.
Moreover, treating all discount payments as satisfying the sale-or-ex-
change requirement for capital gain treatment would eliminate the cur-
rent illogical distinction between the purchaser obligation of a
corporation and that of an individual.266 However, the Treasury pro-
263. Treas. Release No. B-1758, at 7-14. The Treasury's proposal has received support from
the New York State and American Bar Associations. See Joint Report on H.R. 3899 Simplification
ofInstallment Sale Reporting, 33 TAX LAW. 349 (1980).
264. Treas Release No. B-1758. Instead of "discount payments," Release B-1758 uses the
term "collection gain."
265. See Id 11.
266. See note 216 supra. Many may feel, however, that this treatment of discount payments
would create a new problem because of the similarity of the payments to interest income. See text
accompanying notes 210-23 supra. Rather than relying on Arrowsmith, the Treasury proposal
would amend section 1232(a) to equalize notes issued by corporate and noncorporate obligors.
Thus, discount would receive favorable capital gain treatment not only in the case of purchaser
obligations but also obligations purchased for cash, and even third-party obligations generally.
This kind of tampering with the fundamental sale-or-exchange requirement for the capital gain
preference may well be justifiable as a matter of tax policy, but "reform" would seem to be a more
appropriate label than "simplification."
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posal still fails to make the fundamental distinction between the appro-
priate application of the accounting provisions of the Code and the
application of the sale-or-exchange provisions. The Treasury is in fact
trying to have its cake and eat it too by eliminating the possibility of
open-transaction treatment for cash-method taxpayers but retaining
use of taxpayer's accounting method-or a very complicated install-
ment provision-for accrual-method taxpayers. 267
Problems will remain in the Treasury's approach as long as it fails
to recognize that the accounting provisions should apply to transactions
in the regular course of business and the sale-or-exchange provisions
should apply to isolated or casual transactions. For example, if the
Treasury proposal is applied to the facts of the Wiggins case,268 a
number of difficulties arise. Wiggins involved the sale of 1,200 lots in a
subdivision under highly speculative contracts. The court was troubled
by the Service's attempt to apply section 1001 to each sale because of
the difficulty of making so many individual determinations of fair mar-
ket value. Consequently, it held that the purchaser obligations were
without ascertainable fair market value and permitted the cost-recov-
ery method of reporting gain. As discussed above,269 this result could
have been achieved much more easily had the court realized that sec-
tion 1001 has nothing to do with a sale of property in the regular course
of business. However, under the new Treasury proposal, all sales of
real property would be subject to installment reporting unless the tax-
payer elects to report the value of the purchaser obligations immedi-
ately. If the taxpayer wishes to report his gain on the installment
method, that choice is available to him uhider current law, so the ques-
tion is what happens to taxpayers who want to use their regular ac-
counting method in disposing of real property in the ordinary course of
business. Under the Treasury proposal, the taxpayer apparently would
not be free to do so, because an election out of installment reporting
would put him into a revised section 1001.
This result would be one that the Treasury has wanted for years.
A taxpayer who elects out of installment reporting but is willing to in-
clude the full face amount of the purchaser obligation in the amount
realized in the year of sale would measure income in that year simply
by deducting basis, exactly as an accrual-method taxpayer does now.
Consequently, the Treasury proposal would permit accrual-method
taxpayers to use their accounting method in reporting gain. However,
a taxpayer who includes less than the face value of the purchaser obli-
267. See text accompanying notes 102-07 supra.
268. See text accompanying notes 85-95 supra.
269. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
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gation in the amount realized would measure income by deducting
from the amount realized only a reduced basis, with the remaining ba-
sis allocated to later years. Consequently, a cash-method taxpayer
would be denied the opportunity to use his accounting method and
essentially would be forced to use installment reporting. The only al-
ternative would be a fair market value method that is more onerous in
the year of sale than section 1001 is now and that is complicated even
further by the need to allocate basis over a period of years.
The Treasury proposal would thus in effect mandate either the use
of an accrual method of accounting or the use of the installment
method in all real property sales businesses, 270 because it is inconceiv-
able that a rational taxpayer would elect out of installment reporting
into the fair market value method proposed. It is unclear how much
thought Treasury has given to this aspect of the proposal, but it should
avoid plunging headlong into a basic change in the accounting rules
without careful consideration. The accounting rules, designed to meas-
ure the income from business activities, have been in effect for some
time. The regulations in theory have long permitted the use of one of
the standard accounting methods as an alternative to the installment
method,271 and if the method chosen does not adequately reflect in-
come, the Service is authorized to required another method that better
reflects income in the particular case.272 There probably are many
kinds of businesses that involve regular sales of something that could
be called real property, and it is far from clear that all of them would
be best served by the accrual method or the new installment approach.
The Treasury proposal could presumably be modified to exclude
regular sales of real property from the mandatory installment approach
and include only casual sales. As discussed above,273 however, there
are disadvantages to a mandatory installment approach even in the
case of casual sales, and one must ask whether there are benefits from
the proposal that outweigh its disadvantages. The availability of in-
stallment reporting for contingent-price contracts is indeed an advan-
tage, but this could be permitted under current law by regulation.274
Moreover, if statutory authorization is deemed necessary or appropri-
270. The mandatory either/or approach of the Treasury proposal would apply to "gain on any
sale of real property or casual sale of personal property. . . ." Treas. Release No. B-1758, at 8.
Installment reporting for dealers in personal property would presumably remain available under
section 453(a), and the proposed change would apparently leave personal property dealers free to
choose a system of accounting to report income as they have in the past.
271. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(e) (1958). See text accompanying note 43 supra.
272. § 446(b).
273. See text accompanying notes 189-92 supra.
274. See text accompanying notes 252-53 supra.
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ate, the statute could be broadened to include contingent-ptice con-
tracts and still be an elective provision.275 Therefore, the only
significant advantage, from the Service's point of view, is the elimina-
tion of the open-transaction approach to reporting gain from payments
on purchaser obligations. The argument that an obligation has no as-
certainable fair market value would still be available to taxpayers who
receive third-party obligations, and in fact the statutory elimination of
cost recovery in the one case might actually enhance its use in the
other, because it would show that Congress could have eliminated this
particular loophole if it had wanted to do so. As argued in this Arti-
cle,276 the open-transaction approach has no real basis in tax policy
once the problem of contingent-price purchaser obligations is ad-
dressed by making them available for installment reporting. One must
therefore ask whether the Treasury proposal is not statutory overkill.
Its advantages could be obtained without its disadvantages.
There has been considerable opposition to the full Treasury pro-
posal, and Professor Ginsburg has suggested a compromise in which
the 30% and two-payment rules would be eliminated and the Service
would be given a statutory mandate to propose regulations making
contingent-price contracts eligible for installment reporting.277 This
compromise proposal would retain the election-out feature of the
Treasury proposal, but taxpayers who choose to elect out of the install-
ment method would fall under current law. Consequently, installment
reporting would not be mandatory in principle or in practice, and cost
recovery would still theoretically be available for taxpayers who elect
out and prove that their purchaser obligations had no ascertainable fair
market value. The requirement for an affirmative election out, how-
ever, would insure a signal to the Service that the particular return
might be worthy of an audit.278 This is likely to deter taxpayers who
might otherwise claim open-transaction treatment in the hope that they
will not be audited.279 Further, this approach would leave section 1001
275. Professor Ginsburg has suggested this approach. See text accompanying notes 277-82
infra.
276. See text accompanying notes 241-58 supra.
277. M. Ginsburg, Proposed Specifications for a Circumscribed Legislative Approach to Sim-
plification of Installment Sale Reporting (Nov. 21, 1979) (unpublished memorandum delivered to
Bernard M. Shapiro, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation) (copy on file with the author).
This memorandum outlines some of the opposition to the Treasury proposal.
278. Id 13-15. On the other hand, the Service could probably revise its forms for reporting
gain from property sales to insure the desired signal even under present law.
279. Deterrence would be especially strong if taxpayers were denied the opportunity to elect
installment reporting as an alternative to their open-transaction claims. Under current law, alter-
native election appears permissible, see note 255 supra, but this situation would likely change
when the taxpayer affirmatively elected out of installment sale treatment. Indeed, this may be the
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available for those taxpayers who prefer taxation pursuant to the cur-
rent treatment of closed transactions. 280 Like the Treasury proposal,
the compromise in its present form does not distinguish between casual
and regular sales of real property. In principle, this flaw would not
matter, because the taxpayer can elect to report under current law,
which allows businesses to use one of the standard accounting methods
and to avoid section 1001. However, there is no assurance that the
Service will abide the use of accounting methods for sales rather than
try to force section 1001 into application, as it did in Wiggins. More-
over, because election out requires an affirmative act, businesses that
fail to elect out may be forced to fight the Service's attempts to revise
their books to account for income under the new installment method.
As the Wiggins case indicates, any real estate business now on the cash
method should be prepared to defend against such action by the Serv-
ice.
This compromise approach and the approach suggested by this
Article would yield essentially the same end result for isolated-sale con-
tingent-price contracts: they would eliminate, as a practical matter, the
open-transaction approach for isolated sales of property and make in-
stalment reporting and section 1001 the sole alternatives. The statu-
tory amendment would probably eliminate litigation over the open-
transaction approach more quickly.281 Under the current statutory
scheme, the Service would have to adopt regulations permitting install-
ment reporting under contingent-price contracts and then convince the
courts that the no ascertainable fair market value approach was thus
preempted.282 Under the statutory amendment, regulations would still
be necessary, but after their adoption few taxpayers would be so in-
trepid as to litigate their eligibility for open-transaction treatment.
Even if the issue were litigated under the new statute, the analysis
presented above, arguing that open-transaction treatment should be de-
nied when section 453 is available, would still be valid. The compro-
strongest argument for a statutory election-out procedure. When the taxpayer can elect in the
alternative, the Service not only has to make the first move, but the taxpayer also has a comforta-
ble fall-back position if he loses the litigation over cost recovery. Given the Service's limited
enforcement resources, there is much to be said in favor of requiring all taxpayers to fix their
positions at an early stage in the process.
280. Professor Ginsburg suggests retaining the idea of amending section 1232(a) to give sale-
or-exchange treatment to discount payments or, as he also says, "collection gain," regardless of
whether the obligor is a corporation or an individual. This suggestion might give additional in-
ducement to elect out. Ginsburg memorandum, supra note 277, at 20-21.
281. This assumes that the new provision would be interpreted to prohibit an installment elec-
tion in the alternative. See note 279 supra. Far fewer taxpayers would then be expected to seek
open-transaction treatment.
282. See text accompanying notes 244-58 supra.
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mise approach would have no effect on the principal thesis of this
Article. The correct statutory interpretation would still involve a dis-
tinction between isolated sales and those in the regular course of busi-
ness.
In sum, aside from eliminating the 30% and two-payment rules,
neither the Treasury proposal nor the compromise approach is neces-
sary. The problem of contingent-price contracts can be resolved by
regulation under current law, and once this is done, the open-transac-
tion doctrine will be eliminated naturally through proper interpretation
of the current statutory scheme. By following this route, the Service
would accomplish its objectives without violent statutory change. En-
acting the compromise proposal would likely have the same effects
without causing untoward problems, provided some distinction were
made between regular and casual sales of real property. The election-
out feature would probably be an improvement in cases of isolated
sales, and the stimulus of the statute might more quickly prompt new
regulations to solve the problem of contingent-price contracts. The
Treasury proposal, on the other hand, would apply a sledge hammer to
a walnut. Open transactions are simply not a sufficiently serious prob-
lem to require new mandatory accounting rules adopted without care-
ful thought about their ramifications. Moreover, the problem can be
handled through less drastic means.
2. Timing of the Discount-Prorating the Discount Following
Closed Transactions. The preceding discussion focused on the charac-
ter of the gain attributable to the discount payments on a purchaser
obligation. In short, it appears under current law that discount pay-
ments following a closed transaction will be treated as ordinary in-
come. The Arrowsmith case, however, supplies one possible rationale
for treating the discount payments on both fixed-price and contingent-
price purchaser obligations as capital gain. This approach may apply
whether the transactions are open or closed.28 3 Furthermore, if one in-
sists on distinguishing between fixed- and contingent-price contracts, it
is still possible to give capital gain treatment to the discount payments
on contingent-price contracts. This alternative analysis treats all sales
transactions involving contingent-price purchaser obligations as open
unless they are eligible for section 453's installment method.28 4
To the extent section 453 is available and elected, that statute gov-
erns both the character and the timing of the discount payments. If the
transaction is held open, basis is recovered before any gain is recog-
283. See text accompanying notes 237-40 supra.
284. See text accompanying notes 241-43 supra.
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nized; after basis is recovered, all payments become income when re-
ceived and maintain the character of the underlying transaction. When
the transaction is closed under section 1001, however,285 it is necessary
to determine the timing of the discount gain, regardless of whether the
discount is treated as capital gain or ordinary income.
To take a simple example, suppose a taxpayer sells property in
which his basis is $250. He receives a $1000-face-amount note, payable
at $100 per year for ten years, together with sufficient interest to avoid
section 483. Assume that the note has a fair market value of $500 in
the year of sale. If taxpayer does not elect under section 453, he will
have a $250 gain in the year of sale and, if the note is paid in full, $500
additional gain at some point from discount payments. Because his
basis in the note is now $500, the question is whether he can recover
that basis before reporting any discount gain or must rather prorate
each payment between return of. basis and discount income. Clearly,
this problem arises whether the discount is treated as capital gain or as
ordinary income. Of course, it usually arises only in cases involving
fixed-price contracts, because it is difficult, when the total price is con-
tingent, to decide what percentage of each payment is appropriately
termed "discount."
Many of the cases that have considered whether to require prorat-
ing the discount involved third-party obligations, either purchased for
cash or received on corporate liquidation, rather than purchaser obliga-
tions. However, for the purpose of deciding the timing of the gain, as
opposed to its character, this distinction is arguably of little force; in
either case the obligation may be considered to have been purchased, in
one case for cash and in the other for property.286 Accordingly, the
courts have developed a fairly uniform black-letter rule: the discount
on both third-party and purchaser obligations must be included in in-
come pro rata unless the obligation is speculative. 28 7 Whether an obli-
285. The transaction will almost always be closed under the approach suggested in this Arti-
cle, unless section 453 is elected or is unavailable as a result of contingencies that do not involve a
breach of the purchaser's legal obligations.
286. See note 216 supra.
287. For purchaser obligation cases, see, e.g., Riss v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 965 (10th Cir.
1966); Witte v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1137, 1142-43 (1972), remanded far/furherpro-
ceedings, 513 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Potter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 159, 178 (1965), acq.
1966-1 C.B. 3; Shafpa Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 283, 284-85 (1927). For third-party
obligation cases, see, e.g., Darby Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 551, 553 (6th Cir. 1963);
Willhoit v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1962); Phillips v. Frank, 295 F.2d 629,
633-34 (9th Cir. 1961); Smith v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 872, 879 (1967), affd in part andrev'din
part, 424 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1970); General Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH)
656, 662 (1967), aj'd, 401 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1968); Underhill v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 489, 492
(1966). Of these cases, only Willhoi, Phillis, and Underhill found that the obligations were suffi-
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gation is speculative is determined by the same basic factors that are
used to determine the value of the obligation-whether the debtor is
personally liable, whether there is a guarantor, whether the obligor is in
substantial default on payments due, the size of the discount, the ease
of marketability, the terms of payment, and the amount of security.288
Despite the formidable authority in support of this black-letter
rule, a coherent interpretaton of the statutory framework suggests a dif-
ferent treatment for fixed-price purchaser obligations as opposed to
third-party obligations. First, there is little logic to a test that deter-
mines the timing issue by reference to whether the obligation is specu-
lative. As discussed above,289 in the case of a fixed-price contract, any
discount from face may be considered a measure of the degree of spec-
ulation; the instrument might just as well be considered to have a lower
face amount and a higher express interest rate. Even after several pay-
ments have been made on the obligation-when, for example, the obli-
gee has received an amount equal to his basis-the obligation
presumably retains value that is at least potentially realizable by sale.
Thus, a $1000 obligation originally acquired for $100 may still be
worth $80 to $90 after $100 has been paid on it, while a similar but less
risky obligation acquired for $800 is still likely to be worth around $150
after $800 has been paid. There is no logical ground for distinguishing
these situations on the issue of basis recovery. One cannot say that the
first case is speculative and the second is not. Both are speculative,
although in differing degrees. While this difference is appropriately re-
flected in the amount of each payment that is includable in income-a
matter that is handled automatically by requiring that both be pro-
rated-it cannot reasonably be expected to serve satisfactorily as an all-
or-nothing test. Therefore, if prorating is required at all, it should be
required uniformly. As discussed below,290 the only rational basis for
an exception would be a purchaser obligation for which section 453
was either unavailable or unelected.
Second, the basic point of this Article is that isolated sales of prop-
erty should be taxed under section 1001 except when the installment
sale provisions provide tax relief. In other words, sections 1001 and
453 should be read together. The installment provisions offer signifi-
cant benefits, especially as compared with section 1001. The price the
taxpayer pays for these benefits, however, is that he must report all of
ciently speculative to permit the taxpayer to reclaim his basis before including any discount in his
income.
288. Underhill v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 489, 494 (1966).
289. See text accompanying notes 217-23 supra.
290. See text accompanying notes 291-93 infra.
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his gain, including that from the discount payments, pro rata. Section
1001, on the other hand, requires the taxpayer to include a sizeable
gain in his income immediately, though he has received little or no cash
with which to pay the tax. Because section 1001 gives the government
its main tax bite early, it is not unreasonable to ask the government to
wait for the rest. Especially since almost all sales transactions involv-
ing a fixed-price purchaser obligation can be structured to qualify for
section 453 treatment, delaying taxation of the discount seems a sensi-
ble quid pro quo. Just as the existence of section 453 makes it more
reasonable to treat the discount payments on a purchaser obligation as
ordinary income when reported under section 1001,291 the requirement
that the entire gain be reported ratably under section 453 supplies a
rationale for permitting recovery of basis before reporting such ordi-
nary income under section 1001.
Section 453 is unavailable, however, for reporting gain from third-
party obligations received upon the sale of property.292 These obliga-
tions are therefore more appropriately viewed as having been
purchased for their fair market value by the seller of the underlying
property. Discount payments in this case are difficult to distinguish
from interest,293 and because money is fungible there is no reason not
to require that this income be reported in a manner more natural than a
balloon payment at the end. Thus, while the amortization-of-discount
requirement does not affect the suggested interpretation of section
1001, that interpretation does cast light in the other direction and sug-
gests that discount be prorated on all third-party obligations but not on
fixed-price purchaser obligations.
3. Summary. Neither the traditional approach to taxing closed
transactions nor a requirement to amortize the discount payments over
the life of the obligation justifies retaining the current ad hoc approach
to the relationship between section 1001 and the accounting provisions.
Accounting-method concepts, quite simply, should play no role in tax-
ing isolated sales of property. Rather, difficulties perceived in the oper-
ation of section 1001 should be analyzed in conjunction with the
installment sale provisions under section 453. A strict either/or appli-
cation of these two provisions is the most rational interpretation of the
Code for isolated transactions, but this puts additional pressure on the
conditions under which the ameliorative installment sale provisions are
available. Absent statutory reform, the best way to relieve this pres-
291. See text following note 223 supra.
292. See note 191 supra.
293. See text accompanying note 223 supra.
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sure, which arises primarily for contingent-price purchaser obligations,
is to treat as open all transactions that cannot qualify for section 453
treatment because of the contingency.
C. Other Limitations on Installment Reporting.294
1. The 30%o Initial Payment Limitation. Upon an isolated sale of
personal property or any sale of real property, section 453 is available
only if the payments to the seller in the year of sale constitute less than
30% of the selling price.295 The original idea behind this limitation was
that the receipt of more cash in the year of sale would enable the seller
to pay the taxes due under section 1001. Therefore, the relief of install-
ment sale treatment was thought unnecessary. 296
In fact, the 30% rule serves no useful purpose. First, the 30% rule
prevents installment-method reporting in many transactions though the
seller receives little or no cash in the year of sale. Moreover, in the case
of fixed-price contracts, if the taxpayer consults his tax advisor before
culminating the sale, he can almost always structure the transaction to
satisfy the 30% rule without significantly diminishing the amount of
cash he receives or delaying those receipts for very long after the clos-
ing.297 Finally, the rule may even have a detrimental effect on govern-
ment revenue flow. Many taxpayers may delay receipt of funds that,
on purely commercial considerations, would have changed hands at the
closing, simply to insure qualification for installment-method report-
ing. Because the transactions then qualify, the government gets its
taxes later.
Nonetheless, the 30% rule is statutory, and its elimination requires
congressional action. As long as it remains in the Code, taxpayers must
be wary of the pitfalls298 that it presents. For our purposes, it is suffi-
cient to note that the 30% rule should not affect the suggested interpre-
tation of section 1001. In the case of fixed-price contracts, section 453 is
always available if the transaction is carefully structured. Therefore, if
the taxpayer falls into a 30% rule trap upon an isolated sale, he should
be taxed under section 1001 without any reference to his method of
294. Legislation has been introduced that would eliminate the 30% rule and the two-payment
rule as limitations on eligibility for installment reporting. S. 1063, supra note 260; H.R. 3899,
supra note 259. See text accompanying notes 259-61 supra. When and if this legislation is
adopted, the issues discussed in subsections I and 2 of this section will become moot.
295. § 453(b)(2).
296. See, e.g., Tombari v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1962); S. REP. No. 52,
supra note 37, at 19, 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) at 346-47; H.R. REP. No. 704, supra note 244, at 24, 1939-1
C.B. (pt. 2) at 572.
297. See generally Ginsburg 482-83.
298. Professor Ginsburg has done an admirable job of analyzing these pitfalls. See id 482-90.
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accounting. As noted above,299 contingent-price contracts are not pres-
ently eligible for installment-method reporting under section 453. Con-
sequently, the sales in these cases should be treated as open in the
traditional sense, at least to the extent of the contingency.
If the Service follows this approach and attempts to adopt new
regulations permitting installment reporting for contingent-price pur-
chaser obligations, it may have trouble incorporating the 30% rule. At
first glance, it might appear that the new regulations would define the
total contract price and gross profit, so that the 30% limitation could
rationally be tied to those definitions. The statute, however, only re-
quires that the ratio of gross profit to total contract price be ascertained
and that ratio may in many cases be much easier to define than the two
numbers independently5 °° One draconian possibility would be to limit
the initial payments to 30% of any fixed or guaranteed price under the
contract. This limitation would likely result in numerous unnecessarily
artificial delays in payment under the contract until the seller's tax year
following the year of sale. Such deferral of payment may seem ridicu-
lous, but it has the advantage of clearly satisfying the statutory require-
ment. If the Service were to follow an enlightened tax policy, it might
allow alternative approaches that would in all likelihood pass muster
under the statute.30 1
299. See text accompanying notes 241-58 supra.
300. For example, when the seller's basis is very low, there may be grounds for treating all of
each payment as gain and permitting recovery of basis only out of the final payment. See note 253
supra. Alternatively, in the case of a payment period with a time limitation, basis could be recov-
ered ratably over the period, with any excess in a given year treated as income. This approach in
essence skirts the definitions of total contract price and gross profit, but it could probably be
supported under the broad authority given to the Service to draft regulations.
301. In fact, if the ratio of gross profit to total contract price can be reasonably estimated,
either amount can in principle be calculated from the seller's basis in the property. As a simple
example, consider the case of a sale of unmortgaged property, with the selling price (SP) and the
total contract price (rCP) equal. The gross profit (GP) is equal to the selling price less the seller's
basis (B). If we are given the ratio (R) for determining the percentage of each payment that must
be included in income, then GP/TCP = GP/SP = R. Substituting GP = SP - B into the equation
GP/SP = R, we obtain the equation (SP - B)/SP = R. One can easily solve this latter equation
for SP to obtain SP = B/(1-R). The amount of payments that the seller may receive in the year of
sale without losing eligibility for installment method reporting could then be set at 30% of the
selling price calculated from this formula.
Interestingly enough, it is possible to use exactly the same approach even if the property is
mortgaged, whether or not the mortgage exceeds basis. The total contract price approaches the
gross profit as the amount of the mortgage reaches the seller's basis, and the total contract price
equals gross profit when the mortgage equals or exceeds basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1960).
Thus, the extent to which the property is mortgaged will affect the percentage of each payment
that must be included in income, and 100% of the payments must be included whenever the mort-
gage equals or exceeds basis. Nevertheless, although the definition of the total contract price
necessarily starts from the selling price and decreases with the amount of the mortgage, the selling
price itself is never affected by the existence of a mortgage. Therefore, we simply determine the
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In any event, until Congress or the Service speaks on the matter,
we must live with sections 453 and 1001 in their current forms. The
interpretative approach suggested in this Article is clearly consistent
with the statutory scheme. It assures that installment reporting or
open-transaction treatment will always be available to a taxpayer seek-
ing to avoid the harshness of section 1001. It is fair in the sense that
roughly similar tax opportunities will be presented to similarly situated
taxpayers. Further, these benefits are achieved in a manner that high-
lights some of the deficiencies of the current scheme (such as the 30%
rule) and thereby encourages administrative, and possibly legislative,
reform. Therefore, the existence of and the problems presented by the
30% rule should not be permitted to cloud the more fundamental statu-
tory interpretation issues.
2. The Two-Payment Rule. The Service maintains that a sale of
property for which a lump-sum payment is to be made in a subsequent
tax year is ineligible for qualification under section 453; at least two
payments in two separate tax years are necessary. 30 2 This position is
utterly irrational. Nevertheless, both the Tax Court30 3 and the Court of
Claims30 4 have upheld the Service on this point, on the ground that
"lump sum" and "installment" are contradictory terms. There can be
no policy justification for permitting one taxpayer who takes a minimal
downpayment in the year of sale together with a contract for a lump
sum in a later year to report under section 453, while denying that priv-
ilege to another who sells identical property under identical terms ex-
cept for the absence of a downpayment. In fact, the first taxpayer is
ratio R' from the regulations for the case in which the mortgage is assumed to be zero. (By
hypothesis, the regulations have a rational means of producing this ratio.) Our estimate of the
selling price is then SP = B/(l-R'). We then use the selling price so calculated to determine
eligibility for installment reporting under the 30% rule. Once eligibility is determined, the correct
ratio R for the actual problem, in which the property is subject to a mortgage, should be used for
the percentage of each payment that must be included in income.
Finally, even if the seller's basis has been reduced, for example, by depreciation deductions,
there is nothing wrong with using his original basis for the estimate of the selling price. What we
are seeking is a rational method for determining compliance with the 30% rule, and for this pur-
pose taking money out of the property through depreciation deductions from other income is no
different from borrowing on the property subject to a mortgage.
One approach that clearly should not be taken to the 30% rule for contingent-price contracts
is one based on the fair market value of the contract. This approach would leave eligibility for
installment reporting completely unpredictable and would be a frequent source of litigation over
value that, by its very nature, can never be measured satisfactorily. In fact, elimination of valua-
tion problems was part of the impetus for the original adoption of the predecessors of section 453.
S. REP. No. 52, supra note 37, at 19, 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. at 346-47.
302. Rev. Rul. 69-462, 1969-2 C.B. 107.
303. 10-42 Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 593, 596-97 (1971), nonacq. 1972-2 C.B. 4.
304. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1283, 1286 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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clearly in a better position to pay taxes under section 1001 because he
has actually received something in the year of sale.30 5 Fortunately, in
contrast to the 30% rule, the statute does not compel this interpreta-
tion.3°6 One can hope that the Service will reverse its position adminis-
tratively. More realistically, perhaps, the next time an unfortunate
taxpayer falls into this trap, the courts should reverse the ill-considered
judicial approval of the two-payment limitation. Section 1001 often
operates harshly, and Congress has attempted to provide a method of
relief that in general works fairly well. An approach that truly treats
section 1001 and section 453 as Congress intended-as the exclusive
but alternative methods of reporting gain from the isolated sale of
property-can only be expected to work if the two sections are inter-
preted in a manner consistent with their underlying policy: when the
taxpayer receives insufficient cash in the year of sale,30 7 installment re-
porting should be available to mitigate the harshness of section 1001.
The system is too complicated to expect Congress to come to the rescue
every time the Service puts up roadblocks. In the case of the two-pay-
ment i-ule, the courts need not even go to the extreme of importing an
independent concept like the open-transaction doctrine to induce ad-
ministrative action more in line with the statutory policy. They can,
and should, simply overrule the conflicting administrative position.
3. Interaction of Section 453 with Other Nonrecognition Provi-
305. For additional, similar criticisms of the two-payment rule, see Ginsburg 483-84.
Current section 453(a), concerning regular dealings in personal property, refers to "install-
ment payments actually received" as the payments to which the installment method of reporting is
applicable. Therefore, the position of the Service is that a single payment in a single year after the
sale cannot be an installment payment. Section 453(b), dealing with sales of real property and
casual sales of personal property, then refers to returning income in the manner prescribed in
section 453(a), the source of the two-payment rule for those transactions. The proposed legisla-
tion, see note 259 supra, would not expressly eliminate the two-payment rule for section 453(b)
transactions. It would do so implicitly, however, by defining an installment method especially for
section 453(b) and eliminating the word "installment" that now appears in the phrase "installment
payments actually received" in section 453(a). Thus, any payment under section 453(b) would be
taxed only in the year actually received, even if there is only one payment. Presumably, the two-
payment rule would survive for personal property dealings reported on the installment method
under section 453(a), although the policy basis for this distinction is not clear.
306. To treat a lump-sum payment as a single installment does not so offend the language that
we should permit irrational and inequitable results contrary to statutory policy. Moreover, section
453(b), which covers the sales at issue, does not even use the word "installment." It simply per-
mits income from eligible sales to be reported (admittedly under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary) in the manner prescribed in section 453(a). Section 453(a) does use the terms "install-
ment plan" and "installment payments," but those terms do not define the manner of reporting
the gain. One hesitates to rely on this type of technicality, however, because it concedes at least
the potential validity of the two-payment rule with respect to dealers who wish to report under
section 453(a).
307. Le, less than 30% of the selling price.
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sions. The general interpretation suggested in this Article-to read sec-
tion 1001 and section 453 as the exclusive either/or choice upon the
isolated sale of property-requires refinement when a special nonrec-
ognition section applies to the particular transaction. Nonrecognition
is allowed, for example, upon a transfer of appreciated property to a
controlled corporation under section 351; in a corporate reorganization
under section 368; or in an exchange of like-kind property under sec-
tion 1031. The law is at best thinly developed in these areas, 30 8 but it is
possible to make a few general observations on how the proposed inter-
pretation of section 1001 should apply in these cases.
When property is exchanged for other property, section 1001 usu-
ally requires recognition of the gain or loss realized. If no special non-
recognition section applies, section 453 is available in eligible cases to
permit variation of this section 1001 recognition. When a special non-
recognition section fully applies, however, new property is acquired,
usually with a carryover basis, and recognition of gain is postponed
until the new property is disposed of in a taxable transaction. There is,
therefore, neither any need nor any justification for forcing application
of section 453's installment method to the nonrecognized gain from the
sale of the underlying property. Rather, it makes more sense to wait
until the new property is disposed of in a transaction to which section
1001 would otherwise apply and then to ask whether that second dispo-
sition is eligible for installment reporting. The Fifth Circuit, at least,
appears to have adopted this view.309
More difficulty arises when boot is received in these kinds of trans-
actions. In most instances gain is recognized to the extent of the fair
market value of the boot.310 If the boot is a purchaser obligation, the
question is whether section 453 is available to report the gain and, if so,
how. The simplest approach is to break the transaction into two parts
and consider part of the underlying property as being exchanged tax
free and the remainder as being sold for the boot. Unfortunately, this
approach does not comport with the statutory provisions. It suggests
that the basis of the underlying property should be apportioned be-
tween the two purportedly separate parts of the transaction, but the
provision for full taxation to the extent of the boot is to the contrary.
Nevertheless, the basis of the property sold in no way affects the
method of reporting the gain, and this aspect of the nonrecognition
transaction can therefore usually be regarded simply as a special basis
308. Professor Ginsburg has briefly summarized the current state of the law. See Ginsburg
505-06.
309. Dennis v. Commissioner, 473 F.2d 274, 285 (5th Cir. 1973).
310. E.g., § 351(b).
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allocation rule. Thus, if the nonrecognition provision taxes the boot in
full, it is equivalent to finding that the part of the underlying property
deemed sold for the boot had zero basis. Section 453 should still be
available for reporting this gain, provided no more than 30% of the
boot consisted of property other than purchaser obligations.
This approach is clearly consonant with sound policy considera-
tions. As to the nonrecognized portion of the gain, the law deliberately
assesses no tax until a second disposition. As to the recognized gain,
however, there remains the question of whether sufficient cash or other
valuable property has been received with which to pay the tax due.
The policy behind section 453 applies with equal force to recognition of
boot in these transactions.311
D. Reacquisitions of Property.
The seller often reacquires the underlying property upon the pur-
chaser's default or pursuant to another condition of their agreement.
Reacquisition under these circumstances presents a number of
problems, some of which are unlikely to be resolved without statutory
assistance.312 One that could be solved administratively is the utter
chaos in the Service's theory and practice regarding reacquisitions fol-
lowing sales that are not reported under the installment sale provisions
of section 453. More difficult, perhaps, is the case of highly appreciated
personal property, such as corporate stock, gain from the sale of which
is reported under section 453. Reacquisition of personal property fol-
lowing a section 453 election represents a potential tax bombshell
under the current statutory scheme, and taxpayers should at least pause
before electing the supposedly ameliorative provisions.
1. Reacquisitions Following Sales Under Section 453. The reac-
311. Unfortunately, the limited existing authority seems to take a different approach. For
example, in Mitchell v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 953, 965 (1964), acq. 1965-2 C.B. 6, the court
upheld the Service's position that the value of like-kind property received in a section 1031 trans-
action was a payment for the purpose of applying the 30% rule to the purchaser's note taken as
boot in the transaction. See generally Ginsburg 512. It does not seem, however, that this decision
comports with the policies underlying either the nonrecognition section or the installment sale
provisions. In connection with the hearings on proposed legislation to simplify installment report-
ing, see text accompanying notes 259-82 supra, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation sug-
gested that it might be more consistent with the basic objectives of installment reporting not to
consider the value of like-kind property in installment sales. DEscRIPTION OF H.R. BILLS, supra
note 262, at 19-20. The Treasury Department agrees, at least in principle. Treas. Release No. B-
1758, at 18-19. Consequently, congressional reform may be forthcoming, although the problem
could probably also be handled through regulation or enlightened judicial decisionmaking.
312. On the general question of taxing reacquisitions of property, see, e.g., Abbott, supra note
216; Murphy supra note 216.
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quisition problem with the installment sale provisions arises from sec-
tion 453(d), which provides that when a section 453 installment
obligation is satisfied at other than its face value, gain or loss results to
the extent of the difference between the amount realized and the seller's
basis in the installment obligation. The character of the gain is that of
the underlying sale. It was settled fairly early that repossession of
property sold, coupled with release of the obligor, constitutes satisfac-
tion at other than face value.313 That is, section 453(d) applies to the
repossession, and the amount realized is the fair market value of the
property at the time of repossession.
An example will illustrate the enormous burden this rule can place
on a seller of highly appreciated property. Suppose the taxpayer has
long-term capital-asset property with a basis of $50. He exchanges that
property for the purchaser's promissory note, secured by the underlying
property, in the face amount of $1000, payable $100 per year (plus suf-
ficient interest to avoid section 483 imputation) beginning one year af-
ter the sale.314 If the taxpayer elects to report gain under section 453,
he will have no gain in the year of sale, and 95% of each payment in
subsequent years will constitute long-term capital gain. Now suppose,
however, that the taxpayer repossesses the property pursuant to his se-
curity interest in the next tax year, after the purchaser defaults on the
first payment. If the fair market value of the property at that time is,
say, $500, the taxpayer must recognize long-term capital gain in the
year of reacquisition in the amount of $450.3 15 He recognizes this gain
notwithstanding that he has received nothing in the deal and in fact is
in exactly the same position as when he started.316
Partly in response to a perceived threat that this section 453(d)
procedure posed to many businesses,317 Congress adopted section 1038
of the Code in 1964. Section 1038 applies by its terms to reacquisitions
of real property originally sold subject to a security interest in favor of
the seller. It essentially recognizes that the seller has only been restored
to his original position, and it taxes the seller on the reacquisition only
to the extent he has received pre-reacquisition money or other valuable
313. United States v. Eversman, 133 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1943); Boca Ratone Co. v. Com-
missioner, 86 F.2d 9, 10-11 (3d Cir. 1936); Eggerman Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 1196,
1198 (1937), acq. 1938-2 C.B. 10. These cases were concerned with the predecessor of section
453(d).
314. Inclusion of a downpayment would not change this analysis.
315. § 453(d). The taxpayer's basis in the obligation is its face value ($1000) less the amount
of income that he would return were the obligation satisfied in full ($950), or $50. § 453(d)(2).
316. Of course, his property has declined in value, but absent the sale and reacquisition, that
would not be a taxable event.
317. See S. REP. No. 1361, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1964), reprinted in 1964-2 C.B. 828, 833.
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property in amounts exceeding the gain reported prior to the reacquisi-
tion.318 Thus, if the property in our example is real property, the tax-
payer has no gain on the reacquistion, and his basis in the reacquired
property is what it was prior to the sale. For tax purposes, he is simply'
returned to his initial position.319
It is not clear why the language of section 1038 specifies real prop-
erty. Certainly there is nothing in the legislative history that indicates a
conscious intention to exclude reacquisitions of personal property, and
most of the reasons given in support of the section apply with at least
equal force to personal property sales: the inappropriateness of mea-
suring repossession gain by the fair market value of the property when
the seller is in the same position as before the sale; the difficulties inher-
ent in determining fair market value;320 the assessment of tax on appre-
ciation that has not yet yielded monetary return; and the desirability of
equal treatment in transactions differing only in technical details that
are without tax relevance.321 It may have been simply a less than care-
ful response to the Service's regulations, which for some reason have
always referred only to real property in connection with reacquisi-
tions322 but have on occasion been treated as applicable to personal
property as well.323 If so, it makes sense to extend section 1038, either
judicially or administratively, to cover personal property.324
318. § 1038(b).
319. Note that section 1038 governs only the amount and timing of reacquisition gains and
losses; their character, ordinary or capital, must be determined separately. Treas. Reg. § 1.1038-
1(d) (1967). The character of reacquisition gain after a sale originally reported under the install-
ment method is that of the underlying sale. § 453(d). For nonsection 453 sales, the Service has
maintained for some time that when title is retained in the seller or when title is transferred but
reacquired by voluntary reconveyance, the reacquisition gain is ordinary income, presumably on
the ground that no sale or exchange has occurred. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6 (1958). On the other
hand, when property is reacquired through foreclosure, it seems that the purchaser obligation may
be deemed sold or exchanged, in which case capital gain treatment will be available. Murphy,
supra note 216, at 822. It is difficult to justify distinctions that turn on such niceties. Abbott, supra
note 216, at 497-500; Desmond, Sales of Properly Under the Deferred-Payment Method, 32 TAXEs
40, 47 (1954); Murphy, supra note 216, at 822-23.
320. In fact, it is probably easier in most cases to assess the fair market value of real property,
for which the concept of a market is much clearer, than, for example, to evaluate the stock of a
closely held corporation.
321. S. REP. No. 1361, supra note 317, at 5, 1964-2 C.B. at 831.
322. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.453-5 & 1.453-6 (1958). Some of the earlier forms of these regulations
are discussed in Haley, supra note 34, at 319-20.
323. Abbott, supra note 216, at 497 n.26; Murphy, supra note 216, at 808; ef G.C.M. 1387, VI-
I C.B. 48, 50 (1927) (approved method for computing profit from deferred-payment sale of real
estate held applicable to sale of stock), declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307.
324. Dealers reporting under section 453(a) might justifiably be singled out for different treat-
ment upon reacquisitions, but nothing in the legislative history of section 1038 indicates that Con-
gress wished to do this. A dealer should usually be able to resell a repossessed item fairly quickly,
either directly at retail or through the second-hand goods market. Therefore, even if section
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Outside the context of section 453, this approach seems feasible.
There is neither statutory nor express administrative authority on the
problem.325 In fact, at least two cases involving a pre-1964 reacquisi-
tion of personal property sold without an installment-method election
came to results essentially indistinguishable from the result section
1038 would now achieve for real property.326 Nevertheless, when sec-
tion 453 is elected and the property is later repossessed, one is faced
directly with the clear, although harsh, language of section 453(d) and
the equally clear literal application of section 1038 only to real prop-
erty.
It is tempting to suggest that harsh results under section 453(d)
primarily occur only with real property. Indeed, personal property is
often so severely depreciated by the time of repossession that the reac-
quisition gain is low. This general analysis, however, misses the mark
in many cases. The stock of small but prosperous companies is often
sold by the founders at a very high gain. If the buyer is unable at times
to run the company well enough to make the payments, the value of the
stock may fall from the time of sale, but its value may still be well
above the seller's original basis when he reacquires it. Moreover, some
stock reacquisitions are the result of internal policy or management dis-
putes causing one of the parties to depart from the business, and the
reacquisition under these circumstances may not in any way reflect a
lowered value of the stock.327 Far fewer cases of reacquisition may in-
453(d) requires recognition of significant gain upon repossession, the dealer can probably either
realize that gain in cash or at least recognize a cancelling loss upon the resale. Consequently, most
dealers may be indifferent to whether the approach of section 453(d) or that of section 1038 is
used. Moreover, even if dealers should be excepted from the section 1038 approach, a different
rationale is necessary for isolated sales of personal property under section 453(b).
325. But see Held v. United States, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9678 (N.D. Ala. 1975). The Held
taxpayers sold corporate stock for a note secured by the stock. They exchanged the note for a
mortgage on real property and subsequently acquired the property upon foreclosure of the mort-
gage. The court held that section 1038 did not apply because taxpayers sold corporate stock rather
than real estate.
326. Lowe v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 363 (1965), acq. in result 1966-1 C.B. 2; Deatherage v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1410, 1413-14 (1964). The Lowe facts gave the court a rare
opportunity to clarify important points of law in this area. Unfortunately, the stipulations and
concessions of both sides (whether a result of inadequate understanding of the issues or conscious
strategy) led to an opinion so opaque in both its assumptions and conclusions that it cannot serve
as compelling authority. The case is discussed at length by Abbott and Murphy. Abbott, supra
note 216, at 494; Murphy, supra note 216, at 826-30.
327. See, e.g., Spencer v. Granger, 102 F. Supp. 205, 209 (W.D. Pa. 1952). In Spencer a third
shareholder-partner was brought into a business, giving a note in exchange for highly appreciated
stock amounting to one-third of the total stock outstanding. The seller reported his gain on the
exchange under the installment method, but he reacquired the stock two years later for what
amounted to a cancellation of the note, in order to effect a shift of corporate control. The court
found a gain under the predecessor of section 453(d) and approved a valuation of the stock that
was essentially equal to the original sale price.
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volve personal property than real property, and it will undoubtedly be
more difficult to generate the necessary political support for a legisla-
tive change. Nevertheless, this situation only highlights and certainly
does not justify the inequity of treating the two types of sellers so differ-
ently.
2. Reacquisitions Outside Section 453. The law is very unclear on
the taxation of reacquisitions after sales not reported under section 453.
Reacquisitions of real property are governed by section 1038 regardless
of the method of accounting for the underlying sale, although the char-
acter of the gain is determined on other grounds.328 With respect to
personal property, however, all one can say with any confidence is that
reacquisitions under section 453 may be painful; we simply do not
know whether things are better when gain is initially reported under
section 1001. The problem is that the only regulations published by the
Service covering reacquisitions outside section 453-not including
those adopted under section 1038-by their terms cover only real prop-
erty.329 These regulations provide that gain is recognized in the year of
reacquisition in an amount330 that depends on whether title to the un-
derlying property has passed. If title remains in the seller, the amount
of the gain is essentially equal to that determined under the section
1038 approach. 331 If title has passed to the buyer, the amount of the
gain is determined in the manner now fixed for section 453(d), which
looks to the fair market value of the property at the time of reacquisi-
tion.332
These regulations by their terms apply only to real property,333
and are now, of course, superseded by section 1038. Therefore, even if
they were applicable by analogy to personal property, as some com-
mentators have assumed,334 the appropriate analogy would now be to
section 1038 rather than to the obsolete regulations. Moreover, only a
few reported cases involve non-installment-method reacquisitions of
personal property following a completed sale,335 and in at least two
328. See note 319 supra.
329. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6 (1967).
330. The character of the reacquisition gain under the regulations is more complicated, see
note 319 supra, and only adds to the chaos of attempting to decide whether the regulations extend
to personal property.
331. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(b) (1967).
332. Id § 1.453-6(c).
333. Id § 1.453-6(d).
334. See sources cited in note 323 supra.
335. Considerable litigation has arisen on both the buyer and seller sides in the case of options
or defaulted executory contracts of sale. This litigation has frequently focused on the character of
gain or loss to one of the parties. E.g., Turzillo v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1965)
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cases the Service successfully pressed for a result contrary to the regula-
tions.336 At least on their facts, these cases hold that the reacquisition-
year gain should be determined independently of the fair market value
of the property, notwithstanding that title had passed.337 Therefore,
one can only speculate about the outcome of a case today, or even
about the Service's position in a new case.
The stage is clearly set for a complete abandonment of the Serv-
ice's old distinction between passage and retention of bare title. This
distinction has received almost universal scholarly condemnation,338
and even at an early stage it was subjected to judicial criticism. 339 Once
sufficient indicia of sale and/or transfer have occurred to trigger reali-
zation of gain or loss, the gain on subsequent repossession should not
depend on the formalities of the security interest pursuant to which
repossession is effected. If the law ever applied this distinction by anal-
ogy to personal property reacquisitions, there is no longer any support
for it in statute, rule, or regulation. The real property regulations on
which it was based have been superseded, and we now write on a clean
slate. This is surely no time to resurrect the distinction.
If it be granted that distinctions based on retention of bare title
should not govern the reacquisition gain, it remains to decide whether
the approach of section 1038 or that of section 453(d) should apply to
personal property reacquired subsequent to a non-installment-method
sale. There is a certain logic and considerable judicial authority34° for
the proposition that repossession, particularly in a subsequent tax year,
is a separate transaction from the underlying sale. Absent contrary
statutory authority, the principle of annual accounting for income logi-
(release of rights by optionee for consideration); Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner,
99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938) (optionor taxation), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939); Binns v. United
States, 254 F. Supp. 889 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (liquidated damages received by seller on default),
a.f'd, 385 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 273 (1968) (settlement re-
ceived by seller on default), aj'dper curiam, 418 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1969); Bihlmaier v. Commis-
sioner, 17 T.C. 620 (1951) (tax treatment of buyer on forfeiture of downpayment upon buyer's
default), acq. 1952-I C.B. 1.
336. Lowe v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 363 (1965), acq. in result 1966-1 C.B. 2; Deatherage v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1410 (1964). See also note 326 supra.
337. 44 T.C. at 372; 23 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1413. Neither Lowe nor Deatherage is express in its
holding, and as mentioned above, see note 326 supra, the Lowe opinion is very confusing. Never-
theless, the result in each case was that the amount of reacquisition gain was determined without
reference to the fair market value of the underlying property.
338. See, e.g., the sources cited at the end of note 319 supra.
339. Boca Ratone Co. v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 9, 11-12 (3d Cir. 1936). See also Frost v.
Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 190, 193-95 (1938) (Tyson, J., dissenting), acq. 1938-2 C.B. 12; Rev. Rul.
80-58, 1980-9 I.R.B. 16, 17.
340. E.g., Pacific Refrigeration Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 141, 142 (1943); Gillies
v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 570, 572 (1930).
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cally compels treating repossession as a new sale or other disposition of
the purchaser obligation. 341 In this case, however, section 1001 would
require measuring gain or loss by the fair market value of the property
received, which of course is the property originally sold in the prior
year. This line of reasoning thus leads to adoption of the section 453(d)
approach. The rule has the advantage of putting all personal property
sales on equal footing with respect to repossession, since the total gain
or loss, after all the dust has cleared and the seller has his property
back, is the same whether the original sale is reported under the install-
ment method of section 453 or under section 1001.342 Finally, and for
the purposes of this Article most important, adopting a rule that meas-
ures reacquisition gain or loss by the fair market value of the reac-
quired property in the year of reacquisition, even beyond sales under
section 453, would preserve the straightforward structure of sections
1001 and 453 that Congress intended. Section 1001 would govern all
isolated sales transactions independent of the taxpayer's method of ac-
counting, except insofar as the taxpayer has elected the ameliorative
provisions of section 453.343 The taxpayer could decide which section
to report under without worrying about differences that might arise out
of a future reacquisition: the results would be the same regardless of
his choice. Because predictions of future events are hazy at best, elimi-
nation of the need for them is surely helpful in tax planning.
341. Treatment as a "sale or other disposition" should apply even if the original sale was an
open transaction. For example, assume an open transaction in which the seller receives cash in
excess of his basis in the year of sale. Once that year ends, the principle of annual accounting
would generally forbid recalculating his income for that year, but it is equally true that, upon
reacquisition, his transaction with the purchaser is closed. He no longer holds the obligation, he
has the property back, and nothing more can or will ever happen with respect to the original sale.
Now, if we grant that this type of open-transaction seller realizes gain on the appreciated value of
the property upon reacquisition, there can be no reason for not requiring all others to do the same.
That another seller perhaps does not fully recover his basis in the year of sale is not relevant to
whether he should realize gain on the appreciated value upon reacquisition.
342. In the example given above in the text, the seller's basis was $50 and he sold for a $1000
face-amount note payable over ten years. As we have seen, his gain in the year of reacquisition,
when the fair market value of the property was $500, was $450, if he originally elected to report
under section 453. See text accompanying note 315 supra. Now assume the fair market value of
the purchaser obligation in the year of sale was $700 and that the seller did not elect under section
453. He would then have a gain of $650 in the year of sale and a basis of $700 in the obligation.
Accordingly, he has a loss upon the reacquisition of $200. His total gain on the deal would be
$450, exactly equal to that of the installment method elector. Of course, tremendous economic
consequences result from both the timing differences and the limited deductibility of capital losses,
but these are policy matters separable from the issue of whether both sellers should realize the
same total gain from the appreciation of the property.
343. As discussed earlier, another exception might be justified when eligibility for section 453
is denied solely on the ground of contingencies in the purchaser obligation. See text accompany-
ing notes 247-58 supra. However, this exception can be disguised by calling it an open transaction
and relying on section 1001 and the prior open-transaction law that has developed thereunder.
TAXING THE SALE OF PROPERTY
Nevertheless, the section 453(d) approach is harsh and incompati-
ble with the reasoning that led to the adoption of section 1038 to cover
real property reacquisitions. 344 The best solution is to amend section
1038 so that it expressly covers personal property feacquisitions, at least
those reacquisitions following casual sales. Failing amendment, how-
ever, it would be hard to quibble on equitable grounds with a court that
operated on the half-a-loaf principle and gave the benefits of section
1038 by analogy to a personal property seller when the court was not
constrained to do otherwise by section 453(d). The question then be-
comes what effect this judicial rule would have on the fundamental
choices involved in reporting gain or loss from the initial sale.
The closed-transaction seller would receive little benefit from such
a rule. He has already included the fair market value of the purchaser
obligation in the prior year's income. If he repossesses the property, its
value will probably be below the prior fair market value of the obliga-
tion, and the seller will have a loss in the reacquisition year.3 45 On the
other hand, an open-transaction seller potentially has a great deal to
gain. For example, in the case considered above,346 the seller's basis
was $50 and he sold for a ten-year note in the face amount of $1000,
but reacquired the property before any payments were made. If the
transaction is considered open, so that the seller has no gain to report in
the year of the sale, a reacquisition under the principle of section 1038
simply returns him to his initial position with no gain to report, while
the separate-transaction, fair market value rule gives him a gain of
$450. Consequently, judicial adoption of a section-1038-by-analogy
rule would place heavy pressure on any seller of highly appreciated
personal property to qualify the transaction as open in some way. Par-
ticularly if our suggested approach to contingent-price contracts were
adopted,347 one could at least conceive of a rash of litigation with re-
sults even more confusing and irrational than the current line under
section 1001-riddled as it is with irrelevant accounting-method princi-
ples and the almost metaphysical concept of ascertainability of fair
market value.
Until the problem is solved by amending section 1038 to include
reacquisitons of personal property, it is best simply to recommend uni-
344. See notes 320-21 supra and accompanying text.
345. Consequently, a complete adoption of section 1038 by analogy would even be detrimen-
tal to this seller. Section 1038 bars recognition of loss in addition to limiting the recognition of
gain upon reacquisitions. § 1038(a). Because the noninstallment seller of real property is faced
with this loss limitation rule, however, the analogy should be complete if it is to be used for
personal property at all.
346. See text accompanying note 315 supra.
347. See text accompanying notes 247-58 supra.
Vol. 1980:417]
DUKE LAW JO URVAL
form application of section 453(d)'s fair market value approach. It
would help to highlight the problem and thereby encourage prompt
congressional action. Further, the problems raised by the alternative
may be even worse. In any event, the reacquisition tail should not be
permitted to wag the entire sale-of-property dog. The number of re-
ported reacquisition cases is miniscule compared to the number of sales
cases. Moreover, reacquisitions pose a problem only in the case of per-
sonal property, while the confusion in the general sales area includes
all real property transactions as well. Consequently, this loose end in
the reacquistion area provides no ground for deviating from the sug-
gested resolution of the tension between the accounting and the sale-or-
exchange provisions of the Code.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current statutory scheme is amenable to a coherent and
straightforward interpretation of the accounting and sale-or-exchange
provisions of the Code. This interpretation comports with the apparent
congressional intent, gives meaningful effect to each of the relevant
statutory provisions, and permits sound tax planning by providing
fairly predictable results. Under the suggested interpretation, all sales
of property in the regular course of a business should be accounted for
by the taxpayer's method of accounting, except insofar as section 453 is
available and is elected. All isolated sales of property, defined as any
sales not in the regular course of a business, should be accounted for
under section 1001, except insofar as section 453 is available and is
elected. Under section 1001, the value of purchaser obligations should
normally be considered ascertainable. The only obligations that should
be deemed to be without ascertainable fair market value are those for
which section 453 is unavailable solely because of a contingency in-
dependent of the purchaser's legal obligations under the agreement.
While section 453 and section 1038, among other Code sections, can
undoubtedly be improved, there is no need to wait for reform before
clearing up the current confusion surrounding the interplay of section
1001 and the accounting provisions.
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